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ABSTRACT 
As home ownership in the UK housing market has become mature, economic and 
econometric analyses of urban and regional owner-occupier housing markets have 
become a long-standing concern of housing economists. 
This thesis defines a nested local housing submarket structure. The dynamic stock flow 
model with trade friction is revised and applied to analysing the local owner occupier 
housing submarket operational process. The short run and long run equilibrium and 
discquilibrium nature of a local owner occupier housing submarkct system are divulged. 
This model explores the submarket house price determinants and the role of housing 
submarket trade friction in submarket house price formation. The computer simulation 
reveals the relationship between the housing submarket structure and the system 
stability. The role of household housing choice behaviour in directing the system has 
been carefully demonstrated. 
On the premise of the utility maximisation approach, a behavioural model of regional 
household housing choice per housing submarket is set up. It is argued that the structure 
of the regional labour market determines household dwelling location choice. The 
influence of housing submarket marketability (defined as an inverse of the submarket 
trade friction) on household housing choice behaviour is considered. The family life 
cycle pattern of housing choice behaviour and the influence of household financial 
constraints on housing choice are also developed in the model. 
The empirical analysis is based on both Stated and Revealed preference information in 
order to overcome the dwelling supply constraint. The data is derived from the Lothian 
Region owner occupier housing market. The empirical results are compared with those 
of the existing housing choice models. 
The policy implications which follow from this thesis are then discussed in the light of 
the findings 
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 
I. I. Making Connections 
Whilst owner-occupation in the United Kingdom began to expand in the 1920s and 
1930s, since the 1950s, home ownership has become consolidated as the most important 
form of tenure. The proportion of owner -occupied dwellings has increased from 26% in 
1947 to 68% of the 1991 total stock of dwellings in the UK (Bacchin 1994). In the last 
decade, the research in housing economics has primarily focused on the owner-occupier 
mortgage finance system (Meen 1989, Maclennan & Gibb 1990). Recent attention has 
been given to the role of housing in the national economy (Maclennan 1994) and the 
regional structure of the national housing market (Meen 1994). However, there has been 
limited research on how a local owner occupier housing system is structured and 
functions. Therefore, the influence of local housing submarket structure on housing 
choice has been ignored although there is a large volume of literature discussing 
household housing choice behaviour (Boehm 1982, Quigley 1985). Maclennan & Tu 
(1995c) argues that this omission is important for at least three reasons: 
1. There is a limited body of microeconomics knowledge which can inform the 
development and estimation of local and regional housing models. The access space 
model derived from the standard, contemporary Walrasian synthesis of the neo-classical 
framework (See the discussion in Chapter II) has been dominating urban housing 
economic research. However, the distinct drawbacks (See Chapter II) of this model have 
limited housing economists in exploring the complex nature of the urban housing market. 
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The properties of housing variety, spatial fixity and durability imply that a local housing 
market is segmented and market trade friction exists inherently (see Chapter II). Previous 
research on local housing market analysis emphasises the estimates of hedonic house 
prices (Maclennan, Munro & Wood 1988) and the estimates the local housing demand 
and supply (Cobb 1984, Quigley 1985), but ignores the market structures and processes 
which underpin them. Clearly, a new approach aiming at exploring local housing 
submarket structure and its equilibrium / disequilibrium. properties is needed. 
2. There is limited research on intra-urban time series studies as opposed to cross-section 
studies. The dynamics and direction of submarket house prices are unclear. However, this 
is the key component of understanding area rise or decline, and it can provide important 
evidence for urban regeneration policy. The recently developed econometric time series 
technique, namely cointegration analysis, provides an empirical method to investigate 
housing submarket evolution over time. Therefore an explicit definition of the urban 
housing submarket structure is needed to underpin the analysis. 
3. It is at the intra-urban or metropolitan scale that housing issues interface with housing 
and land planning systems. Though some analyses (Bramley 1992) have examined 
housing supply-land planning issues, they have not developed dis-aggregated estimates or 
models of local systems. McFadden (1978), Boehm (1982) and Quigley (1976,1983, 
1985) estimated the disaggregate local housing demand. However, their work is either 
based on an individual dwelling or based- on a group of dwellings rather than on a local 
housing submarket and therefore, cannot provide direct information for city planning 
issues. In this respect, the estimation of disaggregate housing demand and supply on the 
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basis of housing submarkets is required. The research issues arising from these concerns 
fall into two groups: The structure and nature of a local housing market, and household 
housing choice behaviour within this structure. These two issues are further defined in the 
next section. 
1.2 Problem Definition 
Housing variety, space and time are not merely real dimensions of choice but also real 
dimensions of any housing market which may make the likelihood of an instantaneously 
equilibrating, perfectly competitive housing market rather remote. 
The variety of the housing stock arises from a number of different factors. Variety exists 
explicitly because dwellings are differentiated by dwelling type and size which may be 
enhanced by the consumers' needs and housing preferences. There is also inherent 
dimensional variety in that some housing is old and some is new, or housing may be 
more or less accessible to employment centres may be located in different neighbourhood 
environments. That is time and space are both inherent shapers of variety. 
The temporal dimension of a local housing market rcflects the dynamic nature of the local 
housing submarkets. In the short run, this is reflected by submarket housing price 
fluctuation around an equilibrium position. The physical dwelling attributes and qualities 
are assumed to be unchanged, and hence price fluctuation is caused by the change in 
housing demand and supply in each housing submarkct. Within any submarket at a point 
in time, there may be a dispersion of prices paid for a specific housing attribute 
3 
(Maclennan & Tu (1995 c). In the long run, this is reflected by both the price change and 
the housing submarket structure change arising from physical dwelling attributes and 
quality changcs. 
The spatial dimension of urban housing markets was initially given prominence in 
relation to travel to work time to CBD (Central Business District) employment (Muth 
1969). More recent econometric studies allow for multiPle household trade-offs in 
relation to a range of household activities, such as shopping, leisure (Quigley 1985), and 
a wider spread of activity location, for example CBD and multiple nuclei of suburban 
employment. Whilst this latter approach is critical in understanding the mosaic of 
residential location choice within an urban area, it is not enough. This is because space 
does not merely enter well defined preference sets and budget constraints in housing 
choices. It also potentially acts as a constraint in the actual choice process, and it does so 
because dwellings are spatially dispersed across the market (Maclennan & Tu 1995c). 
Adopting Lancaster's (1966) approach, housing should not be viewed as a homogeneous 
good, but as a collection of attributes (or characteristics). King (1976) identifies these 
attributes as Site related attributes, e. g. neighbourhood amenities or physical 
neighbourhood condition, and Dwelling related attributes, e. g. dwelling type, or size. 
Quigley (1985) argues that the complex nature of a dwelling gives housing choice three 
distinguishing features: the bundle of services provided by a dwelling is extremely 
heterogeneous; a consumer faces a large bundle of dwelling alternatives and selects one 
and only one dwelling from the bundle each time; the choice involves the selection of a 
4 
price as well as the other characteristics associated with the dwelling. Maclennan, Munro 
& Wood (1988) further suggests that the dwellings can be grouped into different product 
groups. 
For consumers, Maclennan & Williams (1980) assume that they are rational buyers with 
the axioms of completeness, transitivity, greed and satiation(see the discussion in Chapter 
V). Each buyer makes his/her choice as a maximum utility choice. The dwelling which 
he/she buys can bring him/her more utility as compared to any other dwelling. Therefore, 
a housing buyer has to undertake an extensive housing search over areas as well as over 
different types of dwellings in order to find the dwelling which he/she wants. The 
consumers are also as varied as the housing stock, e. g. they are differentiated by the 
family life cycle. They are capable of being aggregated into consumer groups. The buyers 
from different groups exhibit different housing search and choice behaviours. The 
existence of that segmented dwelling product groups and differentiated consumer groups 
implies that there is a matching process between buyers and sellers as represented in 
Diagram l(l) below. 
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Diagram I(l): 
The Matching Process of the Buyers and the Sellers In a Housing Market 
The Consumers in the Housing Market 
Consumer Group 1 F-Consumer Group 2 
il i2 13 i4 i5 i6 P i8 i9 .................. in 
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 
Area 111 Area 2 
The Dwellings on Sale in the Housing Market 
6 
dl d2 ... dlO dll ...... d20 d2l ..... d40 d4l .... dm 
Diagram l(l) provides a framework describing the matching process of housing 
transactions in a private owner occupier housing market. It is assumed that: 1. there are n 
individual (ii ... in) buyers, who are classified into two consumer groups, looking for 
dwellings; 2. there are m dwellings (di ... dn) on sale. These dwellings are located in two 
areas, and within each area there are two dwelling sectors identified by dwelling related 
attributes (which is in terms of non-spatial variety) since the dwellings are physically 
fixed. The matching process involves the buyers moving and searching over the areas and 
sectors. Each follows his/her own path (see the discussion in Chapter III)., During this 
matching process, within each product group, the number of buyers may not be equal to 
the number of sellers and the number of dwellings transacted is only part of the number 
of buyers and sellers in the market for any fixed time period. 
Two important features of the housing market can be identified from the diagram: first, 
the housing market is both spatially (neighbourhood) as well as sectorally (dwelling type) 
segmented into housing submarkets; second, housing demand and supply cannot be 
matched instantly, instead there exists trade friction in a housing market. Therefore the 
conventional market equilibrium/disequilibrium theory, which assumes frictionless trade, 
will not apply to the housing market situation. This raises two theoretical questions in 
housing economics: 1. can a segmented housing market with trade friction achieve 
equilibrium? and 2. what arc the market equilibrium and disequilibrium properties in such 
a market? 
The matching process also implies that household housing preferences may be the key in 
directing housing demand into different housing neighbouriloodAlousing sectors. Any 
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changes in housing choice behaviour may influence the distribution of total housing 
demand, thus influencing housing market equilibrium. This raises two practical 
a 
questions: how to forecast housing demand per housing submarket and how the housing 
submarket properties influence housing choice behaviour. 
The answers to the above questions constitute the three major objectives of the thesis. 
(a) To define a local housing submarket structure within which both the spatial aspect and 
the sectoral aspect of a dwelling are considered explicitly. 
(b) To develop a mathematical model which is aimed at describing the operational 
process of a local housing submarket structure. This model will explicitly explore the 
matching process of disaggregate housing demand and disaggregate housing supply, 
based on which, housing submarket equilibrium and disequilibrium properties can be 
derived. In order to simplify the discussion, a local housing market is assumed as demand 
oriented. Housing supply is assumed to be from dwelling vacancy with a fixed dwelling 
vacancy rate in the short run. 
(c) To develop a hierarchical housing choice model, through which housing demand can 
be forecast per housing submarket as well as by individual dwelling. This model will 
explore the link between housing submarket structure and housing choice behaviour. The 
discussion will focus on a regional housing submarket system. 
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1.3 Format of Thesis 
The thesis is conceptually divided into two parts: the 'local' housing system and its 
properties (Chapters 11 to IV) and forecasting household housing choice behaviour 
(Chapter V, VI and VII). 
Chapter 11 reviews the existing models in housing economics. The review covers a variety 
of models: the theoretical models concerning housing market equilibrium and 
disequilibrium properties; the national models concerned with forecasting aggregate 
housing demand, supply and housing price; the regional models which focus on the 
regional relationships in terms of housing demand, supply and housing price and the 
urban models aimed at forecasting disaggregate housing demand, supply and housing 
price in the urban context. 
Chapter III sets out the fundamental definitions used in the ensuing analysis. These focus 
on the definition of a dwelling; the link between a dwelling and a sectoral housing 
submarket and a neighbourhood housing submarket in the regional context; the definition 
of a buyer and the latter's place in the family life cycle and the definition of housing 
submarket trade friction. A buyer's housing search behaviour is categorised within the 
context of these fundamental definitions and this lays the foundation for the modelling 
approach adopted in later chapters. 
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Chapter IV sets up a revised dynamic stock-flow model with trade friction to analyse 
housing submarket equilibrium and disequilibrium properties. Based on the mathematical 
specification of this model, a computer program is implemented to simulate the housing 
submarket operational process. From the simulation results, housing submarket 
equilibrium stability properties are derived. 
Chapter V develops a conceptual framework for modelling the housing choice decision 
making process. The framework is based on the nested housing submarket structure 
discussed in chapter 111. It is suggested that a two stage, hierarchical model is needed to 
forecast housing choice behaviour per housing submarket as well as by individual 
dwelling. From this framework, a group of co-variatcs arc derived for the purpose of 
empirical testing. The discussion focuses on a regional housing Submarkets. 
Chapter VI discusses discrete choice probability model selection and the data collection 
procedures used in the research. The multinominal logit model (MNL) and the nested 
multinominal logit model (NMNL) are chosen to calibrate housing choice behaviour. 
Chapter VII presents the empirical results. 
Chapter VIII presents the conclusions from the research. It includes a discussion of these 
conclusions, the policy implications of the results and some future study 
recommendations. 
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CIIAPTERII HOUSING MARKET MODELS: A REVIEW OFTIIE LITERATURE 
2.1 Housing Market Model Classiflcations 
There exist a variety of housing market models and comprehensive classifications of these are 
given in O'Sullivan (1984) and Carruthers (1988). In terms of the focus of these models, they 
can bc classificd into two catcgorics: the theorctical modcls and the crnpirical modcls. 
Theoretical models which were developed in order to understand how a housing market 
actually works. Since the 1960s, urban economists have applied the neo-classical general 
equilibrium model to the issues of residential and urban structure (Alonso 1964, Muth 1969, 
Evans 1973, MacDonald 1979). Building on this, the access-space trade-off model was 
developed and this dominated theoretical and applied analyses until the early 1980s 
(Maclennan 1982). However, this line of development was de-emphasised as researchers 
began to take account of the existence of housing market trade friction. The conventional 
assumption of an instantaneous matching process between housing demand and supply in the 
neo-classical general equilibrium model is violated by the existence of trade friction. Instead, 
a dynamic stock-flow model with trade friction was developed (Snickars 1978, Weibull 
1983,1984, and Wheaton 1990). This provides a new framework for understanding housing 
market operation. 
Empirical models are aimed at providing housing market demand and supply information and 
offering explicit housing market forecasting. Most of these models are derived from the 
general equilibrium model, the utility or the random utility approach. These are three kinds: 
national models, regional models and urban models. National models assume dwellings in the 
market arc homogeneous and the derivation of these models arc either based on a market 
equilibrium or disequilibrium assumption. Although recently many economists have tried to 
reveal tile spatial interactions between the regional housing markets, regional models have 
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been subject to relatively limited development, especially for the U. K. regional private 
owner-occupier housing market. It is a very important aspect because the regional housing 
market is the link between the urban and national housing markets (see Section 2.3.2). Urban 
models have a variety of model forms and are typically based on the utility or the random 
utility approaches. 
Before focusing on a review of these models, it is useful first to introduce three dimensions of 
particular importance vis a vis a housing market, namely, space, time and dwelling type. The 
spatial dimension implies that dwellings are spatially distributed and house prices vary across 
the market. The temporal dimension implies that house prices may change dynamically. A 
dwelling is a complex commodity (Lancaster 1966) and can be specified, in a broad sense, by 
its related attributes including location attributes and neighbourhood attributes as well as 
dwelling structure attributes including dwelling type, dwelling size, and dwelling age. The 
need for an explicit definition of these dimentions is because the existing urban, regional and 
national models tend to differ in terms of their dimensions of specification as well as in their 
levels of aggregation. 
National models arc primarily concerned with the temporal dimension. Their theoretical 
foundation is based on neo-classical general equilibrium theory. Such models are almost 
compictely aspatial and aggrcgative. 
Regional models involve the three dimensions of a housing market identified above. The 
temporal and spatial dimensions together reveal the long term relationship between tile 
regional house prices (see Section 2.3.2). Tile dwelling type dimension has received limited 
attention at regional level. However it is important as, within a region, this dimension 
together with the spatial dimension can rcflect how the regional labour market structure 
influences dwelling location choice, therefore, shapes the regional housing submarke 
structure. 
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Urban models are primarily concerned with the role of space and dwelling type. The 
theoretical basis of such models is the utility or the random utility approaches which are both 
the powerful and flexible ways of formulating models of housing market behaviour. Some of 
the urban models develop the notion of space as a source of transport costs (i. e. land use 
model, see Section 2.3.3.1). There is also another type of urban models which uses statistical 
discrete choice models derived from the random utility approach to model housing choice 
behaviour. Most of these models have been developed in the USA and are more readily 
applicable to the form of housing market prevailing there (i. e. a high degree of private rental 
tenure and car ownership), but in the U. K., the market is the owner-occupier tenure 
dominated. 
The above classification captures most of the salient features of housing market models in 
general, however a closer analysis of these models within each classification is needed in 
order to develop a tractable model form appropriate to the regional analysis focused upon in 
this study. The remainder of the current Chapter presents an analysis and critique of these 
models. 
2.2 Theoretical Models of the Housing Market 
2.2.1 Neo-classical General Equilibrium Model 
The dominant theoretical framework for micro economics of housing markets is the standard, 
contemporary Walrasian synthesis of the neo-classical framework. In this framework, 
consumers and producers are assumed to be fully informed and fully rational and the system 
is usually regarded as competitive. Goods are also assumed to be homogeneous. They are 
either transportable to the market or capable of full descriptions within tile market place. 'File 
market. in which fully informed trading takes place, can adjust or clear itself instantaneously 
during the market trading period. 
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Applied this framework to a local housing market, the Access Space Trade-Off model (see 
section 2.3.3.1) is developed. The basic idea is that in the condition of market equilibrium, 
whilst travel to work cost rises with distance from the centre of a city, land price will fall. The 
total cost of buying or renting a dwelling is determined by both the individual's travel cost 
and the dwelling price or rent. Over the last 15 years, this model has been the dominant 
paradigm of international urban-housing economics research. A variety of application derived 
from the model have been developed which embody minor rather than major differences 
(Maclennan 1982). Some of these specifications will be introduced in Section 2.3. 
However it has been recognised that this model has limited relevance in explaining the spatial 
structure of a metropolitan housing market (Maclennan 1993) and the assumption of an 
instantaneous matching process of housing demand and supply may not hold due to housing 
search behaviour and the existence of a number of spatially and sectorally separated 
submarkets. The same type of dwellings located in the different neighbourhoods may have 
different prices. This means that the two neighbourhoods are within two different 
neighbourhood housing submarkets (Goodman 1981, Richardson & Thalheimer 1982, 
Maclennan, Munro & Wood 1988). Within one neighbourhood, the dwellings are 
differentiated by their dwelling types or sizes and have different house prices. This means 
that there exist several sectoral housing submarkets in a neighbourhood. A buyer has to 
undertake a housing search before finding a satisfactory dwelling from the spatially and 
sectorally distributed dwellings. Housing market trade friction happens. 
If the market clearing processes are incomplete or only partly informed and also capable of 
creating a new dynamic, e. g. the effect of rising real house prices on consumer and 
institutional beliefs, then the mainstream paradigm may throw out important questions in the 
process of making the model assumptions. In other words, the conventional neo-classical 
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framework in microeconomics leaves no room for frictional slacks and shortages in the 
matching of supply and demand. A new approach was developed and is discussed below. 
2.2.2 A Dynamic Stock-Flow Model with Trade Friction 
Market trade friction implies that, in a housing market, there may exist both unsatisfied 
demands and supplies, even in equilibrium. For example, suppose that in a housing market, 
there are 50 housing buyers looking for a dwelling and 40 dwellings available. After a time 
period, 20 dwellings are traded. Thus 30 buyers have not found a dwelling and 20 dwellings 
haveift been sold. This is because some buyers may need to do more housing search and 
obtain more information before making a decision, and they adjust themselves gradually to 
slacks and shortages. 
The essence of the dynamic stock flow model with trade friction is summarised as follows: 1. 
the dwellings are heterogeneous in terms of the temporal (differentiated by dwelling 
construction dates), the spatial (differentiated by dwelling locations); and the dwelling type 
(differentiated by dwelling structures) dimension; 2. the model postulates a matching process 
between the buyers and the sellers over time; 3. price movements are determined by the 
market, with exogeneously fixed price as one possibility. For example, the model can be 
cxtended to describe a housing market where there are private housing with free price 
formation and market trade on the one hand, and public housing allocated through a rationing 
system at administratively fixed prices on the other hand; 4. equilibrium is defined in terms of 
equality between the extra housing demand, supply and the amount of dwelling traded over 
time. 'Due to the trade frictions, there are generally simultaneous 'shortages' and 'slack' in 
all segments of the housing market, even in equilibrium'(Weibull 1983, Page 374). 
This model provides a useful theoretical framework in explaining local housing market 
operation. However, the application of the framework to a regional or urban housing market 
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has not been researched in the aspects of empirical specification of the model, the discussion 
of equilibrium stability as well as the policy implications of the model. In order to remedy 
these defects, a development and application of the approach is given in (Chapter IV). 
2.3 Empirical Models of the Housing market 
2.3.1 National Models 
National housing market models are generally based on temporal dimension. The data used 
are time series data at the aggregate (and hence aspatial) level. The model specification 
depends on the intended purpose, and is broadly classified into two types. The first is as a 
means of forecasting and normally uses a reduced form equation; the second is aimed at 
explaining the housing market mechanism and a structural form equation is generally used. 
However some reduced form equations have been employed in an explanatory role, so the 
boundaries are not distinct (i. e. O'Sullivan 1986). 
In a housing market, the general form of a national model is presented as: 
Demand Function DII = f, (Ph, Px, APh, APx, Y, ZI) 
Supply Function S11 = f2 (Ph, APh, Cf, Z2) 
Where: DII and SH arc the demand and supply for housing; Ph is the house price and AN is 
the house price change; Px is the price of all other goods; Y is the income level; Z, is the 
financial availability on the demand side, Cf is the cost of input factors and Z2 is the financial 
availability on the supply side. For simple reason, subscript T representing time is omitted 
from the model. 
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From this common framework a number of models have been developed both in the U. K. and 
the USA based on different principles (Whitehead 1974, Artis, Kiernan & Whitley 1975, 
Hadjimatheou 1976, Nellis &Longbottom 1981, O'Sullivan & Drake 1993). The models not 
only vary in their treatment of house price endogeneity, their stock or flow specification, and 
their equilibrium or Disequilibrium formulation, but also vary in their employment of 
different statistical techniques. In terms of the latter, there are two typical national models. 
One employs the partial adjustment principle; the other employs the error correction 
methodology (ECM). 
The studies by Whitehead (1974), Artis, Kiernan & Whitley (1975) and Hadj imatheou (1976) 
all incorporate the partial adjustment principle when modelling the demand side of the UK 
housing market in terms of either partial adjustment of demand for the stock of owner- 
occupier housing, or for the flow of new housing into the market. The basic partial 
adjustment principle is shown below: 
X, -X, -l=ý(X*, -X, -l) (0: 5ý-. 51) 
where; Xt is the existing stock at time t. -*X*, is the optimal value of the stock concerned, 
which represents the long term trend and 9 is assumed as an adjustment parameter being 
independent of short run economic influence. However, this assumption is highly 
unsatisfactory in reality because the term 9, in general, is a variable influenced by both the 
short term and long term economic environment, not just a parameter. 
Nellis & Longbottorn (1981) and O'Sullivan (1986) both develop a reduced form model of 
house price determination incorporating the ECM approach. In their models, short term house 
price dynamics is adjusted by an error correction term. The basic principle is: 
APh, =cc* AX, - P* (Ph, -i -Ph*, - i) 
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Where; A is the difference; cc and P are parameters; Xt is a vector of social economic 
variables and Ph*t., represents the long tem trend of house price. In their models, the error 
correction tenn is proved to be significant. 
After the mid 1980s, the time series Cointegration methodology was developed (See Section 
2.3.2). The cointegrated error correction model is developed, and then, widely accepted as a 
time series forecasting model. Drake (1993) uses the Johansen technique (Johansen 1988) of 
Cointegration analysis to estimate a parsimonious dynamic error correction model for UK 
house prices. His study derives a long term equilibrium relationship for the determination of 
UK house price and then based on it, he develops a short-run dynamic model of UK house 
price. The results indicate that in the long term, real personal disposable income is a very 
important driving force behind fluctuations in UK house prices with real mortgage rate and 
private sector house start having more modest influences. In the short term, however, it is the 
lagged changes in both private sector house start and house price which drive short term 
fluctuations in UK house price. 
Nevertheless national models are generally parsimonious in terms of data requirements and 
tractable in its explicit formulation of the elasticities and are therefore the valuable models in 
exploring the temporal housing market operation at macro level. 
2.3.2 Regional Models 
Within the housing market modelling literature, analysis at regional level is a relatively 
undeveloped area. Ilowcver some models, mostly developed after the mid 1980s and aimed 
particularly at the regional level of aggregation, do exist. These models mainly focus on 
explaining regional housing market interaction. A brief review of these models are given 
below. 
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Carruthers (1988) develops an equilibrium model of the Scottish housing market using 
mainly 1981 Census data on 56 administrative districts within Scotland. This is a cross- 
sectional analysis. The theoretical model is summarised below: 
Demand Function DH=-A*Ph+X, *Ml 
Supply Function SH=B*Ph+X2*M2 
Price Function APh=r*(DH-SH) 
Where: DII, SH are n* I vectors of quantities demanded and supplied respectively at the 
prevailing n* I price vector Ph; A, B are n*n matrices of slope coefficients (elasticities in the 
log linear model); XI, X2 are n*k exogenous variables; r= n*n matrix of market adjustment 
speeds; Mi. M2 are k*n exogenous variable coefficients; 'n' is the sample size, here 'n' is 
equal to the total number of districts within Scotland and k is the number of exogenous 
variables considered. 
Matrix A represents spatial demand substitution in response to the relative (spatial) price 
changes between the districts and matrix B represents the substitution in production of 
housing in different districts in response to price changes throughout the districts. 
Matrix r reflects price changes responding to market conditions and particularly the 
behaviour of housing market professionals who are assumed to act as Walrasian auctioneers. 
This means that the housing market professional can correctly assess the degree of excess 
demand or supply prevailing in his own area and adjust price recommendations as 
appropriate. For example, if r is diagonal, the implication is that each area has its own speed 
of adjustment independent of other areas. 
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The empirical application of this regional model gives a number of results which have proved 
fruitful for this research. The results show that spatial models fit better than aspatial models. 
First, spatial effects are strong at the inter-district level in the Scottish housing market. 
Second, the Scottish housing market displays a high degree of interdependence between 
various subcategorises of demand and supply. Third, this interdependence is dynamically 
stable, but the fact that such an equilibrium is tractable in the Scottish housing market does 
not readily generalise the model to the rest of the U. K. which has a different legal framework 
and structure of economic activity. 
The second type of regional model focuses on both the temporal and the spatial dimensions of 
a regional housing market, the so-called Cointegration analyses of regional housing prices. 
Such models are aimed at explaining the dynamics of interregional house prices. For 
example, if there is a stable long-run equilibrium relationship between the regional housing 
prices or if there is a segmentation of house prices in Britain (MacDonald & Taylor 1993, 
Alexander & Barrow 1993 and Meen 1994). 
Briefly, Cointegration analysis includes three parts: integration analysis, which is developed 
to test if a time series is a stable one; Cointegration analysis, which is developed to test if a 
group of time series variables have a long term equilibrium relationship; and error correction 
model, which is developed to estimate an econometric forecasting model capturing both long 
term trend as well as short term dynamics. It has been proved that the necessary and sufficient 
condition of two variables have an error correction representation is the two time series are 
cointegrated (see Charemza & Deadman 1992). 
Based on this technique, Alexander & Barrow (1993), Macdonald & Taylor (1993), Holmans 
(1990) and Ilamnett (1988) give empirical evidence that South East and Greater London are 
the most dynamic regions in terms of housing transactions. South West and East Anglia are 
following the changes of South East and Great London house prices. West and East Midlands 
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as well as York are further lagged of the changes of South East and Great London. North and 
North West are relatively independent of South East house price change. Scotland, Wales and 
North Ireland are even more independent. The gap between North and South is widening with 
a tendency also for price movements in the South to lead those in the Midlands and the North. 
Meen (1994) has found and tested that spatial interaction is potentially important in UK 
housing markets. He argues that if spatial heterogeneity is important, then typically 
aggregation conditions will not hold and we can expect parameter bias and predictive failure 
from aggregate time-scries relationships. His paper also throws light on the issue of how to 
define a housing market. Under his approach, a market should be defined on the basis of sub- 
markets, where different model coefficients may exist. 
Muelibauer & Murphy (1994) also finds out the income elasticity of demand for housing on a 
regional basis is around 2. Thus a 10% income differential implies a 20% house price 
differential between the regions. 
Both of these regional models suffer the same limitation of ignoring the existence of the 
dwelling type dimension within in a regional housing market, for example, the inter-link 
between regional labour market and regional housing market lacks of empirical evidence, 
particularly, household housing choice behaviour in a regional context is still unclear. 
2.3.3 Urban Models 
Urban models can be classified into three types: 
0 Land use models and segmented market models 
0 Simulation models 
0 Disaggregatc choicc modcls 
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2.3.3.1 Land Use and Segmented Housing Market Models: 
The essence of these two models is that all employment is located in the central business 
district (CBD) and that work place position dominates the household choice of a dwelling 
location. Space is considered as a transport cost. Utility maximisation is the theoretical 
foundation for both modelling approaches (Alonso 1964,1978). 
The land use model assumes that housing market is in the long run equilibrium. The price of 
a unit of dwelling service is only determined by the distance from the CBD (central business 
district). This is facilitated by the assumption that the dwelling choice set is continuous in 
terms of the distance. The model implies that a household will locate where the saving in 
transport cost from locating marginally closer to the centre is just balanced by the additional 
housing expenditure which will be incurred. 
The segmented housing market model presents that housing choice is dominant by the 
housing characteristics or attributes. Utility can be described as deriving from the 
fundamental attributes which an individual chooses by constructing combinations of available 
goods so as to maximise utility. The drawback here is that dwelling units are available in 
discrete (not continuous) service units (e. g. a kitchen is a discrete service unit) which 
necessarily precludes most households from owning more than one unit. 
Both models share the main drawback in that they assume the locating households are 
immigrants to the urban area and can costlessly locate anywhere; this entails the further 
assumption that the locating household's decision is in no way dependent on its prior 
residence. Such an assumption is clearly inconsistent in the presence of housing search 
behaviour and housing market trade friction. 
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2.3.3.2 Simulation Models 
Disaggregate households as well as house types considerably increase the complexity of 
housing market analysis and make it more difficult to define the long run equilibrium 
properties. Simulation models are designed to incorporate such complexity and view the 
essence of housing market problem as the allocation of the households to the dwellings, and 
obtain a solution within an explicitly temporal framework. The most famous simulation 
models are the Ul model (Urban Institute) and the NBER model (National Bureau of 
Economic Research). Both were designed for the mainly rental housing market in the U. S. A. 
and have been used there for many years. 
The Ul model developed by De Leeum & Struyk (1976) is an equilibrium model. The 
demand side, a group of households who are seeking dwellings, is classified by race, age and 
income. The supply side is classified into three groups: 1. owners of existing dwellings; 2. the 
government; 3. construction companies. The dwellings are characterised by the'quantity of 
housing services supplied. The housing service assumption and household housing choice are 
made with respect to the available price-quantity configurations as well as the characteristics 
of the zone in which a dwelling is located. The characteristics are accessibility, race and the 
average net rent per dwelling, the latter two being endogenous. The model generates a series 
of prices giving the distribution of prices per unit of housing services for a variety of 
structures representing the quantity of housing services. Such a distribution is termed a price- 
structure curve. It is used to simulate exogenous effects such as an increase in construction 
costs, a decline in population growth, a housing allowance programme and new construction 
subsidies. 
As an indicator of long run trends, the UI model remains an important contribution to the 
study of housing market dynamics. The most important feature of the Ul model is its 
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consideration of the matching between the disaggregate housing demands and supplies. 
However, the main criticism about the model is its assumption of market equilibrium. 
The NBER model is more complex (Ingram & Ginn 1972). It consists of a series of 
submodels e. g. movers submodel, vacancy submodel. The most noticeable difference 
between the NBER model and the Ul model is the treatment of the economic base. The 
NBER assumes that employment location is a fundamental constraint on residential location 
(the implication in the NBER model being that all the residents in one zone work in the same 
place), whereas the UI model imposes exogenous trend costs, e. g. the transport cost, for each 
residential zone. Because of the assumption of workplace dominance in the NBER model, the 
first step in the simulation process is the employment location submodel, which describes 
how and what kind of employment location a mover is going to choose. Then, on the demand 
side, movers are generated by the application of historical mobility rates to household class 
(mover submodel), and this is subsequently modified by workplace specific alteration 
(employment location model). A mover chooses house type first and then residential location 
on the basis of minimisation of travel to work costs (demand allocation model). 
On the supply side, houses come from three sources. Vacancies are created by movers, out- 
migrants and income/household specific changes in occupancy rates (vacancy submodel). 
Supply can also change via changes in the quality level (filtering submodel), e. g. natural 
depreciation of a house or conscious upgrading by owners and finally, new house supply is 
created by government and construction companies (supply submodel). 
The last stage in the process, the market clearing submodel, carries out a variety of 
accounting procedures (e. g. updating the pattern of worktrips). For the purpose of achieving 
market clearing, households can substitute locations according to previous prices, but not 
house types. In practice, there is no one to one allocation of households to houses. Excess 
demands (unallocated households) are carried forward to the next period and expected prices 
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are updated for the next iteration (each iteration happens after one year). Thus the equilibrium 
to which the model tends is a moving target. 
These models are designed however for a mainly rental housing market, but in the UK the 
owner-occupier housing market dominates, rendering the applicability of the above models 
highly problematic in the UK context. 
2.3.3.3. Disaggregate Housing Choice Models 
The assumption of the disaggregate housing choice model is that whilst a variety of factors 
may be important in determining the likelihood of any one individual making a particular 
choice, the relationship between the explanatory variables and the choice probability is non- 
linear. Statistical discrete choice models derived from the random utility approach are 
commonly used. From the work of McFadden (1973,1974,1976a, 1976b, 1976c, 1978,1979, 
1980,1982,1984,1986), a variety of empirical housing choice models have been derived. A 
critical review of these models is given below. 
Struyk (1976) examines the tenure choice process and points out that tenure is important in 
housing analysis because of housing's dual role as an investment and as a consumption good. 
There exists interdependence between the owner and rental housing market since both 
compete for housing services whilst only the owner's demand can be viewed as partly for 
investment purposes. 
Li (1977) successfully uses a logit model to examine all possible multidimensional 
interaction effects of homeownership, e. g. the interaction between age of the head of 
household and homeownership, and income or budget influences on homeownership. The 
research shows that, of the three variables, age of household head, income and family size, 
age has the strongest non-linear and positive relationship with homeownership and family 
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size has the weakest non-linear and positive relationship with it. Of the interaction terms, the 
coefficients of income-family size interaction and age -family size interaction are both 
statistically significant. 
Jones (1978a) examines the sequential nature of the residential-mobility decision making 
process in the UK. A two stage model is considered: the decision to move and the choice of 
tenure. He finds that life-style and demographic factors have stronger influence on the change 
of tenure by moving than on the decision to move. The age of the head of the household is 
generally the most important discriminator. 
Kent (1985) gives some time series evidence on housing tenure choice. He indicates that the 
expected return from owner-occupied housing is an important determinant of tenure choice 
and the UK housing subsidy programs have had substantial effects on tenure choice. 
Research on the housing market which only focuses on tenure choice analyses is too limited. 
Buying a dwelling also involves a choice of the dwelling and a choice of the related 
ncighbourhood attributes. 
King (1980) argues, however, that households' choice of tenure and demand for housing 
services are a joint decision. Ile points out that it appears important to allow preferences to be 
distributed across the population. This implies that there is a distribution of price elasticities 
of demand across consumers which is both interesting in itself and significant for an analysis 
of the welfare gains and losses from housing subsidies and tax policy. 
Kent (1983) points out there are three distinct decisions pertaining to the demand for housing: 
1. household formation ; 2. tenure choice, and 3. how much housing to consume, given 
household formation and tenure choice. 
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Quigley (1976) estimates a conditional Multinominal logit model to analyse housing choices. 
He points out the distinction between the service price and the gross price which is influenced 
by travel to work cost. He then estimates the model with the sample split by income and 
family size, with the relative likelihood of anyone choosing a house type as a function of 
travel to work cost, neighbourbood dwelling density, size, (rooms), quality (age), availability 
and the relative price of each house type. Quigley's work shows that it is unwise to ignore 
house types and the effects of travel to work costs on choice, but the main drawback is that 
the model is based on samples which are renters, so the results cannot be generalised to an 
owner occupier housing market. 
Louviere (1979) explores the potential for estimating individual utility function in housing 
choice and for testing the differences between the utility coefficients as a function of 
interpersonal factors. Ile concludes that it is possible to estimate individual choice functions 
for the general population and that these functions can include a fairly large number of 
housing attributes, at least 13 and probably as many as 20-25, using stated preference 
experimental design. However such design may bring some biases into the model because of 
the possibility of an individual over or under estimating his/her demand for housing services. 
This is addressed later in this study. 
Boehm (1982) argues that house type choice and tenure choice cannot be treated 
independently. He views tenure, size and quality choices as occurring within a'hierarchy' of 
choices. A consumer is viewed as making the tenure choice first. The order in which the 
subsequent choices is made is conditional on the tenure choice, and will vary between 
individuals. fie classifies the model into three hierarchies, the first is tenure choice, the 
second is quality choice and the third (lowest in the hierarchy) is size choice. Each hierarchy 
is treated as dichotomous (binary logit ), therefore, eight possible housing choices arc created. 
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Borsch-Supan (1986) specifies and estimates a nested logit model of housing demand which 
includes the decision of individuals to form an independent household. Parameter estimation 
reveals a considerable response of headship rates not only to income but also to housing 
prices. fie points out that analysis of housitig policies ignoring the endogeneity of household 
formation is thus potentially biased. 
Quigley (1985) develops a nested logit model of a limited number of alternatives to estimate 
household choice of dwelling, ncighbourhood and public services. He points out three 
distinguishing features of housing choice. First, in almost all cases, a consumer selects one 
and only one good out of a large population of alternatives; 2. the bundle of services provided 
by any dwelling is extremely heterogeneous; 3. consumer choice involves the selection of a 
price as well as other characteristics associated with dwellings. From the statistical point of 
view, his model is a type of nested logit model which is designed to avoid the axiom of 
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) implied by the traditional Multinominal logit 
model (This is discussed in Chapter VI). He argues that the axiom is inappropriate in many 
situations involving the choice of housing and neighbourhood characteristics. In this model, 
McFadden's sampling rule (McFadden 1978) is introduced into the model to reduce the 
number of alternatives at each level of the nested logit model. This, to some extent, 
overcomes the practical problem in maximising the log-likelihood function of a nested logit 
model due to the large number of alternatives in housing choice. From the economic point of 
view, the model also provides a good framework to consistently examine household 
preferences for dwelling structure attributes, neighbourhood attributes as well as public 
services. However, the main criticisms of the model are that some arguments are not 
theoretically consistent. 1. The precondition of McFadden's sampling rule adopted by this 
model is that choice behaviour is assumed to satisfy the axiom of IIA implied by the 
traditional multinominal logit model. f lowever, the model developed in this paper is based on 
the argument of the invalidation of the IIA axiom in a housing choice case. 2. In the real 
world, a dwelling is only rejected once when a household makes a choice. But in this model, 
28 
a dwelling is assumed to be rejected three times separately at the stage of town choice, 
neighbourhood choice and dwelling choice. 
Blackley & Ondrich (1988) develops a limiting joint-choice model for discrete and 
continuous housing characteristics. They point out that household utility depends on three 
characteristics of housing: a discrete number of bedrooms and continuous measures of 
housing quality and distance from the central business district. For this reason the traditional 
Multinominal logit models and nested logit models which have been used to analyse 
polychotomous discrete choices are not applicable when utility is a function of both discrete 
and continuous choice variables. Instead the empirical results show that a simultaneous 
discrete and continuous random utility model within the GEV (General Extreme Value) 
framework is the most suitable model in modelling housing choice. However the argument of 
the model is based on the assumption that housing quality can be measured as a continuous 
variable. In fact it is very difficult to find a suitable indicator representing housing quality. An 
inaccurate measurement of dwelling quality may cause estimation bias. 
The main advantage of using hierarchical or nested models is the ease of interpretation since 
the decisions in each hierarchy are treated as separate and the independence from irrelevant 
alternatives assumption used in the traditional multinominal logit model can be avoided. 
However, this does not imply that a hierarchical model is superior to the traditional MNL 
model. Further discussions about the properties of discrete choice models will be given in 
Chapter VI. 
Four disadvantages shared by the above models are discussed below. 
1. These models lack economic underpinning. They do not give a clear explanation of the 
possible interaction between household housing choice behaviour and housing market 
operation. 
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2. The existence of housing submarkcts and the differences of the submarkets, e. g. submarket 
house price, submarket trade friction, may influence housing choice behaviour. But the above 
models do not pay any attention to this relation. 
3. Most of the models focus on urban housing market. The basic difference of a regional 
housing market from an urban housing market is that, regional housing market covers more 
than one employment centres (generally, there is one CBD surrounded by several sub-CBDs), 
and urban housing market has only one employment centre, namely CBD. As the distance to 
the work place is recognised as an important factor influencing dwelling location choice 
(Alonso 1964,1978 and Quigley 1976), the shape of a regional employment distribution may 
be an important factor influencing housing choice behaviour, therefore, determine the 
structure of a regional housing market. However, previous models ignore this effect. 
4. Most of the hierarchical models assume a choice sequence, for example, Quigley (1985) 
assumes that the choice sequence is the public services first, then the neighbourhood, and 
finally the individual dwelling. However, different buyers may have different choice 
sequences and some may make their choice of dwelling related attributes simultaneously. 
Simply assuming a choice sequence in a hierarchical model is unreasonable. A crucial 
question is whether the sequence used in the hierarchical models has the same meaning as the 
sequence used in describing housing choice behaviour. 
A new regional housing choice model per submarket is needed to remedy the above 
disadvantages. The discussions of the new model are given in Chapter III and then in 
Chapters V to VII. 
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2.4 Two New Models 
Concluding the above review, we find that there are two gaps in micro economic housing 
research which need to be addressed. 
The first is local housing market operational process and its equilibrium and Disequilibrium 
properties in the presence of housing submarkets and submarket trade friction lack of 
research. The second is that little attention has been paid to disaggregate housing choice 
behaviour in a regional housing market. 
Therefore, two new models are needed to remedy the above defects. The first model (see 
Chapter IV) is a revised form of dynamic stock flow model with trade friction. In this model, 
the dynamic stock flow approach is applied to both a spatially and sectorally segmented local 
housing market, it is assumed that in a local housing market, short run dwelling supply is 
from the dwelling vacancy with a fixed dwelling vacancy rate; the influence of submarket 
trade friction on housing submarket equilibrium and disequilibrium is considered; the 
relationship of housing submarket equilibrium and disequilibrium. properties and housing 
choice behaviour is emphasised and finally a computer program is implemented to simulate 
housing submarket operational process and its equilibrium stability. The aims of the model 
are to fully understand a local housing market system and its properties. This model can be 
applied to either an urban housing market or a regional housing market. 
The second model required is a hierarchical housing choice model in a regional context (see 
Chapter V). This is a functional framework, on the basis of which disaggregate housing 
demand can be forecast per submarket as well as by individual dwelling. A group of 
covariatcs are derived from the theoretical framework to explain housing choice behaviour in 
a regional housing market context. In this model, the influence of housing submarket factors 
on housing choice behaviour is considered, and travel to work distance is considered as a key 
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factor influencing a buyer's choice of dwelling location. The multinominal logit model and 
the nested multinominal logit model are selected for empirical calibration of each model (see 
Chapter VI). The merits and limitations of the two models are empirically compared. The 
results are presented in Chapter VIL 
Before the two models are built up, it is necessary to define a local housing submarket 
structure. Although a plenty of research have proved the existence of local housing submarket 
(i. e. Goodman 1981, Maclennan, Munro & Wood 1988), the definition about its structure is 
still underdeveloped. Precisely defining a local housing submarket structure will provide a 
basis of understaning a local housing market. This constructs the content of Chapter III. 
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CIIAPTERHI TjIE DEFINITIONS OFA LOCAL HOUSING SUBMARKET STRUCTURE 
AND SU13MARKET TRADE FRICTION 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter defines the concepts used in the analysis later in the thesis. It was established in 
Chapter Il that there is a need to precisely define a local housing submarket structure. The 
definition can provide a basis of discussing and exploring local housing submarket 
operational mechanism. Section 3.2 gives the definition of local housing submarket structure. 
Section 3.3 presents the definition of a housing buyer and provides a comprehensive 
classification of the housing buyers in terms of their social economic backgrounds. Section 
3.4 defines local housing submarket trade friction. 
3.2 Local Housing Submarket Structure: a regional case 
3.2.1. Definition of a Dwelling 
Lancaster (1966) developed a new approach to consumer theory and gave a definition of a 
complex commodity. ' 1. The good, per se, does not give utility to the consumer; it possesses 
characteristics, and these characteristic give rise to utility. 2. In general, a good will possess 
more than one characteristic, and many characteristics will be shared by more than one 
good 3. Goods in combination may possess characteristics differentfrom those pertaining to 
the goods separately. I (Lancaster 1966, Page 135) 
The approach defines a complex commodity having more than one characteristic. Some of the 
characteristics are related to the commodity itself, some of them are the characteristics of the 
commodity as a group. Using this approach, a dwelling can be described as a complex 
commodity which has the following six characteristics (or attributes). 
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1. A person views the dwelling which he/she is going to buy as a bundle of characteristics, 
e. g. dwelling structure, dwelling size; it is the characteristics which he/she values, and the 
decision to buy one or another bundle (dwelling) is influenced by the relative efficiency 
(utility) of each as a source of supply of the constituent characteristics. 
2. Dwellings are unmoveable and spatially distributed. This property determines that the site 
characteristics, e. g. physical neighbourhood condition, neighbourhood amenities or 
neighbourhood school quality are the common characteristics shared by the dwellings located 
within one site. Choosing a dwelling involves a choice of these characteristics. 
3. Any one dwelling is different from another although they may have some common 
characteristics, like the same dwelling structure, or the same neighbourhood characteristics. 
The dwelling prices vary from one dwelling to another dwelling, and from one site to another 
site. 
4. Compared with most other commodities, a dwelling is very expensive. As a result, on the 
demand side, the household financial budget is the main constraint on buying a dwelling. 
5. A dwelling is a durable commodity with dual roles: consumption and investment. The 
consumption of a dwelling is different from consuming a chocolate bar because buying a 
dwelling is also a family investment. The value of the dwelling may increase or decrease 
depending on the changes in the site characteristics, the maintenance of the dwelling as well 
as the general house price inflation. As a result, the decision to buy a dwelling is influenced 
by the buyer's expectation of future housing price changes. 
6. The long construction time and limitations on land use of building a new dwelling result in 
a supply constraint for a buyer, whether seeking an existing or a new dwelling. 
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The multiple characteristics of a dwelling produces a severe problem in housing research, 
which is how to identify or measure these housing characteristics. King (1976) points out that 
a dwelling consists of four main characteristics: dwelling structure (structure), dwelling 
quality (quality), interior space (space) and neighbourhood quality (site). Each can be 
measured by a group of components. For example, the number of rooms or the quantity of the 
interior square feet are the measurable components of the interior space characteristic. In fact, 
the identification of the components of each characteristic depends on the data availability 
and the intended purpose, for example, it depends on whether we want to forecast the number 
of rooms demanded or the lot size occupied by a dwelling. 
Quigley (1985) identifies dwelling characteristics as: public services measured by school 
expenditures, percentage of non-white students in local public school and local public 
expenditures per household; neighbourhood attributes measured by the proportion of 
homeowners, median rent, travelling time or proportion of black households; and the 
dwelling characteristics measured by the dwelling structure, the dwelling age, the number of 
rooms and bathrooms. However this specification is designed for the rental dominated 
American housing market. In order to describe the owner-occupier dominated British regional 
private housing market, a new identification and measurement of dwelling characteristics is 
needed. The definition used here is developed from King (1976) and Quigley (1985). 
First, the dwelling related characteristics are classified into spatial (i. e. neighbourhood 
characteristics) and non-spatial characteristics (i. e. dwelling characteristics). Second. each 
characteristic can be described by a group of components. Some of the dwelling components 
are designed 'Key'. These are the components which can create significant house price 
differences between the dwellings. Some are defined as 'Non-key' components, which 
influence dwelling price, but in a secondary way. In Table 111(l) below, all components' 
examples are likely to be 'key' components, except for those contributing to the non-spatial 
characteristic: '5. Others'. 
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Table III(l) 
An Example of the Classification of Dwelling Related Characteristics and Components 
Characteristics Components 
Spatial 1. Physical e. g. physical dwelling 
(Neighbourhood conditions; appearance, green land 
Characteristics) 2. Amenities e. g. shops, cinemas 
3. School Quality e. g. num. of school 
leavers entering 
universities 
4. Marketability e. g. dwelling transaction 
rates 
5. Accessibility to e. g. road, bus 
the CBD or or train facilities 
the sub-CBDs 
6. Social security e. g. local crime rate 
Non-Spatial 1. Dwelling type e. g. house, flat 
(Dwelling 2. Dwelling size e. g. num. of rooms or lot size 
Characteristics) 3. Dwelling age e. g. year of construction 
4. Dwelling quality e. g. construction 
materials 
5. Others e. g. kitchen, garden 
or central heating 
An example of the average dwelling price differences in terms of the key dwelling component 
differences is given in Table 111(2). The data in the table show that the similar dwellings 
located in the different areas have significant different house prices. Different types of 
dwellings located in the same area have different house prices too. These differences of the 
dwelling prices originate from the different combinations of the key dwelling components 
between the dwellings. This implies that the choice of the key components is not only 
influenced by a buyer's housing preference, but also strictly constrained by a buyer's financial 
budget. 
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Table 111(2) 
An Example of the Average Dwelling Price Differences in Terms of the Key Dwelling 
Component Differences 
Overall Small Old Large New House 
Flat 
The City of Edinburgh 54783(481) 35432(111) 61934(103) 
Central Area 36228(137) 29661(62) 44102(11) 
Near to the 52731(169) 37984(13) 55241(59) 
Central 
Area 
Between the 62536(106) 44048(34) 67235(9) 
Central 
Area and the 
Suburban Area 
Suburban Area 84741(69) 51281(2) 84575(24) 
Data Source: 1992 Lothian Region household housing survey designedfor this study. (1989 House Price f). 
The number in the bracket is the sample size. 
Although the non-key components of a dwelling will certainly influence dwelling price, but 
the influence is not significant, therefore, the choice of them is much less influenced by a 
buyer's financial budget. For example, a case study from the survey shows that, the price of a 
two bedrooms' semi-detached house in Edinburgh with a large kitchen is E39000, compared 
with the price of E41000 of the same type of house with a small kitchen plus a separate 
dinning room. This case study shows that although these non-key components contribute to 
the dwelling price difference, the price difference is not as significant as the one contributed 
by the key components. 
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Unlike Quigley (1985), in this definition, the public services (referring to a town) and the 
neighbourhood attributes (referring to a neighbourhood within a town) are combined as the 
neighbourhood characteristics. The reason is that public services, like the accessibility to the 
CBD, and the neighbourhood characteristics, like the physical appearance of the dwellings, 
are both related to the spatial aspects of a dwelling. When a buyer chooses a place to live, 
both factors will together influence his/her choice. 
Unlike King (1976), in this definition, the dwelling components are split into key components 
and non-key components. This is because not all the components are of the same importance 
to either house price formation or to housing choice behaviour. 
The advantage of the above definition as described in Table III(I) is that it provides a 
theoretical foundation for identifying local housing submarket structure and for forecasting 
household housing choice behaviour. 
3.2.2 Definition of a Housing Submarket Structure 
The following definition is an extension of the work of Maclennan, Munro & Wood (198 8). 
Three concepts are introduced first: the hedonic housing price; the hedonic function, and the 
dwelling product group. The hedonic housing price is the implicit or shadow price of a 
dwelling component. Empirically, it can be measured by the coefficient of the component in a 
hedonic regression function. The hedonic function is a regression function. The dependent 
variable is the dwelling price and the independent variables are the components of the 
dwelling characteristics. The dwelling product group is a group of dwellings classified by the 
key dwelling components. The classification is completed both spatially and sectorally. 
Spatially, the dwellings in one neighbourhood form one neighbourhood dwelling product 
group. Sectorally, within each neighbourhood dwelling product group, the dwellings can be 
38 
divided into different sectors, e. g. small flats and large flats are grouped into two different 
sectors. Each sector forms a sectoral dwelling product group. 
A neighbourhood housing submarket can be defined to exist if there are persistent significant 
disparities in the hcdonic house prices of the non-spatial, key dwelling components between 
the neighbourhood product group and others. 
Where two dwellings in the same neighbourhood submarket have significantly different 
overall house prices, they belong to two different sectoml housing submarkets by definition. 
The dwellings within each sectoral housing submarket are only different in terms of non-key 
dwelling components, and the differences of their house prices are not significant enough to 
classify them into different housing submarkets. 
Diagram 111(l) shows a simple case of the connection, between the dwellings and the housing 
submarkcts. 
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Diagram 111(l) 
Nested Housing Submarket Structure 
This housing submarket structure is defined as a nested housing submarket structure. In the 
diagram, 'N' denotes a neighbourhood housing submarket; 'SS' denotes a sectoral housing 
submarket; 'D' denotes an individual dwelling. The advantages of defining structure in this 
way are as follows. 
1. This structure defined above reflects the complexity of a dwelling. The neighbourhood 
housing submarkets are formed through differences in the spatially fixed neighbourhood 
components and the sectoral housing submarkets are formed through differences in the non- 
spatial dwelling components. The differences between the dwellings in each sectoral 
submarket arise from the non-key dwelling components. 
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2. This structure presents a hierarchical dwelling supply framework, which provides a useful 
foundation for discussing local housing submarket equilibrium and disequilibriurn properties 
(to be discussed in Chapter IV) and household housing choice decision making process (to be 
discussed in Chapters V to VII). 
3.2.3. Regional Owner Occupier Housing Market 
The definitions discussed above can be applied to either an urban housing 
market or a regional housing market. In this section, an identification of a regional owner 
occupier housing market is given. This is because the discussions in Chapters V to VII will be 
based on a regional housing market as emphasised in Chapter Il. Therefore, the discussion 
below will provide a theoretical basis for the discussions in the following chapters. 
Geographically, a regional housing market area interacts with the regional labour market area 
(See Diagram 111(2)). The structure of a regional labour market can be described as: a main 
employment centre surrounded by a group of sub-employment centres. This main 
employment centre is usually located within the CBD, and the sub-centres are separately 
located within the sub-CBDs (See the dark points in Diagram 111(2)). This regional labour 
market structure is named as nu! ýJý-i structure, which is different from an urban labour market 
where there exists only one central business district. This nuclei structure shapes the regional 
residential distributions (See Diagram 111(2)), which is that, majority of the households live in 
or around the CBD forming a central residential area (CRA), the others live in or around the 
sub-CBDs forming the sub-central residential areas (Sub-CRA). 
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Diagram 111(2) 
A Regional Housing Market Area 
CBD 
-CBD C 
S ub-CBD 
Sub-CRA 
Sub-CBLT- 
Sub-CRA 
Considering a household in which only one person has a job, if he/she is working in the CBD, 
he/she can either live in the CRA by paying a higher house price and a lower transportation 
cost, or live in one of the sub-CRAs by paying a lower house price and a higher 
transportation cost. If he/she is working in a sub-CBD, he/she can either live in the sub-CRA 
by paying both a lower house price and a lower transportation cost, or to live in one of the 
adjacent sub-CRAs or CRA, by paying a higher transportation cost (in this case, house price 
can be either lower or higher). The choice depends on the household's preference. 
Hence the regional labour market area is the best approximate geographic unit within which 
to define the regional housing market area. One available approximation to an empirical 
definition of local housing market areas in Great Britain is the Local Labour Market Areas 
(LLMAs) of the Functional Regions Framework developed by Coombes et al (1982). 
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A general description of LLMAs is given by Coombes et al (1982): There are 280s LLMAs 
(34 in Scotland) across Britain. Each has its main urban centre, by which each is known. Each 
includes all contiguous areas which in 1971 supplied more commuters to their centre than to 
any other recognised centres. The level of self-containment approach divides Great Britain 
into a set of relatively independent places. 
However this division was given based on the data 20 years ago. The boundaries of the 
LLMAs may have changed. Although the revision work is being carried out by researchers 
using 1991 census data, the results haven't come out yet. Some modifications may be needed 
when using the existing LLMAs to define a regional housing market boundary. For example, 
in Lothian Region, the owner-occupier housing market area is defined as the Edinburgh 
Labour Market Area, (ELMA) but including Bathgate and Blackburn. Twenty years ago the 
Bathgate and Blackburn areas were excluded from the regional housing market area, now 
they are treated as a part of the regional housing market area with improving housing 
marketability because of the development of the transport system (Lothian Region Structure 
Plan 1993). This boundary is a bit smaller than the Lothian Region administrative area. 
Regional housing market is both spatially (neighbourhood) and sectorally (dwelling type) 
segmented. Spatially, the dwellings in the same neighbourhood are assumed to have similar 
distances to the CBD, similar dwelling prices and also similar structures of the dwelling 
types. Sectorally, the dwellings in the same sector are assumed to share the same 
neighbourhood facilities and to have similar types of dwellings. 
An empirical identification of Lothian Region neighbourhood and sectoral. dwelling product 
groups are given in Chapter VII. In that chapter an empirical nested housing submarket 
structure is set up. 
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3.3 Housing Demand 
The sources, types and natures of housing demand can be more readily defined in terms of the 
housing 'buyers' and two important constraints, namely, imperfect housing market 
information and different levels of market information, focusing on the latter which gives rise 
to trade friction in the housing market. 
A housing buyer can be defined as a household who is searching for a dwelling in a housing 
market. A household can be a single person living alone or a group of people living together. 
It'combines the time of its members andpurchased goods andservices into theproduction of 
"output". at least some of which are shared among its members. Examples of these outputs 
are shelter, meals, home entertainment. ' (Ermisch 1990, Page 1) 
The decision to buy or not to buy a dwelling is influenced by a household's social and 
economic background, but primarily via income and demographic composition. Buying or 
not buying a dwelling is a decision of the household as a whole. For this reason, it is 
necessary to analyse the possible compositions of households. 
The definition of the Minimal Household Unit (MHU) is given by Ermisch and Overton 
(1985) for the analysis of household formation. The MHUs are defined as the smallest 
divisible, familial elements within households. It can be regarded as a unit of economic 
decision-making. In other words the unit is able to attempt to maximise benefits from a given 
set of alternatives. 
44 
There are four tYpes of MHUs: typel-Adult individual; type2-Lone parent families (single 
parent families); type3-Childless married couples; type4-Married couples with dependent 
children. 
Diagram 111(3) 
The Minimum Household family life cycle 
De ndant 
ChiUrlen 
Marriage 
Type I Type 3 
Adult 
Loss of 
spouse Childless 
individual married couple 
Loss of Ilk eý' Loss of Birth 
children bi% last child of child 
ype 2 Type 4 
Lone parent Marriage Married couple 
family with A ndent 
, r, r, chi ren 
Loss 0 spouse 
Source: Ennisch, J. F. and E. Overton (1985) Minimal Household Units: A New 
I is o Approach to the Anal)s f Household Formation, &pulation Studi . 39. - 33-54 
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'An MHU is the smallest group of persons within a household that can be considered to 
constitute a demographically definable entity. It is definable in purely demographic terms in 
the sense that an individual, over his lifetime, moves from one type of unit to another by 
means ofa simple demographic transition or event'. (Ermisch & Overton 1985, Page 5) 
A household includes one unit or a combination of several of the MHUs. Its housing choice 
behaviour is influenced by the types of the MHUs and the life cycle of the MHUs. The 
demographic transitions of a household over its lifetime can be represented as follows: 
The arrows in the diagram show the possible transition process between the MHUs. 
Based on this diagram, a traditional stream of the family life cycle can be presented as 
follows: 
The life cycle process in the above is that a single young person is separated from his/her 
parents and forms a new household (Type 1). This household is transferred into the second 
stage of the life cycle by marriage (Type 3). After the birth of their first child, the household 
is in the third stage of the life cycle (Type 4). When the children have grown up, they will 
leave the home, the household will be back to type3. The final stage will be the one person 
family if one of the couple dies (Type 1). 
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This traditional stream has been undergoing dramatic changes during recent years in 
industrialised countries. 'Marriage and motherhood are occurring later, and there is 
increasing cohabitation without legal marriage, more divorce and one parentfamilies, lower 
birth rate and a growing proportion ofwomen in paid employment. (Ermisch 198 1, Page 
353) 
In fact, different households may follow a different life cycle. Diagram 111(3) shows that a 
household can be initially formed in any type of the four MHUs and then is transferred to the 
next stage of its life-cycle through the transition from one MHU to another, e. g. the birth of 
the first child; or through the combination of the different MHUs, e. g. two single households 
are united by a marriage; or through the separation of the MIIU, e. g. divorce. 
Although a household's income and its expenditure on housing vary from one to another, 
some households may have the same demographic composition. The latter allows us to 
classify the buyers in terms of their demographic compositions, the MHU system provides a 
useful foundation of grouping the households in terms of their demographic compositions. 
This is because: 
1. the MHU is defined by demographic variables and therefore provides a useful framework 
to construct the family life cycle which has been recognised as an important factor 
influencing household housing choice behaviour; 
2. the MHU is also defined as an economic decision making unit. A housing buyer or seller 
can be one of the MHUs in a household although the decision is influenced by all the MHUs 
in a household. 
There is a slight revision here of Ermisch and OvertoWs MHU system in that type3 MHU of 
'childless married couple' is revised to indicate both married couples without children and 
long term partners since many long term partners are joint housing buyers. 
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In this study, households are grouped into four 'stages' based on the theory of MHUs. The 
first stage are single young person households. The census data between 1981 and 1991 has 
shown that the number of one person households has been increasing dramatically. For 
example, in Lothian Region, the percentage of single person households has increased from 
23.5% (in 1981) to 29.2% (in 1991). As these people are generally economic active, they 
provide an important source of owner-occupier housing demand. Their demand is 
significantly different from the other households, e. g they may prefer smaller size dwelling. 
The second stage is households of young married couple or long term partners. The third 
stage is households with dependent children. Single parent households are grouped into this 
category although the survey results (Chapter VI) have shown that this group of households is 
not active in owner-occupier housing market as most of them are low income households. If 
the income is fixed, the preference of a single parent household in choosing a dwelling is 
expected to be similar with that of the other households with dependent children, for 
example, the demand for good school quality or the dwelling size. As a consequence, they are 
grouped into the third stage life-cycle. The fourth stage is older single households or older 
couple households. For most households, this is the end of the life cycle. The decision to buy 
a dwelling is not only influenced by income, but also by their life savings, especially for 
retired people. 
A housing buyer faces two important constraints when entering the housing market. First, 
he/she has imperfect housing market information when entering the market, and second, 
different housing buyers may have different market information levels. 
In section 3.2., it was shown that the dwellings in a housing market are unmoveable and both 
spatially as well as sectorally distributed, and as a result, a buyer may only have partial 
(imperfect) information about the market when entering it. 
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To understand the second constraint, it is necessary to analyse the sources of the housing 
buyers in a market. 
Generally housing buyers come from three sources: inter-regional migration, intra-regional 
migration and new household formation. Any changes in the socio-economic factors which 
may influence the above three migration flows will affect the demand in a regional owner- 
occupier housing market. 
Inter-regional migration is assumed to be a long distance, employment-related migration. It 
happens when households move from one region to another region and the migration involves 
both job change and housing location change. After entering a regional housing market, this 
group of people will distribute themselves into the public rental housing market, the private 
rental housing market and the owner-occupier housing market separately. 
Intra-regional migration is assumed to be a housing-related migration. It happens when 
households move from one dwelling to another one within the region. In most cases, such 
migration only involves housing location change. The migration -involves a series of 
turnovers, e. g. from the public or private rental housing market to the owner-occupier housing 
market or from the owner-occupier housing market to the private or public rental housing 
market. 
New household formation is the third important source of regional owner -occupier housing 
demand. As discussed above, new households can be formed in any type of the MHUs, e. g. 
newly married young couples, or newly divorced middle aged people with or without 
dependent children. Unlike the above two sources, new household formation will certainly 
add new demand to the housing market. 
However in practice the distinction between the three demand groups is unlikely to be clear- 
cut. Particularly within a dynamic context, the migrants may initially move for housing 
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related reasons then later change their jobs as they become familiar with opportunities 
existing in their new neighbourhoods or the migrants may be newly formed households, but 
simultaneously joining the inter-regional migration. For example, some young couples may 
get married in their home town, but will settle down in another town as a job related 
migration. In other words, there are overlaps to some extent among these groups. The 
interaction between the migration groups and the regional owner-occupier housing market 
can be expressed as below: 
Diagram 111(4) 
The Sources of Regional Owner Occupier Housing Demand 
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Thus, regional owner-occupier total housing demand (THD) comes from five sources: 
THD=DOR+DOO+DPR+DPU+DNH. Among them the inter-regional migration (DOR), the 
regional owner-occupier turnovers (DOO) and the regional new household formation (DNH) 
are the main demand sources. 
The household housing survey undertaken for this study in Lothian Region shows that 45% 
of the total buyers were previous owner-occupiers in the region, 24% were from outside the 
region and at least 16% of the total were newly formed households. Among all the buyers - 
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67% of households had at least one experience of buying a house. The others were first time 
buyers. 
As the buyers are from different sources and have different experiences of buying a dwelling 
in the market, their housing market information levels will be different. The newly formed 
households who were originally living in the region and the households from intra-regional 
migration have more information about the market than the households who are from inter- 
regional migration. The first time buyers have less information about the market than the 
second (or more) time buyers have. 
Thus, different buyers have different housing market information levels and the buyers who 
have less market information generally need a longer search time and face a higher search 
cost. This combination of imperfect information and differential information levels gives rise 
to the crucial problem of trade friction in any housing submarket. 
3.4 Housing Search, Choice and Trade Friction 
The imperfect housing market information and spatially as well as sectorally disaggregate 
housing supply forces a buyer to undertake extensive housing search before choosing a 
dwelling. The search cost and search time depend on his/her market information level. 
Housing submarket trade friction is a direct result of this housing search. In order to 
understand housing submarket trade friction, we need to understand a buyer's housing search 
process and the outcome of that process. 
3.4.1 Housing Search and Housing Choice Decision Making Process 
Housing search is examined as a process from initial 'considering a move' through 
orientation search (which is a rapid process with the households quickly focusing on 
particular product types and areas) till a satisfactory dwelling is found. It is an extensive 
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search over areas as well as over different types of dwellings with house price bidding 
behaviour. Therefore housing search behaviour will influence the submarket house price. 
Two examples are given below in order to illuminate the nature of the process. 
The first buyer is assumed to be an inter-regional migrant and his/her information on the 
market is zero or minimum. The second is assumed to be an intra-regional migrant and the 
reason for moving is that he is not satisfied with his present neighbourhood. As these two 
buyers have different knowledge about the market, they will have different search processes 
and search areas. The discussion will be based on Diagrams 111(5)&(6), which are constructed 
on the simplest nested housing submarket structure. 
Since the first buyer has no knowledge of this market, his search begins at the neighbourhood. 
level (see Diagram 111(5)). 
Suppose that he chooses 'N2' first, and searches in 'SS2', but he dislikes the neighbourhood 
components. He switches the search to'Nl'. After checking the dwellings inSSI' of'Nl', he 
finds the dwellings in this sector are too expensive, and so changes to 'SS2' or'SS3'. 
He keeps switching between these two sectors and investigates the dwellings in each of the 
sectors until he f inds a suitable dwelling. His final choice is assumed to be dwelling 'D F from 
'SS2'. Clearly his choice of a housing sector and the related neighbourhood is a sequential 
choice process. 
His search area and search routine are shown as the shaded boxes and arrows in Diagram 
111(5). 
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Diagram 111(5) 
The I fousing Search Process: Example One 
(Final Choice) 
The second buyer is frorn the intra-regional migration source and is assumed to live in 'SSY 
ot"N2' previously. As he doesn't like this neighbourhood, his search starts from 'N V only. 
I le also has some pre-knowledge about the market, so he can limit himself to searching in 
'SS2' and 'SS)' only. For example he may know that the dwellings in the sector of 'SS V are 
too expensive to aff'Ord. I lis search areas and search routine are shown as the shaded boxes 
and arrows in Diagram 111(6). Ills final choice is assumed to be a dwelling'D2' frorn 'SS2'. 
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Clearly, his choice ol'a 11OLISing sector and the related neighbourhood is a ýiýultaneous 
choice process. 
Diagram 111(6) 
The Housing Search Process: Example Two 
Final Choice 
Lived Here 
In addition, compared with the second buyer, the first buyer will have a longer search time 
and his search cost will be higher than the second one although both have chosen dwellings 
from the same submarket. 
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Thus different buyers are likely to have different search behaviours. Spatially and sectorally 
distributed dwellings as well as disaggregate housing demand are the main reasons behind for 
housing search. Search cost and search time depend on the buyers' information levels on the 
housing market while search routines depend on the preferences for dwelling components and 
the possible dwelling components' trade offs. Maclennan (1979b) investigated the furnished 
rental housing market for students and found that local students had less search cost and less 
search time than non-local new comers and also their search areas were shaped by their 
experiences of the market. 
Housing choice is the joint result of both the buyer's housing preference and his/her search 
behaviour. However the search cost will not significantly influence a buyer's financial budget 
in buying a dwelling. Some empirical evidence, see Turnbull (1993) shows that search costs 
will not significantly add differences to hedonic housing prices. Turnbull empirically tested 
the housing costs between the first time buyers and the repeated buyers and between the out- 
of-town buyers and the in-town buyers. Clearly these are groups with varying levels of 
market information and search cost. The results show there are no significant differences in 
the hedonic housing prices across various groups of buyers. The implications of this result 
are: 1. the cost of buying a dwelling is mainly a function of housing price itself-, 2. although 
housing search may incur search cost and increase the total cost of buying a dwelling, the 
influence of the search cost on a buyees affordability (income constraint) can be ignored; 3. 
different buyers may have different choice sequences. 
3.4.2 Housing Submarket Trade Friction 
The above analysis exposes an important feature of housing market: housing submarket trade 
friction. 
In the cases illustrated above, although both buyers only chose dwellings from 'SS2' of 'Nl', 
they had been bringing their demands to 'SS V, 'SS2', 'SSY of the same neighbourhood and to 
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'SS2' of 'N2' when they undertook housing search in those submarkets. Their search 
behaviour not only brings demand to the submarket, but also influences the house price there 
because of their bidding behaviour. Undertaking housing search but not buying a dwelling in 
a submarket results in housing submarket trade friction. The phenomenon of housing 
submarket trade friction is, at any time, only a fraction of the short side of the housing 
demands and supplies being transacted in each housing submarket. Different housing 
submarkets may have different levels of trade friction. The definition of housing submarket 
trade friction is given below. Its properties and determinants are discussed. 
Two examples are presented here to illustrate the essence of housing submarket trade friction. 
In the examples, we use 'NI-SSI' to represent the sectoral submarket 'SSI' in the 
neighbourhood submarket'Nl', and 'NI-SS2'to represent the sectoral submarket'SS2' in the 
neighbourhood submarket'N F. 
In the first example, it is assumed that, at time t, there are 'sl' number of dwellings on sale in 
'NI-SS I'and'dl' (assuming that, the short side is 'dl', 'sl'>'dl') number of buyers searching in 
this submarket. In a unit time interval, there are 'T1' number of dwellings transacted. 
Provided the time unit is short enough for no new buyers or sellers to join the market, T1: 5 
min(sl, d1). 
If 'T, '-'dl', the surplus demand represents that some buyers have searched and then left 
although there existed surplus supply in the submarket. This indicates the submarket has 
'trade friction. If'T, '='dl', then the submarket has no'trade friction'at this point in time. 
In the second example, suppose that, at time t, there are 'S2' number of dwellings on sale in 
'NI-SS2'and'd2' (assuming that, the short side is 'Sl', 'S2'<'-d2') number of buyers searching in 
this submarket. After a unit time, there are 72' number of dwellings transacted, clearly 'T2'. -: 5 
min(S2, d2). 
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If 'T2-: '. S2',, the surplus supply shows that some sellers did not sell their dwellings successfully 
even though there was the surplus demand in the submarket. Clearly, this submarket has 
'trade friction' . If ' T2'ý--'SY, then the submarket has no 'trade friction' at this point in time. 
Clearly, the definition of T implies that q= -1 is a measure of the sellers' waiting time in this T 
housing submarket. Further discussion about it will be given in Chapter IV. 
However, when we say that the submarket has no trade friction, it doesift follow that the 
buyers have perfect knowledge of the submarket. It only implies that the dwelling related 
components in that submarket suit the buyers' dwelling preferences. Suppose that the buyers' 
housing market information levels are fixed in the short run. This means that each buyer's 
search routine is unchanged. If trade friction in one submarket is higher than that of the other, 
it will often be due to dwelling related components in the other submarket being more 
suitable to the tastes of the buyers. Therefore, in the short run, submarket trade friction is 
determined by the degree of the match between the dwelling related components in the 
submarket and the preference of the buyers for this submarket. 
From the analysis above, an equation is suggested for measuring housing submarket trade 
friction: 
TF = 
Min(di, si) TFiý: I. 
T, 
here i denotes the submarket i and TF represents the submarket trade friction. 
The larger the value of TFj is, the higher the submarket trade friction will be. If all the buyers 
have perfect market information, therefore, they can immediately know in which submarket 
and which dwelling suits their taste, then in all the submarkets, TFi=l. In this case the 
housing submarkets have no trade friction. 
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If in one housing submarket, TFi-*+co, then no trade occurs in the submarket. This doesnt 
mean that the buyers have little information about the submarket, but it implies that people 
don't prefer the dwellings in the submarket; if TFi-*I, it means that the dwellings in this 
submarket are very preferred by the buyers or it means that this submarket is well-known by 
the buyers. 
If we assume that, the quality of the dwelling related components in a housing submarket, the 
buyers' housing preference and their market information level remain unchanged in the short 
run, then the submarket trade friction will be a constant. Any change of these factors in the 
long run will change the submarket trade friction. 
Chapter IV will discuss how housing submarket trade friction influences housing submarket 
equilibrium price and Chapters V and VII will discuss how housing submarket trade friction 
influences housing choice behaviour. 
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CIIAPTERIV TiIE HOUSING SUBMARKET OPERATIONAL SYSTEM AND ITS 
PROPERTIES 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter IV will discuss the nature of regional housing submarket equilibrium and 
disequilibrium, and the dynamic process via which equilibrium is achieved. The 
discussion is based on the nested housing submarket structure defined in Chapter III. 
One of the main arguments of Chapter III is that a local housing market consists of the 
disaggregated housing demands and the disaggregated housing supplies. As a result the 
market operational process is a matching process between the housing demand and the 
housing supply. Each buyer must search to find an appropriate dwelling. This gives rise 
to housing submarket trade friction as discussed in Chapter III. 
Given this argument, can such a matching process generate equilibrium and will this 
equilibrium be stable? Given housing submarket trade friction, the conventional 
equilibrium approach which assumes frictionless trade is not suitable to the housing 
market situation. A relatively new equilibrium approach, the 'Dynamic Stock Flow 
Model with Trade Friction' developed by Weibull (1983,1984), and Wheaton (1990), is 
extended and applied to analyse the local nested housing submarket system defined in 
Chapter 111. 
The analysis proceeds as follows: 1. setting up a theoretical framework to describe the 
operational matching process of a regional nested housing submarket system (see 
Section 4.2); 2. simulating the system using a revised dynamic stock-flow model with 
trade friction (see Section 4.3); 3. analysing the static properties of housing submarket 
equilibrium (see Section 4.4); 4. simulating the system equilibrium stability, and 
analysing the dynamic disequilibrium properties of housing submarket (see Section 4.5). 
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4.2 The Housing Submarket Operational System 
4.2.1 The System: a Matching Framework 
In Diagram 1(l) of Chapter 1, the round box represents a matching process between the 
disaggregate housing demands and housing supplies. Understanding this matching 
process is the key to understanding housing submarket operations. The following 
diagrams (Diagrams IV(I)&(2)) specify this matching process based on a simple nested 
housing submarket structure, in which there are two neighbourhood housing 
submarkets, within each there are two sectoral housing submarkets. 
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Diagram IV(I) 
Housing Submarket Operational System: a matching framework (1) 
BUYER: Re-Neighbourhood Choice Re-Dwelling Choice Re-Choice 
SS11 N ý 
N1 
Stay KS S-Choice 
Trade SS22 
Extra 
'IV Stay 
Housing Re-Dwelling Choice Re-Choice 
Demand N-Choice eave the market 
In-flow lingChoice Re-Choice T Re-Dwel 
/1\ Trade Dt SS21 
\ 
; 
Stay ý: N2 S-Choice 
Trade 
SS22 Stay 
Re-Neighbourhood Choice Re-Dwelling Choice Re-Choice 
Diagram IV(2) 
Housing Submarket Operational System: a matching framework (2) 
SELLER: 
Extra Dwelling Vacancy 
Inflow from Time t-1 to t 
ssij 
Unsold Dwellings 
from Time t-1 tot 
Where: ij=1,2 
nsold 
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Diagrams IV(I)&(2) represent a dynamic operational process in a regional owner- 
occupicr housing markct. 
For the buyers: in Diagram IV(I), the round boxes represent the buyers' search and 
choice decisions and the square boxes represent the housing submarkets. 'N-choice' and 
'S-choice' represent the distributional process of the buyers to the different 
neighbourhood housing submarkets and the different sectoral housing submarkets. 
The thick lines show the search routes of the buyers distributed into the different 
housing submarkets and the hair lines are the routes of the buyers joining the re-choice 
process. 
D, is the extra housing demand in-flow to the market at time t. The sources of Dt were 
discusscd in Scction 3.3. 
'Trade' represents the number of dwellings traded within a specific time unit (See 
Section 3.4) and 'Stay' represents the number of buyers who keep searching in the same 
housing submarket and transfer their demands to the next time unit in the same 
submarket. The re-choice flow contains buyers who leave the housing submarket and 
will be re-distributed among the other housing submarkets. There is a possibility that 
these buyers will go back to the same housing submarket. 
For the sellers: in Diagram IV(2), the total housing supply comes from the dwelling 
vacancies and the unsold dwellings from the last time period, and then, they have two 
possible outcomes: some are traded ('Trade'); some are not traded ('Unsold') and will 
be transferred to the next period. 
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The dynamic matching process between the buyers and the sellers is described in 4 
steps: 
1. At time t, a group of buyers enter the regional owner-occupier housing market (D). 
This in-flow joins the re-neighbourhood choice flows which are the housing demands 
transferred from the last time period and forms the total demand in-flow to the 
neighbourhood housing submarkets. 
2. The first action of these buyers is to make a neighbourhood choice. They face three 
choices at this stage: to enter neighbourhood housing submarket 'NJ'; to enter 
neighbourhood submarket'N2' or to leave the owner-occupier housing market. Housing 
demand is thus distributed into different neighbourhood housing submarkets in relation 
to the buyers' preferences for each housing submarket. 
3. After being distributed into the neighbourhood, housing submarkets, the buyers form 
an extra demand in-flow in each of the neighbourhoods. This in-flow joins the re- 
dwelling choice flows which are transferred from the last time period and forms the total 
demand in-flow to the sectoral housing submarkets nested in the neighbourhood. These 
buyers are distributed into the sectoral housing submarkets in relation to their 
preferences for the dwellings in the sectoral housing submarket. 
4. The buyers who enter a sectoral housing submarket, are merged with the buyers who 
are transferred from the last time period in the submarket and form the total housing 
demand for this sectoral submarket. On the other side, the new dwelling vacancies 
together with the sellers who didn't sell their dwelling in the last time period form the 
total housing supply for this submarket. Therefore, a matching process between the 
buyers and the sellers in this submarket starts. The total housing demand described 
above has three possible outcomes. Some find the dwellings which they want and 
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transactions are undertaken ('Trade'); some leave the submarket and join the re-choice 
flows ('Re-choice'); the others decide to keep searching in the same submarket ('Stay'). 
The above discussion describes a general matching process between the buyers and the 
sellers. Two points related to this process are stressed below. 
1. The model allows that different buyers follow different search routines. For example, 
a buyer, who was living in the submarket 'NI-SSI' and wanted to change a dwelling, 
will join the re-choice flow first, then enter one of the housing submarkcts. 
2. The buyers' housing market information level improves during the search, and hence, 
their housing preference may be altered. In other words, their probabilities of entering 
different housing submarkets changes during the search. This probability is named as 
search probaUUty which is a function of their housing market information level as well 
as their housing preference. The probability estimated without considering the buyers' 
information level, is named as choice probahjUly. 
The above discussion shows the complexity of mathematically modelling the matching 
process. Therefore, some assumptions are deemed necessary. 
4.2.2. Some Assumptions about the System 
Assumption I 
The housing market is a pure owner occupier housing market. This means there are no 
housing price controls, and the housing price change is only influenced by housing 
demand and supply in each submarket. 
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Assumption 2 
The housing market is in a stable socio-economic environment in the short-run. 1. There 
are no changes in the regional wage rate, unemployment rate or the relative wage rates 
or unemployment rates between the regions. 2. There is no change in regional 
demographic structure. As a result, the extra demand inflow to the owner-occupier 
housing market is a fixed flow. The subscript't'can be dropped from'Dt'. 
Assumption 3 
The discussion focuses on the short run during which the new additions to or deletions 
from a housing market can be ignored. The total housing stock in each housing 
submarket is unchanged. The only supply channel is via vacancies. It is also assumed 
that the vacancy rate is constant in only the short run period. This implies that the 
housing market is demand oriented. 
Assumption 4 
On the supply side, within each sectoral housing submarket, differences in the dwelling 
prices and the dwelling components (non-key) are ignored. The choice for a dwelling is 
simply assumed as the choice for a sectoral housing submarket. 
Assumption 5 
On the demand side, the buyers are distributed into different housing submarkets by 
their search or choice probabilities. Since the housing market information level can not 
be measured, we are forced to use the choice probability model as an approximation to 
the search probability model. The choice probability model to be used in the 
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mathematical model is discussed in Section 4.3 to describe housing search behaviour. In 
this model, all buyers are assumed to face the same choice set and have the same 
housing preference, which implies that the coefficients in the probability model are the 
same between the buyers in the short run. 
4.3 An Extended DYnamic Stock-Flow Model with Trade Friction 
The approach of a dynamic stock-flow model with trade friction was introduced in 
Chapter 11. This is developed based on the work of Weibull (1983,1984) and his earlier 
joint study on the functioning of markets under conditions of chronic shortage, (Kornal 
& Weibull(1978)) which was to a large extent inspired by the comprehensive discussion 
in Kornai (1980); in particular, the present treatment of market trade friction can be seen 
as a direct formalization of Kornai's ideas. In this chapter, the approach is extended to a 
nested housing submarket system. The econometric model discussed below is a 
mathematical specification of the housing market operational system (see Diagrams 
IV(I)&(2)). 
The dynamic analysis will be conducted in terms of discrete time t, where t is an integer, 
0--5 t <+oo. The relevant time interval T, including t=O, is an interval between [0,4-00). 
The dynamic analysis can also be discussed in terms of continuous time (Weibull 1983), 
but in terms of housing market, discrete time is more realistic as the real housing 
information, i. e. dwelling price or dwelling transaction, is usually produced by month, 
quarter or year. Another advantage is that using discrete time can make the discussion in 
this section to be consistent with the computer simulation in Section 4.5. 
Each time period, from t-I to t, represents one unit time interval during which some 
dwellings are traded and housing submarket prices undergo some adjustments. It should 
be emphasised that this time unit is different from a buyer's search time. It only means a 
time period during which, in each housing submarket, some demand and supply can be 
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transacted and the housing price change signals can be fed back to the buyers and the 
sellers through the housing agencies (e. g. estate agencies or solicitors). It can be one 
week or one month, and depends on the system of housing agencies. However the 
search time is related to a specific buyer's (sellers') time in a market. Some empirical 
evidence on the seller's waiting time in a market is given in Hughes & Sirmans (1992), 
who reports that the time a dwelling is on the market is about 100 dayson average. 
The current state of a housing market at time teT is a set of points in a three 
dimensional state space, which can be defined as: 
kkkk 
IF = R+OR+OR++ (1) 
where, k is the number of submarkets in a housing market; R+ is the non-negative real 
axis and R++ is the positive real axis. Each point describes one housing submarket using 
three variables, housing demand, housing supply, which values change between [0, +00) 
described by non-negative real axis; and housing price, which value changes between 
(0, +oo) described by positive real axis. 
For example, if k=l, it means that it is unitary market. The dwellings are homogeneous 
with one housing price prevailing. The current market state is one point X(t) in r' : 
X(t) = [d(t) s(t) p(t)] 
where, d(t) is the current effective housing demand, s(t) is the current effective housing 
supply and p(t) is the current housing price. Here the 'effective demand' means all the 
buyers who are engaged in a search and the 'effective supply' means all the dwellings 
which are on sale in each housing submarket. In other words, the current effective 
housing demand (supply) is the number of dwelling units that the aggregate of housing 
buyers (sellers) is willing to buy (sell) at time t. We also assume the current housing 
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price represents all the expenditures in buying a dwelling. This is because, in reality, 
buying a dwelling entails a number of expenditures, i. e. search cost, legal fee or 
insurance. But, compared with the house price, these expenditures are not significant. 
In the case of the nested housing submarket structure shown in Diagram IV(I), totally 
there are six housing submarkets: two neighbourhood housing submarkes, two and four 
sectoral housing submarkets with each two nested in one neighbourhood. The current 
state of the housing market can be represented by a group of six points in the state space 
1-6, these six points are xj(t), X2(t), X11(t), X12(t)t X21(t) and X22(t). The market situation at 
time t can be represented by the matrix X(t). 
xi(t) di(t) sl(t) PI(t) 
X2(t) d2(t) S2(t) P2(t) 
x(t) XII(t) 
dii(t) sli(t) P11(t) (2) 
X12(t) d12(t) S12(t) P12(t) 
X21(t) d2i(t) S21(t) P21(t) 
X22(t)_ 
, _d22(t) 
S22(t) P22(t).. 
j 
where, xi(t), i=1,2, is the situation of neighbourhood housing submarket, N; 
xij(t) ij=1,2, is the situation of sectoral housing submarket, SSjj nested 
in neighbourhood housing submarket, Ni. 
The dynamic process of this housing submarket structure is presented by Diagram 
IV(3). 
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Diagram IV(3) 
p(t) 
Three Dimensional State Space (r, 6) 
t1t=3,4,5(equilibrium 
state) 
SM 
00 
t=2 71 
,, (D 
d(t) 
In this diagram, each circle contains six points, each point representing the situation of 
one housing submarket (x(t)), including housing price (p(t)), housing demand (d(t)) and 
housing supply (s(t)) in the submarket. Six points in each circle together represent the 
situation of a nested housing submarket structure (X(t)). 
The dynamic pathway is: from t=1 to t=3, the housing demand, supply and housing 
price in each housing submarket are changing and the market position in this state space 
is moving, which is shown as arrows. At t=3, the housing market achieves an 
equilibrium position which means that, after t=3 onwards, the housing demand, supply 
and housing price keep still in each submarket. 
As discussed in Section 4.2.1., housing demands are distributed into the different 
housing submarkets through the search probability 'channel'. This search probability is 
approximated by the choice probability (see Assumption 4 in Section 4.2.2). 
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In a nested housing submarket structure, it is assumed that the probabilities of a buyer 
choosing different housing submarkets can be calibrated using the nested logit model (a 
detailed discussion is given in Chapter VI). A brief summary of the model is given 
below. 
According to Assumption 5 in Section 4.2.2, the buyers have the same housing 
preference, therefore, the subscript denoting an individual buyer can be dropped from 
equations (3)-(6) below, which makes the discussion simple. 
Pr,, exp(a i* p, 
(t)) +a 2* q, (t) + CC 3* Xv) (3) 
exp(cc i* p, (t) +a 2* q,, (t) + CC 3* Xv) 
Pr, (t) exp(%* 
Yi + (I - a)L) (4) 
exp(%* Yi + (I - a)b) +I 
Pr o(t) =1 (5) Eexp(, %*Yi +(1-a)Ii) +I 
i 
L= In(Zexp(eti*p, (t) +ct2*q(t) +a3*Xo» (6) 
1 
-where, 1. Pr, (t) is the marginal probability of choosing neighbourhood Ni at time t, and 
Pro (t) is the probability of leaving the housing market at time t, (in the case of 
th 
Diagram IV(I), i= I or 2); Pr j (t) is the conditional probability of choosing the j 
sectoral housing submarket nested in the i'll neighbourhood housing submarket at time t, 
Ih (in the case of Diagram IV(I), j=1 or 2). Pr # (t) is the probability of choosing the Ij 
sectoral housing submarket at time t, where: 
Pri, Q) = Pr, (t) * Pr i 1, (t) 
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2. li is the 'inclusive value'. This summarises all the dwelling information in the Ih 
neighbourhood. The coefficient of the inclusive value I-a, O<cr: 51 allows a test of the 
IIA axiom, and when 1-cr=l, equations (3) to (6) reduce to the traditional multinominal 
logit model (see Chapter VI). 
3. Xjj is the dwelling components of the j1h sectoral housing submarket nested in the i1h 
Ih 
neighbourhood submarket and Yj is the neighbourhood components of the 
neighbourhood. In the short run, they are assumed to be the constants. 
4. p ii 
is the dwelling price of the jth sectoral housing submarket nested in the i1h 
neighbourhood submarket and qjj is the seller's waiting time in this submarket (See the 
discussion in Section 3.4.2 and equations (7-1)&(7-1) in this section). 
The importance of including qjj in the model are discussed below. 
Buying a house has dual roles: as a consumption good and as an investment good. 
Housing's role as an investment good requires that a buyer has to deal with uncertainty 
and forms expectations regarding future house prices. The prices of housing submarkets 
are not only different, but also expected to have different changing rates. For example, 
in Lothian Region, a phenomenon observed in the owner occupier housing market is 
that the price of Lothian Villa is increasing faster than the price of Lothian Terraced 
Villa in the past few years (see Diagram I in Appendix 7-2). This implies that the future 
housing price changes may be different between the different regional housing 
submarkets. The uncertainty and expectations for the future submarket housing prices, 
therefore play a crucial role in housing choice behaviour. 
Empirically, this expectation is assumed to be measured by the current housing sellers' 
waiting time. A shorter waiting time implies that there is a higher dwelling transaction 
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rate in the submarket. In other words, the housing submarket has a higher marketability. 
Therefore a buyer has a higher expectation of the future submarket housing price 
increase. 
Referring to equation (3), both the coefficients a, and % are therefore negative real 
numbers. 
The sellers' waiting time at time t can be represented by equation (7-1), which is the 
quotient of the current submarket housing supply and the number of dwellings traded in 
unit time in the submarket. Replacing Tij(t) by equation (1) in Section 3.4.2, equation 
(7-1) is extended as: 
qu(t) 
±4-(t) sq(t) S6(t) (7-1) 
Tj, (j) min(d4Q), sijýt-)) N(t) * min(d,, Q), so(t)) 
TF& (t) 
POW 
1 
(7-2) 
TFo(t) 
TFjj(t) is defined in Section 3.4.2. Pij(t) in equation (7-2) is named as submarket 
dwelling transaction velocity defined as an inverse of the trade friction (TFU(t)) in the 
ij th sectoral housing submarket (Weibull 1983). 
If dij(t) is bigger than sJt), the waiting time is just the inverse of PJt), which is equal to 
TFJt). This means that a smaller submarket transaction velocity (or a larger housing 
submarket trade friction) will produce a longer waiting time. If sJt) is bigger than djt), 
then either a shorter demand queue or a longer supply queue will increase a seller's 
waiting time in that submarket. 
Since Tij(t): 5Sij(t) if Tij(t) (and so Pij(t)) tends towards zero over time, this means that the 
housing submarket exhibits no trade, e. g. the dwelling related components are not 
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matched with the buyers' preferences at all. If this happens, the sellers'waiting time qjj(t) 
will tend towards oo, which means no sellers can sell their dwelling in this submarket. A 
realistic phenomenon in an urban housing market is some previously prosperous 
neighbourhood becomes dumping over time and attracts less and less buyers. Finally the 
area may have to be demolished as no one would like to buy a dwelling there any more. 
If Tij(t) tends towards min(sij(t), dij(t)), and so Pij(t) tends towards I over time, this 
means that the short-side of the submarket, either demand or supply, can all be traded 
immediately and the trade friction in this submarket reduces to zero. If this happens, the 
sellers' average waiting time qij(t) will either tend towards I (if sij<dj) or tend towards 
SIj (if sij>dij). In the latter case, the sellers' average waiting time is bigger than T, which 
means some sellers cannot sell their dwelling immediately because there are not enough 
buyers. 
In the short run, TFij(t) is assumed as a constant (Section 3.4.2). Therefore t is dropped 
from TFij(t) and Pij(t). 
The dynamic process (See also Section 4.2), from time t to t+l, in a housing market can 
be mathematically specified as follows. As 't' is defined as discrete time, the sentence, 
'from time t to t+l', will represent one time unit which is from the beginning of t to the 
beginning of t+l. The specification below is an extension or revision of the work of 
Weibull (1983). 
At the ij'l' sectoral housing submarket: 
dij(t)=Tij(t)+RCij(t)+SDij(t) (8-1) 
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dij(t+l)=NDij(t)+SDij(t) (8-2) 
sij(t)=TSij(t)+Tij(t) (8-3) 
sij(t+l)=NSij(t)+TSij(t) (8-4) 
At the th neighbourhood housing submarket: 
di(t)=T, (t)+RCI(t)+SDi(t) (9-1) 
d. (t+l)=ND, (t)+SDi(t) (9-2) 
si(t)=TS, (t)+Ti(t) (9-3) 
si(t+l)=NS, (t)+TSi(t) (9-4) 
where, from the beginning of t to the beginning of t+l, in the sectoral and 
neighbourhood housing submarkets separately, where: 
Tip T, are the number of dwellings traded; 
RCij, RCi are the number of buyers who join the re-choice flows; 
SDip SDi are the number of buyers who keep searching in the same 
submarket; 
NDjj, NDj are the total addition to the demand side; 
NSij , NSj are the total addition to the supply side; 
TSiji TSj are the number of sellers who haven't sold their dwelling. 
The dynamic process is given as follows: 
(dy (t)) 
= NDy(t) - (RCo(t) + Ty(t)) (10) At 
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A(S4(1)) 
= NSýj(t) - To(t) At 
(po (t)) 
=f (dy (t), so (t)) * py (t) At 
A(d(t)) 
= ND, Q) - (RC, (t) + T(t)) (13) At 
A(S'(t)) 
= NS, (t) - T(t) At 
A(P'(t)) 1 j: f(dj(t), so(t))pu(t) (15) At i 
where, is the difference function, and if assuming that the housing price in a At 
neighbourhood is an average of the housing prices of all the dwelling sectoral 
submarkets in the neighbourhood, equation (15) is derived from equation (12). 
In equation (12), it is assumed that the housing price change in a submarket is 
endogeneously determined by the balance (zjj(t)=djj(t)-sjj(t)) between the effective 
demand and the effective supply. A question of both theoretical and practical 
importance is how the balance zij is conveyed to those market agents who are ultimately 
the price setters. In practice, observations of demand queues and dwelling vacancies in a 
submarket will convey the balance of demand and supply to the dwelling price setters. 
Theoretically, function 'f' can be assumed as a sign-preserving function, which means if 
f (a) 0 <=* a0 and 'a' is a real number. 
Equations (I 0)-(l 2) can be specified further by assuming that: 
A(d,, (I)) 
al(x(t), 1) - b,, (x(t), t) At 
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A (so (t» 
= cu (x (t), t) - bo (x (t), t) ät 
A(PO(t)) 
=f (dy(t) - so(t))* pu(t) At 
where: ajx, t), b,, (x, t), and cjx, t) are defined as behavioural functions, which represent 
the market change rates of demand, trade and supply over time. Equation (18) is the 
current price formation rate for the j 
Ih 
submarket (the rate at which the price changes 
over time). Further specifications of these functions are given below. 
In equation (16), aij(x(t), t)=ND ii 
(t)-RC 
ii (t) which 
is the current net effective demand rate 
in the ij th sectoral housing submarket (the inflow of new requests minus the outflow of 
withdrawn requests). It is specified as: 
aij (x(l), t) = ((D + Ey 
2 dkx(t)) Pr, (t) I dx(t)) Pr i I, Q) - (y 
1 +7 2)dy(t) (19) 
k, )6 
kX Auu 
I As explained in Assumption 2 (Section 4.2.2), D is time-invariant. The parameter y. is 
the housing buyers' re-choice rate at the dwelling level, and yU is the housing buyers' 
re-choice rate at the neighbourbood level. They are assumed to be time invariant 
constants (See Diagrams IV(I)&(4)). 
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Diagram IV(4) 
An Example of Housing Submarket Operation 
From time t to t+l: 
2 *dll(t) jy: *dll(t) T11(t) Yll II 
N, r---*(, S-Choice)--l SSI I 
I (t) PrI I (t) SDI I(t) 
-*X N-Choice 
bij(x(t), t)=T ii (t) 
is the current trade rate in the j 
th 
sectoral housing submarket (number of 
dwellings traded from t to t+I). According to equation (1) of Chapter III and equation 
(7-2) of this Chapter, it can be expressed as: 
bu(x(t), t) = Pu* min(dy(t), s6(t)) (20) 
In equation (17), c ii 
(x(t), t)=NS ii 
is the current net effective supply rate in the ij 
th 
sectoral 
housing submarket (the inflow of additional dwelling units. The withdrawals from sales 
are assumed to be zero. According to assumption three, it is specified as: 
co(x(t), t) = cy(8u-sý(t)) 
where c Ii 
is the vacancy rate and 8 11 
is the total housing stock. 
(21) 
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From the above definitions, it is clear that bjx(t), t) and c,, (x(t), t) are non-negative 
numbers and ajx(t), t) is a real number. 
Using the same arguments, equations (13) to (15) can be re-specified as: 
A(d(t)) 
= a, (x(t), t) - b, (x(t), t) (22) At 
(s, (t)) 
= c, (x(t), t) - b, (x(t), t) (23) At 
Ef(du(t)-so(t))pu(t) (24) 
At ii 
where: 
a, (x(t), t) = aji(x(t), t) (25-1) 
(25-2) bi(x(t), t) = 2: bo(x(t), t) 
ci(x(t), t) = Eco(x(t), t) (25-3) 
j 
i 
The above equations (16)-(18) and (22)-(24) represent the dynamic process within a 
nested housing submarket structure. The dynamic features of this process are discussed 
below. 
1222 
First of all, 0: 5 7,7 and7' +7 :: 51. When 7'+7 -=O, no dwellings join the re- 
2 
choice flows in that submarket; when7l +7 =I, all the buyers in that submarket join Y 
the re-choice flows and no trade happens, Pij will be zero. The relation is: 
0: 57, * dj(') +72 *dy(t) +pd*min(du(l), so(t)) --5 4(t) (28) uu 
78 
which denotes that at any time, in each housing submarket, the number of dwellings 
traded and the number of buyers joining the re-choice flows are less than the total 
effective housing demand in that submarket. 
Second, equations (18) and (24) describe a model of housing submarket price formation. 
Clearly, the neighbourhood housing submarket price is determined by the sectoral 
housing submarket prices within it. 
Rewriting equation (18) by assuming that the sign reverse functionT is a linear function 
with zero intercept, we get: 
A (py (t» 
= Zo * pi (t) * (du (t) - sý (t» At 
(26) 
where X is assumed as a constant (non-negative real number). Equation (26) shows that ýij 
the submarket housing price change within each time unit is positively related to the 
submarket housing price level as well as the excess housing demand in this submarket. 
X,, =O means that the submarket housing price will not change in response to any excess 
housing demand, e. g. the submarket housing price is regulated, i. e. under house price 
control. 
If it is assumed that one time unit is equal to 1, At = 1, equation (26) can be written as: 
1-1 
py(l) = py(O)* 11 (1 + X#* (dy(T) - sii(-r))) 
t. 0 
(27) 
Thus housing submarket price formation is related to the whole history of housing 
demand, supply and price in the submarket. Third, equations (16) and (17) can be re- 
written as 
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f-I 
du(t) = d4(0) + 1: (aii(x(-r), -r) - N(x(T), -r)) (28) 
11.0 
1-1 
s4(t) = s4(0) +Z (ci, (x(T),, r) - bo(x(, r),, r)) (29) 
1-0 
Combining with equation (27), it is clear that all the system stock variables dii(t), sij(t) 
and pij(t) depend on the whole history of all the submarkets. And it is easy to prove that 
the housing demand, supply and housing price in a neighbourhood housing market are 
simply the aggregation of those of the scctoral housing submarkets (referring to 
equation (25-1) to (25-3)). 
The above describes the dynamic system of a nested housing submarket structure. 
However an implicit assumption in this system is 'having entered the housing market, a 
household is actively searching in, at most, one of the channels at each point in time. 
Hou, ever a searching household may reconsider its channel choice at an time; ... Hence, Y 
while in reality many households are simultaneously searching in several channels, they 
may shift arbitrarily fast betiveen channels but they are available for trade in one 
channel only at every point in time. ' (Weibull (1983), Page 3 83) The question is if and 
when the system can achieve an equilibrium, which we now turn to. 
4.4 Housing Submarket Short Run Equilibrium 
4.4.1 Equilibrium Condition 
The system equilibrium condition can be defined, during a specific time interval T, to 
be: 
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1. in each sectoral housing submarket: 
aij(x(t), t)=bij(x(t), t)=cij(x(t), t)= constant, tET (30) 
pij(t)=constant (31) 
and, 
2. in each neighbourhood housing submarket: 
a, (x(t), t)=bi(x(t), t)=ci(x(t), t)=constant, tr=T (32) 
pi(t) = constant (33) 
In equilibrium, all the behavioural functions are unchanged. There is no housing price 
movement in each submarket. The number of dwellings traded in each submarket is 
equal to the net housing demand rate and to the net housing supply rate. For this reason 
the index 't' can be dropped and the behavioural functions can be represented as aij, aj, 
bij, bl, cij, cl and the prices as pij, pi. This implies that, even in equilibrium, there exists 
unsatisfied demand and supply. 
Substituting these conditions into equations (16) to (18) and (22) to (24), the following 
equations can be obtained. 
dij=sij=constant (34) 
di=si=constant (35) 
This means that in each housing submarket, the effective housing demand and supply 
are both equal to constant in equilibrium. 
Combining the above conditions with equation (25), it is not difficult to prove that if all 
the sectoral housing submarkets are in equilibrium, the neighbourhood submarkets will 
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also be in equilibrium. But if all the neighbourhood submarkets are in equilibrium, the 
sectoral housing submarkets will not necessarily be in equilibrium. In other words, 
conditions (32) and (33) are necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for conditions 
(30) and (3 1) to hold. For this reason, the nested housing market equilibrium conditions 
are reduced to equations (30) and (3 1) only. 
4.4.2 The Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium 
Proposition 1: 
Suppose that the housing market satisfies the condition 
2: cu* (S# - dy) 
ij 
This means that, at equilibrium, the total extra housing demand to the whole housing 
market is no less than the total extra housing supply. This implies that, at equilibrium, 
the housing market is demand oriented. 
There exists a unique equilibrium point in the short run, i= Ll and j= IJ: 
Xj sc 
ij *8fi (36) 
+ cii 
q# TFY (37) N 
CC 2a3 Pr, ' p, j = --*qjj - Xj - *In( (38) )I+ *ln(Pr,,, ) + ai al cti*(I-a) ai a i*(l -cr) Pr. 
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Where, 
+(Y +Y 
Pr; li (39) d*u) + (Y ul +Y U)*d*u) 
2: 7 
y* 
diý + co * (8y - si*, j) 
Pr, ' 
=1 (40) -r,, D-I: ckj (5ki - s*kj) 
k, l 
(The proof is given in Appendix 4-1 and'*'denotes short run equilibrium). 
As in each neighbourhood submarket: 
dj* du' 
si Es*u 
P, EP; 
i 
the neighbourhood equilibrium point can be obtained from equations (36) to (38) 
simultaneously. Therefore the sectoral housing submarkets and the neighbourhood 
housing submarkets achieve short run equilibrium at the same time. Any changes of the 
housing market parameters, e. g. a change of vacancy rate, may violate short run 
equilibrium. 
4.4.3. Some Static Properties of Housing Submarket Short Run Equilibrium 
A number of equilibrium static properties can be derived from the above proposition (if 
other things remain unchanged). 
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Property One 
In each sectoral or neighbourhood housing submarket, the equilibrium housing demand 
(supply) is a strictly increasing function of the submarket dwelling stock. More dwelling 
stock in a submarkct attracts more effective housing demand. 
Property Two 
In each sectoral or neighbourhood housing submarket, the equilibrium housing demand 
(supply) is a strictly increasing function of the submarket dwelling vacancy rates. 
Higher vacancy rates creates more dwelling supplies in the submarket. As a result, more 
demands are attracted to the submarket. 
Property Three 
A seller's waiting time in a housing submarket is an increasing function of housing 
submarket trade friction. 
Property Four 
In each sectoral or neighbourhood housing submarket, the equilibrium housing demand 
(supply) is a strictly decreasing function of P ii 
(see equation (36)). This is because 
smaller P ii 
is related to a larger submarket trade friction, which accumulates the effective 
housing submarket demand as well as supply. In other words, the number of dwellings 
traded during a specific time is reduced. 
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When P 
ii tends towards zero, the submarket equilibrium 
housing demand and supply 
will tend towards their maximum point. All the buyers will be engaged in housing 
search and all the sellers will be waiting to sell their dwelling. No trade happens. 
When P 
ii tends towards 
1, the dwelling transaction in this housing submarket will tend 
towards its maximum point and the effective housing demand and supply will tend 
towards their minimum point, which will be equal to the number of dwellings transacted 
in that submarket (see equation below). 
d, j = s# = b# 
E-o*-8# 
I+cy 
Property Five 
In equations (3), (4) and (38), a, and oý2 are negative real numbers. CC3 and X are the 
coefflicients of Xjj and Yj, which represent the qualities of the sectoral and 
neighbourhood housing submarkets, therefore, they are positive real numbers. Equation 
(38) can be re-written as: 
4 CC 2 CC 3% p4j -* TF? 'j --* Xj - Yi + CC I CC I CC I* (I -a) 
* ln(Pr*i/, ) +-* In(Pr, *) - In (Pro) aI CC I* -a) a I* -CF) 
It follows that, in each sectoral housing submarket: 
1. the equilibrium submarket housing price is a strictly decreasing function of submarket 
trade friction. Equation (37) shows that higher housing submarket trade friction results 
in a longer waiting time for the sellers. This is because housing submarket trade friction 
is determined by how well the dwellings in that submarkct suit to the buyers' housing 
preferences (Section 3.4). A poor match will arise %%-here the sellers' waiting time in the 
85 
submarket is high. This will further reduce the buyer's expectation of the future housing 
price increases in that submarket. The result is that less demand will go to that 
submarket. The price will fall. 
2. the equilibrium submarket housing price is positively related to the dwelling related 
components in that submarket. In other words, housing price is partly determined by the 
neighbourhood components as well as the dwelling components; 
3. the equilibrium submarket housing price is positively related to the buyers' choice 
probabilities for the submarkets Prj*,, and Pr% and is negatively related with the buyers' 
choice probability of leaving the submarket Pr*o - 
Substituting equation (36) into equations (39) and (40) and then replacing Prj*jj and Pr; 
in equation (41) by equations (39) and (40), an implication can be drawn from the above 
three conclusions. This is that in a housing submarket, the equilibrium housing price is 
determined by the housing submarket factors only, given that in the short run household 
housing preferences are unchanged. The factors are: submarket trade friction (TFij), 
dwelling related components(Xij and YI), housing stock (8j), dwelling vacancy rate (cij) 
re-choice rates (y and the total extra housing demand inflow to the housing market 
(D). Any change of these factors will change the short run equilibrium position. 
An other implication is that the equilibrium submarket housing price is a strictly 
increasing function of the extra housing demand inflow (D). This is derived from 
equations (38) and (40). It implies that in an urban or regional housing market, the 
increase of net migration into the area will increase each submarket housing price. 
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4.5. The Stability of Housing Submarket Short Run Equilibrium 
4.5.1 A New View of Equilibrium Stability 
Stability analysis is an important part of equilibrium theory as many economic theories 
depend on the comparative static of equilibrium and the equilibrium properties make 
sense only if the underlying system is stable. Conventional equilibrium theory considers 
three types of equilibrium stability. They are: Global Stability, Neighbourhood Stability 
and Instability (Weibull 1983). In this section, this approach is extended and four types 
of stability will be discussed in terms of the degree of stability. They are: 
Global Stability 
Neighbourhood Stability 
Bounded Instability 
Instability 
Global Staaly is defined as that a market price will converge to equilibrium from any 
disequilibrium position. Neighbourhood StabilitY is defined as that a market price will 
only converge to equilibrium from a disequilibrium position which is within the 
neighbourhood of its equilibrium price. Bounded Instability is a mixture of stability and 
instability. It is defined as that the dynamics of a market price, after it moves from its 
equilibrium to a disequilibrium position which is within the neighbourhood of its 
equilibrium position, will be bounded in its equilibrium neighbourhood. Instability is 
defined as that once the market leaves its equilibrium position, it will not be able to 
return to equilibrium. 
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Is the dynamic stock-flow equilibrium discussed in Section 4.4 a stable one? What 
determines housing submarket equilibrium stability? How do the submarket housing 
prices move and what is the key force directing housing submarket operation? To 
answer these questions it is necessary to undertake a computer simulation of the system 
defined in the model above. The stability properties are ascertained from the simulation 
results. 
4.5.2 Computer Simulation Procedure 
The housing submarket system used in the simulation is an artificial one. It is randomly 
identified by Program One (Appendix 4-4). The output of program one is a group of 
housing submarket parameter values (An example is given in Table I in Appendix 4-3). 
k These values, i. e. D, c#, 8#, 0#, 7 Y 
(I-CF), 0E1, CC2,0E3. XY,, %, Yi (The definitions are given in 
Appendix 4-2) are inter-related and satisfy the equilibrium conditions in Section 
4.4.1&4.4.2. The housing submarket system identified has a nested housing submarket 
structure derined in Chapter 111. 
Program two is a simulation program of the nested housing submarket (identified by 
program one) operation (Appendix 4-5). 
The simulation starts from an equilibrium point, then either submarket housing prices or 
other market parameters are changed, which will push the housing market to a 
disequilibrium position. The dynamic process of the housing submarket operational 
process is recorded to see how and in which condition the housing submarkets go back 
to equilibrium. 
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The two programs are implemented using Turbo-C on IBM-PC compatible machines. 
The simulation results are explained in terms of discrete time, namely simulation 
time(s). 
4.5.3. Short Run Dynamics of Housing Submarket System 
This section focuses on the short run dynamic properties of a nested housing submarket 
system. It is assumed that, during the simulation the market related parameter values, 
k 
Pi e. g. D, cij! j, J'y # 
9(l - CY 
), (X 1, CC 2, (X 3. XY, X, Yj are unchanged. Only submarket house 
price change is emphasised. 
A large number of simulations have been performed to simulate a two level nested 
housing submarket operation (see Diagrams IV(I)&(2) in Chapter IV and Appendix 4- 
3). The results show that, in the short run, a nested housing submarket equilibrium is 
either Neichbourhood Stable, or Bounded Instable or Instable, which is deten-nined by 
the housing submarket structure. In particular, it is related to the differences between the 
submarket equilibrium house prices. The larger the difference is, the more stable the 
submarket equilibrium is. This is shown by the following three simulation cases. 
These three simulation cases are produced based on three different housing submarket 
system. Their difference is, in the first case, submarket equilibrium house prices are 
widely distributed and this type of submarket structure is named as Lam Housing 
Submarket Structure; in the third case, submarket equilibrium house prices are very 
close and this type of housing submarket structure is named as rigbLhousing submarket 
structure; and in the second case, the distribution of the submarket equilibrium h(; use 
price is between the first and the third cases and this type of housing submarket 
structure is named as Nornia housing submarket structure. Some main simulation 
results related to the above three cases are given in Appendices 4-6 to 4-8 separately. 
The results are presented by diagrams. In order to simplify the discussion below, the 
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I-CSLIltS Zit SCOOI'ýIl 11011', Illg SUbmark-ct lcýcl are prescmcd 1'()I- (IISCLIS. S]011. I IIIS IS hCCMISC 
the results at I)Clglll)()Lll-ll()O(i ICVcl are simpk the lincar aggrcuation of the results at 
scctol-al Ic\ cl. I lie results at licig, 1111OL11-1100d lc\ cl are given in Appendix 4-6 to 4-8. 
I. Case Olie: Short I-1111 equilibrium 1% ilh neighboul-hood stabilitN 
Case ( )nc 1)1. cscllts all cNalliple of housing suhnim-kct CCIL1111111-111111 \ý 1111 IICI 11 IIIIOLII-1100(1 
SUINIIIý -I 
lIC VýIILICS Ol'tlIC 1XII-LIMCM-S LISCd III thiS SIIIILIkItIOII M-e IlStCLI III Appcndi\ 4-, 
and Aplicndix 4-6.1 his market has a loost, housing submarket structure. 
Diagram IV(5) 
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In this case, when the submarket housing price decreases -20% from its equilibrium 
price, the simulation results are out of control, e. g. in some housing submarkets, the 
housing price becomes either very cheap or very expensive with a very unstable market 
situation. 
This is because a very big change of the submarket housing price implies that the 
original housing submarket structure may have changed. For example, Xij or Yi. which 
representing the sectoral and the neighbourhood housing submarket quality in the 
model, may have changed. However, in the simulation, the program is designed to suit a 
short run situation, which is the parameters are assumed to be the constants and cannot 
be adjusted by the program itself. As a result, technically, some extreme cases (e. g. one 
of the submarket housing prices becomes very small) may happen. Economically, it 
implies that this type of housing submarket equilibrium has neighbourhood stability. 
Another interesting phenomenon is that Diagram IV(6) has an unsymmetric shape. when 
the submarket housing price increases (the right part of the diagram), the market takes a 
shorter time to return to equilibrium than the case of the submarket housing price 
decreases (the left part of the diagram). Looking back to the housing submarket 
structure in this case (Appendix 4-6), it is shown that if the housing price in that 
submarket increases, the whole housing submarket system becomes less segmented. If 
the housing price in that submarket decreases, the whole housing submarket system will 
become more segmented. Therefore, the implication is that the market equilibrium 
stability is related to the segmentation of the system. This conclusion will be further 
proved by Cases 2&3. 
This dynamic process implies that the buyer's housing search behaviour and the housing 
choice probability are the key forces in directing housing submarket operation. Tile 
sequence is: the submarket housing price change results in the household housing 
preference change (both the search behaviour and the choice probability), which re- 
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distributes the housing demand between the submarkets. Other submarket housing 
prices will be changed, which may further influence the household housing preference. 
This cycle is illustrated by Diagrams I to 4 (the dynamic process of the household 
housing submarket choice probabilities); Diagrams 5 to 8 (the dynamic process of the 
submarket housing prices); and Diagrams 9 to 12 (the dynamic process of the submarket 
housing demands) in Appendix 4-6. 
As housing choice probability takes a key role in directing housing submarket operation, 
it implies that, if the buyers become more sensitive to the changes of the submarket 
housing price or to the changes in the expectation for the future house price (which is 
represented by the sellers' waiting time in the model), the housing submarket system 
will be less stable. In other words, the neighbourhood range which keeps the system 
equilibrium stable will be small 
2. Case Two: short run equilibrium with bounded instability 
Case Two presents an example of housing submarket equilibrium with bounded 
instability. The values of the parameters used in this simulation are listed in Appendix 
4-3 and Appendix 4-7. This market has a normal housing submarket structure. 
The dynamic processes of the sectoral submarket housing prices to disequilibrium are 
illustrated in Diagram IV(7). The diagram shows that, in this housing submarket 
structure, equilibrium has bounded instability. The meaning of bounded instability is 
illustrated by the diagram below. The diagram shows that the dynamics of the 
submarket housing prices are within the neighbourhood of their equilibrium position. 
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Now the question is why the degree of equilibrium stability becomes enfeeble: from 
neighbourhood stability (case one) to bounded instability (case two), till instablility 
(case three). 
Comparing the housing submarket structures, it is found that the similarity between the 
submarket equilibrium housing prices is the reason of contributing to the housing 
submarket stability/instability. This conclusion can be further proved by Table IV(I). 
In the table, from Structures 5 to 6, the equilibrium stability of the housing submarket 
systems simulated changes from Bounded Instability to Instability. 
Table IV(I) 
Housing Submarket Equilibrium Stability and Housing Submarket Structure 
Housing Submarket 
Structure 
Cr 
%--- of the submarket x 
equilibrium house 
prices 
Results 
1 0.66 Neighbourhood Stability 
2 0.61 Neighbourhood. Stability 
3 0.55 Neighbourhood Stability 
4 0.44 Bounded Instability 
5 0.36 Bounded Instability 
6 0.35 
- 
Instablility 
7 0.32 
7 
1nstability 
If other things are unchanged, the difference of the buyers' housing preferences for the 
different housing submarkets in a less segmented (tight) housing submarket structure is 
smaller. This implies that there is a higher housing choice substitution between the 
housing submarkets. When the housing price in one housing submarket changes, there 
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will be a larger scale of housing demand re-distribution between the submarkets. 
Therefore housing submarket equilibrium is less stable in this structure. 
The Diagrams IV(5), (7) and (8) have also shown that there is a spatially lagged effect 
between the submarket housing prices. 
For example, in Diagram IV(5), the equilibrium housing price in SS- II is increased and 
the equilibrium condition in this submarket is broken first. The effect is transmitted to 
other housing submarkets through the changes of the buyers' choice probabilities for the 
different housing submarkets. As a result, the housing prices in other housing 
submarkets will change. But the diagram also shows that the effect on the other 
submarket housing prices are decreasing with spatial distance. This is because a buyer's 
location choice is also influenced by the distance to the work place, to the city centre or 
to the relatives/friends' dwelling location. His preference for housing submarkets has a 
spatial constraint. As a result, when the housing price in one sectoral housing 
submarket is changed, it will have a bigger influence on the buyer's preference for this 
submarket, and the other sectoral housing submarkets located in the same 
neighbourhood. Such influence will decrease on the sectoral housing submarkets located 
in the adjacent or the remote neighbourhoods. The conclusion from the above discussion 
is that, in a local housing submarket system, there exist both spatial and auto correlation 
between the submarket housing prices, which is caused and directed by the buyers' 
housing search behaviour. 
4.5.4 Implications in the Long Run 
In the long run, any of the factors listed in the model can be changed, which will shift 
the submarket equilibrium position. The long term consequence of such change is 
t housing submarket structure may change. The submarket housing prices will be either 
drifting apart or moving closer. 
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The change of housing submarket trade friction. If other factors are unchanged, but 
the housing submarket trade friction is reduced (e. g. as a result of the household housing 
preference change or the area re-generation), the submarket equilibrium housing price 
will be increased, the whole local housing market will be located in a new equilibrium 
position (See Diagram IV(9)). Suppose that there are only two housing submarkets. 
Trade friction in one submarket (sub-I) is reduced, the new equilibrium position for the 
submarket will be shifted up. The whole local housing submarket structure will be 
changed. In this case, the two housing submarkets are drifting apart. 
Diagram IV(9) 
The Long Run Trend of a Housing Submarket Structure (1) 
House nrice 
I 
2 
P Long Run 4 
The change of physical dwelling quality. This change can be a result of dwelling 
maintenance, or area regeneration, which will increase the submarket dwelling price. 
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, Short Run , 
The whole local housing market will be located in a new position. The housing 
submarket structure will be changed too (See Diagram IV(10)). Suppose that the 
dwelling quality in one submarket (spb-2) is improved, the new equilibrium position for 
the submarket will be shifted up. In this case, the two housing submarkets are moving 
closer. 
Diagram IV(10) 
The Long Run Trend of a Housing Submarket Structure (2) 
House price 
I 
2 
Short Run 
Long Run 
The change of the household housing preference. When the buyers become more 
keen on a particular type of dwelling, for example, in a local housing market, the small 
flats located in the central area is becoming more popular than before, the submarket 
housing price will be increased. Therefore, the submarket structure will be changed too. 
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The change of the local population or the housing stock. The increase or decrease of 
the local population may increase or decrease all submarket housing prices. The whole 
housing market will be located in a new position. The structure change of the local 
housing submarket will depend on how the relative housing prices change. The change 
of housing stock, for example, building up new towns, will certainly change the local 
housing submarket structure. The changing pattern will be uncertain and largely depend 
on the relative submarket housing price change. 
In the long run, the housing submarket structure change can be serious, i. e. some 
housing submarkets may have deteriorated whilst others remain unchanged or become 
prospered. 
Diagram IV(11) 
The Long Run Trend of a Housing Submarket Structure (3) 
House price 
, Short Run , 
Long Run 
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Diagram IV(I 1) shows that one submarket housing price could possibly drop below the 
other one. 
The model in this chapter provides a new framework for the housing submarket 
analysis. The main conclusion is: in the short run, the housing market is in a 
neighbourhood disequilibrium and in the long run a local housing submarket structure 
can change as a result of the submarket related components change (Section 4.4). Two 
more questions arise from it. One is how to empirically identifying a local housing 
submarket structure based on the above framework. The other is how to empirically 
estimate the buyers' housing choice probability for the different housing submarkets. 
A large volume of academic literature in the 1980s has been devoted to empirically 
identify a housing submarket (i. e. Goodman 1981, Maclennan, Munro & Wood 1988). 
The basic procedure is: 1. describing the internal (non-spatial), neighbourhood and 
accessibility (spatial) components of each dwelling unit (See Chapter III). These 
components have different functions in identifying the housing submarket structure; 2. 
clustering the individual dwellings, by factor or principle component analysis, into 
product groups (PG), which are constructed both spatially and sectorally (See Chapter 
111); 3. undertaking analysis of price variation and identifying local housing submarket 
structure based on the hedonic housing price analysis method (Pollakowski 1982). An 
example of this analysis based on a neighbourhood level housing submarket is given in 
Maclennan, Munro & Wood (1988). First, for each neighbourhood product group, a 
hedonic regression model is specified and estimated; second, within a metropolitan area 
the regression results for each PG are systematically compared for similarities and 
differences; third, there is an attempt to establish whether such price differences persist 
over a time period. Although sofar no empirical analysis is given based on a nested 
housing submarket structure defined in chapter 111, the empirical work isjust a repetition 
of the above procedure. Therefore, the analysis in the following chapters will not focus 
on this aspect, but will focus on modelling household housing choice behaviour in the 
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circumstance of a nested housing submarket structure. As discussed in Chapter 11, the 
previous housing choice behaviour modelling work didn't Pay enough attention to the 
role of a housing submarket structure in household housing choice decision making 
process, especially at a regional level. This will be discussed in Chapter V to and VIL 
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Chapter V Modelling Household Housing Choice Behaviour per Submarket 
at Regional Level: a theoretical discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter IV explored the operational process of a local housing submarket system which has 
been identified as a nested housing submarket structure in Chapter III. The computer 
simulation results have shown that the buyers' housing choice probabilities for the different 
housing submarkets are the key force in directing the housing submarket operation. The 
changes of the buyers' housing preferences, i. e. the preference for the submarket housing 
price, will change the distribution of housing demand between the housing submarkets, as a 
result, the dynamic process of the whole housing submarket system operation will be 
changed. However, the review in Chapter II concluded that, empirically modelling housing 
choice behaviour at regional level has received little attention 
The question is how a nested housing submarket structure influences a buyer's housing 
choice behaviour, especially at regional level where the spatial dimension of a housing 
market may play an important role in influencing the housing choice behaviour? A housing 
submarket can be identified by a number of factors: i. e. submarket housing price, trade 
friction, location, dwelling type or size. Which of them are the key factors influencing the 
buyers' housing choice for a submarket? Chapter 11 has given an extensive review of housing 
choice models, but none of them can be used to answer this question. 
Briefly, three principal disadvantages of the previous housing choice models (e. g. Quigley 
1976,1985, Louviere 1979) can be drawn from the discussion in Chapter II. 
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1. The previous research isolates a household's housing choice behaviour from the local 
housing submarket structure. The influences of the different submarket housing prices as well 
as the buyers' expectation for the future submarket housing price change on housing choice 
behaviour are ignored. Therefore, the selection of the independent variables in these models 
lacks theoretical underpinning. In other words, they mainly emphasis the goodness of fit, but 
less concern the economic interpretation of the independent variables. 
2. Distance to the work place has been considered as an important factor influencing housing 
choice behaviour. For example, some urban housing choice models measure this effect using 
the distance to the CBD (Alonso 1978). Within a large urban area where there are several 
employment centre or subcentres, this effect is measured by the distance to the work place. 
Quigley (1976) have examined this effect in the USA housing Market. However, there has 
been lack of empirical evidence in the UK regional housing market. The distinct feature in the 
UK regional housing market is that regional residential dwelling distribution is shaped by its 
nuclei employment structure (see Chapter 111). Therefore understanding and measuring the 
influence of this nuclei structure on housing choice behaviour is important. 
3. The availability of dwelling supply in a submarket and its influence on the disaggregate 
housing demand forecast are ignored. Using revealed choice information may therefore bring 
estimation biases to forecasting as a buyer's real housing choice may not represent his/her real 
housing preference because of the dwelling supply constraints. Louviere (1979) used a stated 
preference method to collect housing preference information. Although his method, to some 
extent, remedied the above deficiencies, a new problem was inherent, which was that some 
people might over- or under- estimate their housing preferences. The above implies that there 
is a need to combine a household's revealed housing preference and stated housing preference 
to obtain the 'true' housing preference information. 
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The model introduced in this Chapter is designed to remedy the above three disadvantages. 
Section 5.2 introduces the economic approach to a dwelling choice. A hierarchical conceptual 
framework, which can be used to forecast housing demand by a submarket as well as by an 
individual dwelling is set up in Section 5.3. Based on this framework, the housing demand 
forecasting procedure, variable selection and a housing information collection strategy are 
derived. 
5.2 The Economic Approach for a Dwelling Choice 
5.2.1 The Definition of a Hierarchical Dwelling Choice Set 
A dwelling is a complex economic commodity. 'The principal features of the housing 
commodity which distinguish itfrom most goods traded in the economy are its relatively high 
cost of supply, its durability, its heterogeneity and its locational fixity' (Quigley 1983, page 
25). 
The features of durability, heterogeneity and locational fixity indicate that the housing market 
consists of a group of closely related, but spatially or sectorally segmented housing 
submarkets, which are differentiated by size, type, and neighbourhood conditions as well as 
submarket house prices. These submarkets are connected in a complex way, for example, the 
nested housing submarket structure outlined in Chapter III (see Diagram 111(l) of Chapter 
111). 
In this nested housing submarket structure, the dwellings in each sectoral housing submarket 
are homogeneous. This implies that the dwellings in a sectoral housing submarket have the 
same bundle of key dwelling components but different bundles of non-key dwelling 
components (Chapter 111). 
105 
Before a buyer chooses a specific dwelling, he/she has already chosen a sectoral housing 
submarket as well as the related neighbourhood housing submarket. The alternatives in a 
choice set faced by a buyer thus have a hierarchical structure. 
The first level alternatives are the neighbourhood housing submarkets; the second level 
alternatives are the sectoral housing submarkets and the third level alternatives are the 
individual dwellings in each sectoral submarket. 
The alternatives are assumed as the discrete alternatives although some components, such as 
distance to the work place or house price, are continuous variables. Therefore, each buyer has 
only one final choice. This means that the total utility that a buyer can obtain from one 
dwelling is different from that of any others. 
5.2.2 Rational Behaviour 
The essence of economic choice theory is that a buyer's choice behaviour in a market is 
generated by the maximisation of his/her choice utility. The choice utility is derived from 
consuming the services which are provided by the components of the commodity. For 
example, if the commodity is a dwelling, the rooms will provide the service of sheltering and 
the kitchen will provide the service of cooking. 
A choice is a rational choice if it satisfies three axioms: the axiom of completeness, the axiom 
of transitivity and the axiom of greed, or satiation (Maclennan & Williams 1980). 
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(1) The buyer makes a rational preference ranking of all the potential dwellings which he/she 
knows in the market. (The axiom of completeness) 
(2) If the buyer prefers Dwelling A to Dwelling B, and prefers Dwelling B to Dwelling C, 
then he/she will prefer Dwelling A to Dwelling C. (The axiom of transitivity) 
(3) A buyer will always prefer Dwelling A to Dwelling B if Dwelling A can provide more of 
at least one service to the buyer than Dwelling B can. (The axiom of greed and satiation) 
Although as pointed out in Chapter III, a buyer enters the market with imperfect information, 
in the real world, a buyer rarely makes his/her final choice of a dwelling with imperfect 
market information. This is because buying a dwelling is one of the largest expenditures for 
most of the households, he/she would rather undertake an extensive housing search to obtain 
full market information than make a choice in a rush. A full discussion about the search 
process was given in Chapter III & IV. So, it is reasonably to assume that each buyer will buy 
a dwelling after obtaining full market information. Under this assumption, the axiom of 
completeness will be satisfied. 
The axiom of transitivity denotes that a buyer is able to efficiently select the dwelling. He/she 
doesn't have to compare all the dwellings, but can eliminate the dwellings he/she has less 
preference for. 
The axiom of greed and satiation means that under the budget constraint, a buyer will always 
prefer the dwelling which can provide him/her more services. 
Based on the above approach, a buyer's utility derived from buying a dwelling can be 
described as: 
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Uij = U(Gij, Si, S2,... Sk. ) (1) 
where Ujj is the total utility buyer i obtains from the consumption of the j 'h dwelling; SV 
k=l.. K, is the total amount of the 
ýh type of service which the buyer obtains from the 
consumption of the j" dwelling; Gq is the services which the buyer obtains from the 
consumption of all other goods. Because of the budget constraint, the more a buyer spends on 
a dwelling, the less he/she can spend on other goods. The choice between Gj and Sk reflects 
the constraint of a buyer's financial budget. 
Although each buyer faces a hierarchical choice set, his/her choice for a dwelling depends on 
the total utility which he /she can obtain from consuming all the components associated with 
a dwelling and the related neighbourhood. 
The amount of each type of housing service is produced from consuming at least one 
component. Each component can produce more than one service, e. g. a room can be used as a 
sleeping place or studying place. Different components may provide the same service, e. g. a 
garage and a front door parking area both produce the service of. 'parking'. 
Different buyers have different cognitive abilities or perceptions (tastes) for the dwelling 
components, therefore, the same bundle of components may produce a different bundle of 
services for different buyers. But for one buyer, different bundles of components will produce 
different bundles of services, therefore, produce different utilities. 
Uij >- Uy, for all j#j', means that the total utility a buyer obtains from dwelling j is larger than 
from that for the dwelling j', if dwellings j and j' have different dwelling components. 
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However, the analysts are seldom able to 'peep-into-the-head' of a buyer and accurately 
calculate the amount of each service S1, S2-Sk. In order to make utility function (1) 
measurable, a specification is given below. In this specification, the dwelling components are 
used to measure the services. 
U, j = Vi(Gy, 
Cl, C2,.. Cin) + V2(Gii, Cl, C2,.. Citt) + gij (2) 
Where: ýDj is the error term capturing the information on all the unmeasurable factors or 
inaccurately measured factors in the utility function; Cnq n=l.. m, denotes the component, e. g. 
C, denotes a component of the dwelling size, C2 denotes a component of dwelling type, or C3 
denotes a component of the neighbourhood; V, represents a buyer's preference for the 
components; V2 represents a buyer's perception for the components. 
Although many researchers have tried to identify a buyer's housing perception (MacFadden 
1986), so far we have not found an efficient way to deal with this problem. In this study, V2 
will be treated as an error term in the empirical model calibration. Utility function (1) can be 
rewritten as: 
U# = Vi(Gii, Cl, 
C2,.. Cnt) + C# (3) 
where, C# --: V2(Gij, Cl, C2,.. Cips) 
A buyer's housing choice behaviour can be described by the following probability function: 
Pry = P(Uy >- Vy-. Vj';, - j) 
Pr y= P(V i (G! i, Ci, 
C2,.. Cin) + C#> Vi(Gj-, Cl, C2,.. Cm) + CU'), Vj # f) 
where, in this chapter, Prij is the probability of the 
th buyer choosing the j1h dwelling. 
109 
Equation (4) means that the probability of a buyer choosing dwelling j' is the probability of 
which, the utility obtained from choosing dwelling j is bigger than the utility obtained from 
choosing any other dwelling j', j'*j. 
The economic approach of a dwelling choice implies that to explore household housing 
choice behaviour needs to empirically estimate the probability function (Eq (4). Two things 
have to be done in order to estimate the function: one is to select a statistical choice model. 
This is going to be discussed in Chapter VI; the other is to identify the components (also 
called as explanatory variables in the empirical analysis) outlined in equation 4. The 
identification will take two steps: first, to set up a theoretical housing choice model (Section 
5.3), which provides a theoretical foundation of explanatory variable selection; second, to 
empirically identify and estimate these variables (Chapter VII). 
5.3 A Conceptual Framework of Housing Choice Forecasting Model at Regional 
Level 
5.3.1 A Conceptual Framework 
The complex nature of housing demand and households leads to more diverse household 
actions and hence to no universal pattern' (Jones 1978(b), page 552), and therefore 'the 
choice decision of a household represents the outcome of a complex interaction of the 
psychological propensities, cognitive capabilities and social and economic pressures which 
affect the decision unil'(Maclennan & William 1980, page 909). 
Based on tile above principle, a theoretical housing choice framework is set up (Diagram 
V(I)). In order to study this framework, an assumption is needed, which is 
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a housing buyer is assumed to be a household unit, a consumer and a decision maker. He is a 
rational buyer and is aware of what kinds of dwellings which he prefers and can afford. 
Diagram V(I) 
The Conceptual Framework 
Socio- A Buyer Three Levels' Housing Hierarchical Choice Set Submarket Economic Marketability Background 
Expectation 
of Future 
Preference of ------ ------------------ ------- 
Hous 3 Price 
Neighbourhood 
Components N1 N2 
---------------------------- ---- 
----- ----- ------------------------ 
Dwelling 
Affordability 
Preference of SS11 SS12 SS21 SS22 
& 
Key Dwelling <- Trade-Off 
Components Between Housing 
r- -------- 
Consumption and 
Non-housing 
Consumption 
Preference of --- ------- -------------- --- 
Non-key 
ý'ý DI11 D112 D121 D, 122 D211 D212 D221 D222' 
Components - -------- -----I --------------- ---- Budget Constraint 
Final Choice 
Note: 1. N1 and N2 are the alternatives of neighbourhood submarkets. The dot-line box 
represents the choice for a neighbourhood submarket. 
2. SS1 1.. SS22 are the alternatives of sectoral housing submarkets. The dot-line box 
represents the choice for a sectoral housing submarket. 
3. D1 1 1.. D222 are the alternatives of individual dwellings. The dot-line box 
represents the choice for a dwelling. 
Diagram V(l) provides a conceptual housing choice framework. It is built on a two level 
nested housing submarket structure. Therefore, each buyer faces a three level hierarchical 
choice set, namely, neighbourhood, dwelling sector and individual dwelling. In order to 
simplify the discussion, it is assumed that there are only two alternatives at each level of the 
choice set. In empirical analysis, the number of alternatives at each level are determined by 
the need of forecasting. 
The framework outlines the dimensions of the factors which may influence housing choice 
behaviour, The main dimensions considered are: 1. household nic background, 
e. g. the family life cycles; 2. housing submarket marketabilit which casts a buyer's 
expectation of the future housing price change; 3. household budget constraint which 
determines a buyer's dwelling affordability and his/her trade-off between the housing 
consumption and the non-housing consumption and 4. household housing preferences for the 
neighbourhood components, key and non-key dwelling components. 
From each dimension, a number of factors which may influence the housing choice behaviour 
can be derived. 
This framework can be applied to either an urban housing market or a regional housing 
market. However, the factors influencing housing choice behaviour will be different. In this 
study, the framework is applied to a regional owner occupier housing market. The following 
discussion will derive the factors corresponding to each dimension. 
5.3.2 Factors Influencing Housing Choice Behaviour at Regional Level 
1. Household socio-economic background. Household socio-economic background is 
determined by many factors. Among them, two factors are the most important in terms of 
112 
housing choice: income and the family life-cycle. The influence of the household income as a 
budget constraint on the housing choice behaviour will be discussed later in this section. 
Here, the attention is paid to the effect of the family life cycle on the housing choice 
behaviour. A specification of the family life cycle was given in Chapter 111. The significant 
differences in the preferences of the households' housing consumption are associated with 
their family components, like family size, age structure or marital status (David 1967). These 
will differentiate the households into the different stages of the family life cycle, and the 
households who are at the different stages of the family life-cycle will show the different 
housing choice behaviour. Therefore, a certain classification of the households in terms of 
their life-cycles is necessary when calibrating their housing choice behaviours. An empirical 
identification of the family life cycle is given in Chapter VII. 
2. Household budget Constraint. Compared with most of the goods consumed by a 
household, buying a dwelling is one of the most expensive. The average housing price in a 
market is much higher than the average household annual income. In Lothian region, the 
average housing price (in 1989) is about 2.2 times as much as the average household annual 
income (Lothian Region Household Housing Survey, Appendices 6-2 & 7-2). On the other 
hand, the dwellings in the different housing submarkets have significantly different housing 
prices. Therefore, if the household income remains unchanged, a buyer's choice for a housing 
submarket is constrained by the submarket housing price. For example, the low income 
households are more likely to buy a dwelling in the sectoral submarket of small flat, and less 
likely to buy a dwelling in the sectoral submarket of larger house. If the requirement for the 
dwelling components is unchanged, the low income households are more likely to choose a 
dwelling from an inferior neighbourhood and less likely to choose one from a superior 
neighbourhood because of the budget constraint. 
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Because of the large gap between the housing price and the household income, most of the 
households have to join a mortgage system in order to buy a dwelling. This system allows a 
buyer to pay his/her housing expenditure by instalment. 
Suppose that the amount of the deposit, mortgage rate and the total period of the payments 
are fixed, the amount of the monthly instalment for a buyer is determined by the housing 
price. A higher housing price results in a higher monthly instalment. On the other side, if a 
buyer's income is fixed, the more he/she pays on a dwelling, the less he/she can spend on 
other goods. Therefore, the housing consumption is related to the non-housing consumption. 
A buyer has to trade off between choosing a higher quality dwelling and/or choosing a higher 
quality of other goods. The final combination of these two kinds of expenditures should 
provide a buyer with maximum utility. 
One possible indicator to reflect the influence of budget constrain and the trade-off is the ratio 
of the housing price to the household annual income. For most building societies or banks, 
this ratio is an important factor in determining how much money a buyer can borrow. When a 
buyer chooses a dwelling, it implies that he/she has already chosen the ratio. Choosing a 
higher ratio means a buyer prefers a better quality dwelling to a better quality of other goods, 
ceteris paribus. This ratio will be introduced into equation(4) to replace'Gij'. If J' represents a 
housing submarket (either neighbourhood housing submarket or sectoral housing submarket), 
the ratio is the average submarket housing price over a household income. 
3. Housing Submarket Marketability. For most of the households, buying a dwelling is a 
family investment. A buyer expects to gain more equity from selling the dwelling in the 
future. Previous analysis has show that the housing equity is mainly from the general housing 
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price inflation (Maclennan &Tu 1995a). Therefore, the expected housing price increase in a 
submarket will increase the likelihood of a buyer choosing a dwelling from this submarket. 
One of the conclusions in Chapter IV is that equilibrium submarket housing price is a strictly 
decreasing function of the submarket trade friction, or in other words, an increasing function 
of dwelling transaction velocity in the submarket. The latter represents submarket 
marketability. Reducing submarket trade friction will increase submarket dwelling transaction 
velocity, and hence, shorten the sellers' waiting time. Empirically, submarket marketability 
refers to how 'easy' a dwelling can be sold in a housing submarket at a good price. Therefore, 
submarket marketability can be measured by the submarket dwelling transaction velocity (P) 
defined in Chapter IV. This factor will enter equation (4) to replace one of the Ck(s). An 
empirical specification of the factor will be given in Chapter VIL 
4. Household Housing Preference. A buyer's housing preference reflects how much a buyer 
prefers the components of the dwelling characteristics or the related neighbourhood 
characteristics. The more a buyer prefers the components, the more utility the buyer can 
obtain from the services provided by the consumption of the components. 
A buyer's housing preference can be measured by the neighbourhood components and the 
dwelling components (See the classification in Chapter 111). 
At neighbourhood level, distance to the work place is a crucial factor to determine a buyer's 
location choice. In micro-economic theoretical and empirical analyses of housing demand, 
great emphasis has been placed on the importance of choice and the role of the journey to 
work as a determinant of residential location (e. g. Alonso 1964,1978, Muth 1969, Jones 
1979, Pollakowski 1982 and Quigley 1976,1985). The empirical work (Quigley 1976,1985) 
has suggested that it is unwise to ignore the effects of travel to work costs on dwelling 
115 
location choice. A household will locate where the saving in transport costs from locating 
marginally closer to the employment centre is just balanced the additional housing 
expenditure which will be incurred. 
Regional owner occupier housing market interacts with the regional labour market which has 
a nuclei submarket structure. This structure influences the household housing location choice 
in a number of ways. An example is given below to show the influence. In Lothian Region, 
Edinburgh is the central business district (CBD), and therefore it is the central residential area 
(CRA). East, West and Mid Lothians are the sub-CBDs and each is surrounded by a sub- 
CRA. If a buy works in the CBD, he/she can either choose a dwelling from the CRA by 
paying a higher house price but lower transport cost, or choose a dwelling from a sub-CRA 
but paying a lower house price but higher transport cost. If he works in the sub-CRA, e. g. 
East Lothian, he can either choose a dwelling from the CRA by both paying a higher house 
price and higher transport cost, or choose a dwelling from the sub-CRA by both paying a 
lower house price and lower transport cost. The choice depends on his/her preference for both 
the neighbourhood components and the transportation facilities if the dwelling components 
remain the same. Empirically testifying the influence of the nuclei labour market structure on 
the housing choice behaviour is important. Therefore distance to the work place will enter 
equation (4) to replace Ck(S). 
If other things are equal, a buyer is more likely to choose a dwelling from a superior 
neighbourhood rather than an inferior one. The quality of a neighbourhood can be measured 
by a number of components, for example, physical neighbourhood condition, neighbourhood 
amenities, neighbourbood school quality. The preference for a neighbourhood has a clear life 
cycle pattern. For example, the survey has shown that 33.3% young single households 
evaluate their physical neighbourhood condition as 'Excellent', compared with 68% oldest 
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households (Table 14 in Appendix 7-2). A specification of these components is given in 
Chapter VII. 
Dwelling components are: dwelling type, size, age as well as the interior dwelling structure 
(e. g. kitchen type). A large volume of empirical work has shown that the different households 
have the different preferences for these components (Boehm 1982, Quigley 1976, 
1983,1985). The survey has shown that the average number of rooms chosen by young single 
households is 1.8 compared with 2.9 chosen by the households with dependent children 
(Table 13 in Appendix 7-2). These components will enter equation (4) to replace Ck(s). 
The discussion above leads us to expect that (if other things remain equal): 
1. The household housing preference has a clear family life cycle pattern. 
2. A higher submarket marketability will increase the likelihood of a buyer choosing a 
dwelling from it. 
3. A buyer prefers to live near to the work place, therefore, regional labour market structure 
shapes the regional household residential location choice behaviour. 
4. A buyer's financial constraint limits himself to the housing submarkets which he can 
afford. A higher ratio of the average submarket housing price to his income may reduce the 
likelihood of the buyer choosing a dwelling from it. 
These hypotheses are empirically examined in Chapter VII. 
117 
5.3.3 Modelling Strategy 
Another implication emerging from this framework is that a buyer's choice for a dwelling can 
be split into two stages: stage one is to model a buyer's choice for a housing submarket (a 
sectoral housing submarket and the related neighbourhood housing submarket); stage two is 
to model a buyer's choice for a dwelling after selecting a sectoral housing submarket. 
There are two advantages of this split. One is that the size of the choice set faced by each 
buyer at each stage is reduced and this can simplify the empirical calibration procedure. The 
other is that the budget constraint and the dwelling supply constraint can be considered in two 
stages separately. When a buyer chooses a housing submarket, his choice is strongly 
constrained by his financial budget. This is because the dwelling prices between the housing 
submarkets are significantly different (See the discussion in Chapter 111). Although at this 
stage the dwelling supply also constrains a buyer's choice (this constraint may result in a 
buyer's real choice is not his maximum utility choice), the revealed preference data is still 
suggested to be used to reflect the buyers' housing submarket preferences. This can avoid a 
buyer over- or under estimating his housing preference, which is very likely to happen if 
stated housing preference is used. 
After a housing submarket is chosen, the choice of a dwelling from the submarket will be 
less likely constrained by a buyer's financial budget. This is because the dwellings in the 
same sectoral housing submarket are only different in terms of non-key dwelling components 
(See the discussion in Chapter 111), and their housing prices are not significantly different. 
Therefore, the dwelling supply constraint becomes important. The stated housing preference 
is suggested to be used to reflect a buyer's choice of an individual dwelling. 
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Actually, this two stage split model suits to most of the real world situation. Assuming that a 
household is looking for a dwelling, he will first have a picture in his mind about which area 
and what type of dwelling sector he prefers to home in. Then his housing search will help him 
to choose a specific dwelling finally. 
The main disadvantage of the split model is that, the choice of a sectoral housing submarket 
may be also influenced by the non-key dwelling components (defined in Chapter III) in that 
submarket, but such influence is ignored by the split model. 
Equation (4) is thus split into two: 
Pi, i= P(Vi (Gi. j, C* i.. 
Ck., C,, i.. Cw) + cy > Vi(Gi. j. v, 
Ck i.. Ck.,, C, i.. Cw) + ci. y) (5) 
Pri. j. d = P(Vdl(CP'kl.. CAtn) + Cl, j. d > Vdl(Cnkl.. Cnkm) + Ei, j. d', Vjtl # jd') (6) 
where, PrIj represents the probability of choosing a housing sector. Prij, d represents the 
probability of choosing a dwelling from a housing sector. Gjj is the budget constraint. CkI to 
Ck,, are the key dwelling components. C,,, to C,,, are the neighbourhood components. Cnkj to 
Cnkn, are the non-key dwelling components. 
Equation (5) represents the probability of a buyer's choice for a sectoral housing submarket as 
well as the related neighbourhood. It denotes that such choice is constrained by his financial 
budget and influenced by his preference for the key dwelling components. The empirical 
calibration is suggested to be on the basis of the revealed housing preference. Equation (6) 
represents the probability of a buyer's choice for a dwelling after choosing a sectoral housing 
submarket, which is influenced by his preference for the non-key dwelling components. The 
empirical calibration is suggested to be on the basis of the stated preference. 
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The framework discussed in this section remedies the three disadvantages mentioned in 
Section 5.1. A consideration has been given to the possible influence of housing submarket 
structure on housing choice behaviour. Based on it, the factors which may influence a buyer's 
housing choice behaviour are selected in terms of their economic meaning. The split model 
also provides a framework for estimating housing choice behaviour by the combination of 
stated preference information and revealed preference information. The reason is that the 
choice of a dwelling from a. sectoral housing submarket is less influenced by the buyees 
budget, but more influenced by the dwelling supply, while the choice of a submarket is 
mainly constrained by a buyees financial budget. Therefore the estimation of equation (5) 
will be based on revealed preference, but the estimation of equation (6) can be based on stated 
preference. 
On the basis of this framework, Chapter VI will discuss two questions. One is how to select a 
suitable statistical model to empirically forecast a buyer's choice of a housing submarket and 
a buyer's choice of a dwelling after choosing a housing submarket; the other is how to design 
a questionnaire to collect the information needed. The empirical analysis will be given in 
Chapter VIL 
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CIIAPTERVI METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter V provided a theoretical model of forecasting housing choice behaviour and 
showed that the housing choice behaviour can be modelled in two separate stages: the 
choice of a sectoral housing submarkct and the choice of an individual dwelling in the 
submarket. From the model, a number of factors which may influence the housing 
choice behaviour, were derived and two different infonnation. collection techniques 
were suggested. This Chapter is aimed at selecting the suitable statistical models to 
empirically calibrate the housing choice behaviour (Section 6.2) and designing a 
questionnaire to collect the infonnation needed (Section 6.3). 
6.2 Discrete Choice Models : the MNL and the NMNL models 
Modelling housing choice behaviour involves that the dependent variables are discrete 
values. Therefore, the discrete choice models should be used. A comprehensive 
classification of the discrete choice models is given below. This classification is a 
direct extension of the work of McFadden (1982). 
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Probit Models Logit Models Elimination Models 
41 44 40 
Binominal Probit Binominal Logit Elimination By 
Aspects (EBA) 
40 
Multinominal Probit Multinominal Logit Hierarchical 
Model (MNP) Model (MNL) Elimination By 
+ Aspect (HEBA) 
tkk le 
Nested Multinominal 
Logit Model (NMNL) 
Among these models, the MNL and the NMNL models are the most widely used 
models in the housing choice analyses. This is mainly because they have much 
simpler functional forms and the parameters in the models have a direct link with the 
choice probability. All these models are derived from the random utility approach and 
they are different in terms of the different assumptions of the probability distribution 
of the error term cij of equation (4) in Chapter V. There are several assumptions 
involved and each produces a different discrete choice model. These are discussed 
below. 
The multinominal probit model (MNP) is derived by assuming the error terms, cU 
j=l.. J, have a joint multivariate normal distribution with zero mean and an arbitrary 
variance-covariance matrix Q. This model was first proposed by Thurstone (1927) 
/101 
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and has been applied to psychological-choice data by Bock & Jones (1968). Then it 
was further developed by Hausman & Wise (1978) and Daganzo (1980). 
The main advantage of MNP over the MNL model is that it does not have the 
restrictions imposed by the IIA axiom of the MNL model (further discussion is given 
in the latter part of this section). The main disadvantages are: 
1. the interpretation of the coefficients can not be done easily as the relationship 
between the choice probability and the coefficients is not direct; 
2. a large number of alternatives is difficult to handle. Computation is the primary 
impediment to widespread use of the MNP model. Implementation of a fast and 
accurate approximation to the MNP probabilities remains an important research 
problem (Maddala 1983), especially in the housing market research where a dwelling 
is defined as a complex commodity with multiattributes. The number of dwelling 
alternatives will increase rapidly as more dwelling attributes are considered. For this 
reason the application of the probit model in housing choice is very limited. 
The elimination By Aspect (EBA) model views an individual's choice as a process in 
which alternatives are screened from the choice set until a single alternative remains. 
It can be defined by the probability of transition from a set of alternatives to a subset. 
During this process each individual has his/her own criteria of elimination based on 
the known, identified, explanatory variables. The statistical model form was given by 
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Tversky (1972a, b). The advantage of the EBA model over the MNL model is similar 
to the MNP model. But this model suffers from two main criticisms. 
First, the EBA model assumes that the aspects (in housing circumstances, 'aspects' are 
used to represent dwelling related components) which are shared by all alternatives do 
not affect the final choice probabilities. In my view, this may be a restriction for 
analysing housing choice behaviour as neighbourhood components shared by the 
dwellings certainly influence the final housing choice behaviours. 
Second, the EBA model has a technical disadvantage similar to the probit model in 
that the computational burden will increase rapidly as the number of alternatives and 
diffcrent aspccts incrcascs (McFaddcn 1982). 
The hierarchical elimination by aspect model (HEBA) is an extension of the EBA 
model. It assumes a clear tree structure to reduce the number of alternatives faced by a 
buyer at each hierarchy. However the main drawback of the HEBA model is that it is 
a direct derivation of the EBA model, but not directly derived from random utility 
theory, and therefore the model lacks theoretical underpinning (Tversky & Sattach 
1979). Besides, although it involves fewer parameters than the EBA model, the 
HEBA model is still computationally infeasible for large choice set and has not found 
many econometric applications (Maddala 1983) 
The multinominal logit model (MNL) can be derived from equation (4) of Chapter V 
if the error terms c,,, Vj are assumed to satisfy the following assumptions: 
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1. ejq Vj, are mutually independent and are identically extreme-value 
distributed (T denotes an individual and 'j' denotes an alternative); 
2. cjj Vj are uncorrelated to the directly measured independent variables and 
related parameters of these variables; 
3. c ii 
Vj have zero means; 
4. c ii 
Vj are consistent with respect to maximisation, i. e. if c ii and e ii, 
havethe 
same distribution, then max (cj ge ii, 
) must also have the same distribution. 
This model and its extensions were developed by McFadden (1973,1974,1976a, 
1978,1979 and 1982). The functional form of the MNL model is: 
Pr # .1 
exp(v(gop) 
Eexp(v(Ru, 
J. -I 
(See McFadden 1982) 
(1) 
The MNL model relies on an important property, which is the' Independence from 
Irrelevant Alternatives' (IIA) axiom. This means that the odds of j being chosen over 
is independent of the availability or attributes of alternatives other than j and j'. This 
property can be expressed as: 
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Aj P# 
Ai. = Pii, 
jjes jjec 
where C is the full choice set and scC is a subset of C. 
(2) 
In other words, for an individual T, the relative choice probabilities of choosing the 
alternatives j and j' are irrelevant of the existence of the other alternatives in the choice 
set. The axiom of IIA is a necessary and sufficient condition for applying the MNL 
model. The following example illustrates the essence of the IIA axiom when the MNL 
model is applied to a housing choice case. 
Suppose that there are three dwelling alternatives: 
hl=small sized dwelling; 
h2=Middle sized dwelling; and 
h3=largc sized dwelling 
Choice sets: C=Ihl, h2, h3) 
s=(h I, h2) and scC 
Suppose that the odds of choosing h, over h2 from S are 2, thus: 
P(hi / S) exp(Um) 
=2 P(h21S) exp(Uh2) 
(3) 
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Again, suppose that the third dwelling'h3' is added to the set, fonning the set C, and 
the IIA axiom holds, then 
Pr(hi /Q= exp(Vhi) 
=2 Pr(h2 /Q exp(Vh2) 
From equations (3) and (4), it is obtained that 
Pr(hi / S) 
= 
Pr(hi Q= exp(Vhi) 
=2 Pr(h21S) Pr(h2 Q 
ýXP(N2) 
Relating to the choice set s, Pr(h, /S)+Pr(h2/S)=l and combining with equation (3), 
(4) 
(5) 
Pr(h, /S)=0.67 and (6-1) 
Pr(h2lS)=0.33 (6-2) 
Assuming that 
Pr(ht /Q exp(Vm) 13 (7) 
Pr(h3/ Q eXP(Vh3) 
Relating to the choice set C, Pr(h, /C)+Pr(h2/C)+Pr(h3/C)"'21 and combining with 
equations (5) and (7), 
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Pr(h, /C)=0.46 (8-1) 
Pr(hX)"ý0.23 (8-2) 
Pr(hX)ý0.31 (8-3) 
The above results show that if the IIA axiom holds, an individual's relative preference 
for any two dwellings, h, and h2, should not be influenced by the existence of the third 
dwelling, h 3. Although the choice probability for each dwelling has changed. 
Although the MNL model has a very simple model form and the coefficients have 
direct relation to the choice probabilities compared with the other alternative discrete 
choice models, it suffers some criticisms, mainly the possible violation of the IIA 
axiom, particularly in a housing choice case. Quigley (1983,1985) argues that the IIA 
axiom is violated in a housing choice circumstance. 
However if a buyer is a rational buyer, satisfying the axiom of completeness (see 
Chapter V, the violation of the axiom of IIA can be avoided. This is mainly because a 
rational buyer can rank the dwellings properly; and after housing search, each buyer is 
assumed to have obtained full market information. As a result, each buyer will be able 
to judge the relative utility he/she can obtain from two dwellings. This implies that the 
axiom of IIA can be satisfied theoretically although empirically a buyer may not 
always behave rationally. Hausman and McFadden developed a statistical diagnostic 
to test the axiom of IIA (11ausman and McFadden 1984). The principle of the test is to 
estimate if there is any significant difference between the coefficients of the 
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independent variables estimated by the full choice set and the coefficients estimated 
by any one of the subsets. However, empirically, this test is only applicable to the 
smaller sized choice set. In this study, there are 63 alternatives in the full choice set, 
and a huge number of subsets are derived. This may cause an empirical calibration 
problem and, therefore, limits the use of the method. 
However, one of the assumptions of the MNL model is easily violated in the housing 
choice case and this is the assumption of independent error terms. This is mainly 
because, in the MNL model, the independent variables 91 include the neighbourhood 
components shared by the dwellings in the same neighbourhood. The unmeasured part 
of the neighbourhood components are classified into the error terms, which means that 
c ii and ej,, 
if j and j' are in the same neighbourhood, share the same unmeasured 
factors. They are thus not independent, and the assumption of the error terms is 
violated. This will introduce biases to model estimation. 
In order to avoid this drawback but take the advantage of the model, the NMNL 
(nested multinominal logit) model has been developed (McFadden 1978). 
The NMNL model is an empirical generalisation (a mathematical functional change) 
of the N4NL and the IIEBA models (McFadden 1978,1982). It is computationally 
tractable for a large choice set and involves the sequential use of the MNL program. 
McFadden (1978) proved that the model could be derived from random utility theory 
by assuming that 'c(s)' have a gencralised extreme value distribution. This derivation 
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remedies the drawback of the IIEBA model and avoids the assumptions used in the 
MNL model. 
A simple case is illustrated below based on Diagram III(l) in Chapter III. A buyer 
faces four alternatives. These four alternatives are split into two groups: two 
neighbourhood housing submarkets and two sectoral housing submarkets within each 
neighbourhood. The forecasting model will be able to calculate the choice probability 
for each of the four sectoral submarkets as well as for each of the two 
neighbourhoods. 
Both the MNL model and the NMNL model can be used for the empirical calibration. 
The MNL model will derive all the choice probabilities simultaneously and the choice 
probability of each neighbourhood is a simple aggregation of the probabilities of the 
sectoral housing submarkets. However, the NMNL model will calculate the choice 
probabilities sequentially. 
The functional form of a two stage nested logit model can be expressed as: 
Pl1k=Pr(I1k)= 
, 
exp(v(jFkip)) (9) 
exp(v(jFki- 
Prk= Pr(k) exp(v(ikcc)) +(I -a) 
A- 
(10) 
Z 
exp(V(jFk - a) + (I -a) Iki' 
k'- I 
lk= Lpi(ýexp(v(. Wkip))) 
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The choice probability for alternative kI which represents a sectoral housing 
submarket, is the product of PrIlk and Prk 
Pro = Pritk*Prk (12) 
where: k denotes the neighbourhood housing submarket, I denotes the sectoral 
housing submarket. 
Ik is named as the inclusive value. It captures the information of the sectoral housing 
submarkcts nested in one neighbourhood. For the ease of discussion, the subscript T 
denoting an individual is omitted from the model. 
When I-a=l (a=O), the nested logit model is reduced to the form of the MNL model. 
This implies that this coefficient can be used for testing if the alternatives in the 
choice set satisfy the IIA axiom. 
Compared with the MNL model, the NMNL model has three very distinct advantages: 
1. It allows the residual terms in the random utility function to be correlated. This 
property means that the NMNL model has a variety of applications. 
2. Theoretically the model provides a statistical test of the IIA axiom. If (I-a) is 
significantly different from 1, the axiom of IIA is violated. 
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3. The hierarchical structure of the model reduces the number of alternatives handled 
at each hierarchy, making the computation easier. 
However it has two main disadvantages: 
1. A necessary and sufficient condition for a NMNL model to be consistent with 
random utility theory is that the coefficient of the inclusive value should lie in the unit 
interval (McFadden 1978). However, the statistical distribution of I-cr is still unclear. 
This creates the problem of empirically testing it. Particularly, there is no statistical 
diagnostics available to test if the true value of I -a is within a unit interval. 
2. Economically, the choice of a neighbourhood T is influenced by the 
neighbourhood (spatial) components as well as the aggregate condition of the 
dwellings in the neighbourhood. The functional form of the NMNL model implies 
that the latter influence is measured by the inclusive value ( Ik) in the model. A 
suspect is raised if this value can accurately convey the information of the dwelling 
sectors to the neighbourhood level. For example, if a buyer is interested in the small 
flats located in one ncighbourhood, the quality of larger house will have less influence 
on the buyer than the quality of the small flats. The NMNL model does not emphasis 
this difference. 
3. The precondition of using the NMNL model is that an estimation sequence has to 
be assumed. A key question is if the assumption influences the estimation results? For 
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example, is there any empirical difference if the estimation sequence is assumed as 
that neighbourhood is in the first level and dwelling sector is in the second level or the 
sequence is the opposite? This disadvantage together with the second one implies that 
the restrict of the functional form might introduce estimation biases to the choice 
probability. 
Based on the above discussions, using either the MNL model or the NMNL model 
may bring biases to the empirical results. Briefly, the bias caused by using the MNL 
model is from two sources: 
1. The possible violation of the IIA axiom implied by the model. 
2. The assumption of independent error terms is violated in the housing choice case. 
The bias causcd by using the NMNL modcl is from two sourccs: 
1. the restrictions of the NMNL model functional form: the assumptions of the 
estimation sequence and the inclusive value. 
2. there is not a satisfactory statistical test to test if the condition of 0<1-c;: 51. holds. 
Therefore, the theoretical foundation of the NMNL model is not sound. 
The above discussion shows that theoretical, both models have their merits and 
limitations when applied to a housing choice case. Therefore, which one should be 
chosen will depend on the empirical results. In other words, the model empirically 
creating less biases should be used. Two statistical diagnostics are suggested to judge 
the quality of the model. One is the Pseudo-R2, the other is the significance of the 
coefficients. Tile mathematical specification of these statistical diagnostics are given 
in Appendix 6-1. The empirical comparison is given in Chapter VII. 
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In Chapter VII, both models will be used to calibrate a buyer's choice of a sectoral 
housing submarket as well as the related neighbourhood housing submarket and the 
MNL model will be used to calibrate a buyer's choice of a dwelling given the choice 
of a sectoral housing submarket. This is because the choice for a dwelling given a 
sectoral housing submarket only involves one level choice. 
6.3 Outline of Data Collection 
6.3.1 Data Collection Procedure 
As an initial step, the existing data bases were investigated to establish what data 
already existed. The ESPC (Edinburgh Solicitors Property Centre) database and the 
Register of Sasine database were used. The information in the ESPC database 
includes the asking price and the sale price of a dwelling, the offer type and the sellers' 
real waiting time in the market. The information in the Register of Sasine includes the 
sale price, the dwelling address and the buyer's name. They were found to provide 
only part of the required information, e. g. the housing price and the dwelling address. 
Further data collection was deemed necessary because the discussion in Chapter V 
suggests that the following data is required: households socio-economic backgrounds, 
dwelling and neighbourhood related components. 
Two major data collection methods were considered with the view to supplementing 
the existing databases: 
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1. Mail questionnaires (the respondent records his answer on a printed schedule of 
questions); 
2. Structured interviews ( an interviewer administers a printed schedule of questions). 
Each of these methods has distinct advantages and disadvantages. In particular there is 
a strong association between the cost (time and finance) and quality of the information 
with both tending to increase as one moves from method (1) to method (2). 
The method of mail questionnaire was selected as a better method for this study ( The 
questionnaire used is presented in Appendix 6-1). The reasons for this selection are: 
1. Low financial cost and quick responses. Compared with the structured interview 
method, mail questionnaire has a much lower financial cost and a much shorter 
response time. 
2. Confidential. The household survey involves asking the respondents private 
information, e. g. household income. A direct home interview may affect the chance of 
the respondent providing the correct information. Contrarily, the anonymous mail 
letter can give the respondent a confidential feeling and reduce the bias. 
The main disadvantages of the mail questionnaire are the relative low response rate 
and the possibility of inaccurate answers. The first disadvantage requires that the 
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selection of the sample size should consider the influence of the response rate. The 
second disadvantage requires that it is very necessary to 'clean' the collected data, i. e. 
to omit any unreasonable returns. The unreasonable returns can be identified by 
testing if some logic relationships between the questions are satisfied by the response, 
for example, the logic relationship between the household income and the occupation 
as well as the age of the head of the household; the relationship between the housing 
price and the dwelling type, size and location. Based on the above discussion, the data 
collection procedure involved: 
1. Identifying the survey population (Section 6.3.2); 
2. Choosing a suitable information collection technique to design the questionnaire 
(Section 6.3.3); 
3. Selecting the sample size. A pilot survey was used in order to obtain some pre- 
knowledge of the likely response rate (Section 6.3.4); 
4. Controlling the response rate. This is undertaken by rc-scnding questionnaires to 
the same address after one or two weeks (Section 6.3.4). 
5. Evaluating the data quality, e. g. testing and omitting the unreasonable returns, 
checking the representative of the sample (Section 6.3.4). 
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6.3.2 Derining the Research Area 
To investigate household housing choice decision making process, the Lothian Region 
housing market area was selected as the research area ( see Map One in Appendix 7- 
1). The reasons are: 
1. Lothian Region is defined as a travel to work area by Coombes et al (1982). 
Edinburgh is the Central Business District (CBD) with East, West and Mid Lothian as 
travel to work districts. The dwelling types and prices are different across the districts. 
Therefore, this geographic pattern provides a good foundation for identifying a nested 
regional housing submarket structure and investigating the buyers' preferences for a 
each housing submarket. 
2. The theoretical model in Chapter V has shown that submarket house price is an 
important factor influencing a buyer's choice and a precise house price information is 
required for modelling. The Register of Sasine database in Lothian Region records 
exact dwelling transaction price as well as dwelling address, which provides a good 
condition for questionnaire survey. 
Two sample populations were considered as possible objective populations: 
1. a random sample from the entire population; 
2. a random sample from recent movers. 
137 
In the first case, people who have lived in the region for some length of time are 
grouped with the people who have only recently bought a dwelling in the region. The 
main drawback of using this sample for modelling is that the recent movers and the 
non-recent movers may have faced different dwelling price levels because of the 
housing price inflation. This makes it difficult to compare the submarket housing 
prices. Therefore, the recent movers are selected as the sample population in this 
study. Cross-scctional data arc used. Practically, all the samples bought their dwelling 
in the same year (in 1989). 
6.3.3 Questionnaire Design 
Chapter V specified the information needed to build the model. A questionnaire is 
needed to obtain this information. As pointed out in Chapter V, the revealed 
preference data is suitable to calibrate a buyer's choice for a sectoral housing 
submarket and the stated preference data is suitable to calibrate a buyer's choice for a 
dwelling after choosing a sectoral housing submarket. Therefore both methods were 
used to design the questionnaire. An explanation of the two methods is given below. 
Traditionally, the analysis of housing choice has been based on 'revealed preference' 
data (i. e. Quigley 1985, Blackley & Ondrich 1988). That is, the choices and the 
decisions have actually been made in the market place. The revealed preference (RP) 
data requires an observation of what was chosen (or how often it was chosen) and 
what was rejected (or how often it was not chosen), plus actual measurements of 
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associated attributes and interpersonal factors. Models are calibrated directly using 
these data, and the statistical tests determine their' adequacy. 
The true validity of a model, however, lies in its ability to reproduce other choices 
which do not draw from the calibration sample or an associated 'hold out' sample 
(Louviere 1983). The main limitations of the revealed preference are connected with 
the high survey costs, and lack of control in some choice alternatives which may not 
yet exist in the real choice set but may be preferred by the buyers. In other words, the 
influence of the supply constraints on the housing choice behaviour is ignored. 
As an alternative, the stated preference methods (SP) have been developed, especially 
in market demand analysis. A definition of SP given by Green & Srinivasan (1988) is 
that SP data are collected in the form of preferences or choices from the hypothetical 
alternatives. These hypothetical alternatives are pre-specified in terms of different 
attributes. For this reason, SP is also called Laboratory-Simulation analysis or 
conjoint analysis. The main advantages of the stated preference method are: 
(1) The approach can directly study and evaluate products, services or situations 
which are qualitatively or quantitatively different from those which are commonly 
encountered. In a housing choice circumstance, using this kind of information relaxes 
the housing supply constraint. 
(2) Each individual can respond to several different hypothetical choice situations; 
this increases the efficiency of data collection and in some cases can provide enough 
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data to estimate the utility function for each individual (eg, by rating response). In 
other words, the envirorunent of choice can be precisely specified requiring a decision 
which allows straight forward identification of effects and large quantities of relevant 
data can be collected at moderate cost. 
Therefore, the SP approach is a method which is =jkLto control, e. g. the researcher 
can control the potential sources of bias and so reduce model misspecification by 
appropriate design techniques before data collection, more flexibig-,. e. g. the design can 
cope with broad ranges of choice attributes and reduce intercorrelation between 
attributes and cheape to apply than the RP method. 
The major disadvantages of using SP are both validation problems: 
(1) It is important to know whether the models calibrated on the SP data 'agree with 
those calibrated on the RP data' (Bates 1988). That is, people (in the future) may not 
necessarily do what they say, but this only becomes serious where research 
undertaken to estimate demand levels uses only SP data. 
(2) People may not be able to evaluate their preferences properly on the measurement 
scale being used. For example some people may overstate their response under 
experimental conditions. Especially in a housing choice circumstance, the respondent 
may ignore the budget constraint when answering SP questions. This results in some 
respondents misestimating their housing demand preference structure. 
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In terms of this study, a combination of SP and RP data may offer an attractive 
solution to investing housing choice behaviour. 
Firstly, it has been shown (Chapter V) that the information needed to calibrate 
housing choice behaviour by submarkets should be based on the revealed preference 
data only. This is because the budget constraint is an important factor influencing a 
buyer's choice for a submarket. 
Secondly, the empirical calibration for a buyer's choice of a dwelling given the 
housing submarket is based on both kinds of information. Therefore the results from 
both RP data and SP data can be compared. The influence of the dwelling supply 
constraint can be investigated (Chapter V). 
Appendix 6-2 gives a full discussion of questionnaire structure. 
6.3.4 Determining the Sample Size and Evaluating Data Quality 
According to the Register of Sasine database, there were 22,139 dwelling transactions 
in Lothian Region in 1989, which was the 11% of the total regional owner-occupier 
dwelling stock. 
A pilot mailing questionnaires were sent out to 150 households in order to estimate 
the response rate and test the questionnaire. The response rate was 31%. This number 
was used to estimate the total required sample size. Considering the data size 
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requirement in empirically calibrating the discrete choice models by splitting samples, 
information from approximately 700 households was needed. Considering the 
expected response rate, 2000 questionnaires were sent out and 500 kept as reminding 
questionnaires. If the response rate obtained from the first wave was very low in some 
areas, the reminders were needed for a second wave. 
A structured, random sampling technique was used to select the respondents' 
addresses. Lothian Region has four districts: Edinburgh, West Lothian, East Lothian 
and Mid-Lothian. Almost 80% of the owner occupier dwellings are located in 
Edinburgh, therefore, majority of the dwelling transactions occur in Edinburgh. In 
order to increase the representative of the sample, the sub-sample size of each district 
was made proportional to the owner-occupier dwelling transaction (in 1989) of each 
district. After determining the subsample size, a random sampling tecl-mique was 
applied to each district. 
Of the initial 2000 questionnaires, 296 were sent back due to 'wrong' addresses and 
the response rates in Edinburgh and the East Lothian area were low. As a result, 
another 500 new addresses were selected. 100 were sent to East Lothian and 400 were 
sent to Edinburgh. Totally 8 10 respondents completed the questionnaire. The response 
rate is about 36.7% (the number of returns over the number of questionnaire receivers 
which is equal to (810/(2000-296+500)). However, about 113 respondents' answers 
were bad quality and omitted (e. g. some of the respondents erased their address in 
order to keep their information confidential, or some of them gave wrong 
information). As a result, the actual, effective response rate of approximately is 32%. 
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In the empirical analysis of Chapter VII, 710 sample points'are actually used. The 
extra 13 sample points are the artificial sample points created for the purpose of 
modelling. Lothian Region owner occupier housing market is divided into 7 
neighbourhood and 36 sectoral housing submarkets (Chapter VII). In some housing 
submarkets, i. e. the submarket of large house located in the central Edinburgh, there 
was few dwelling transactions in 1989. As a result, none of the sample points obtained 
was from these submarkets. However, the empirical model requires at least one 
sample point for each alternative. Therefore some artificial sample points have to be 
created. The sample has a good representative (see Table VI(l) and VI(2)). 
Table VI(I) Sample Representative (1) 
Location Number Number Number Average Average 
of of of Housing Housing 
Dwellings Dwellings Dwellings Price (Sa) Price (Sm) 
(c) (Sa) (SM) 
Edinburgh 157,423 16,603 488 E52,347 f. 57,215 
Area (79.1%) (75%) (69%) 
Outside 41,547 5,536 222 E47,771 E47,275 
Edinburgh (21.9%) (25%) (31%) 
Lothian 198,970 22,139 710 L51,202 L54,112 
Region (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Note: (c) represents the 1989 owner occupier housing stock (censits data). 
(Sq) represents the 1989 Register ofSasinc data (the nunthcr ofdwelling transactions). 
(Sm) represents the 1992 randointy sampledsurvey dalaftom 1989 Sasine's dalabase. 
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Table VI(l) gives a broad comparison of the sample distribution and the average 
housing price distribution. The results show that the average housing price from the 
sample is very close to the average population housing price. Although the sample 
proportion in Edinburgh is lower than the population proportion, the difference is not 
significant (7 percentage point lower). The sample rate in Edinburgh is 2.9% and in 
other areas, it is 4% compared with the average sample rate is 3.2%. 
Table VI(2) Sample Representative (2) 
Register of Sasine Sample 
Livingston Area 42% 40% 
M. Lothian & 
Linlithgow Areas 
30% 35% 
E. Lothian Area 28% 25% 
Total 100% 100% 
Edinburgh-I 7% 14% 
Edinburgh-2 27% 22% 
Edinburgh-3 42% 35% 
Edinburgh-4 24% 29% 
Total 100% 100% 
Table VI(2) compares the population distribution with the sample distribution across 7 
neighbourhood housing submarkets. The identification of these housing submarkcts 
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are given in Chapter VII. The data shows that the sample distribution is very close to 
the population distribution in East, West and Mid- Lothian, but in Edinburgh, 
especially, in the central Edinburgh (Edinburgh-1), the sample proportion is much 
higher than the population proportion. The bias partly comes from the creation of the 
artificial data, partly comes from a higher response rate obtained from this area. The 
Edinburgh central area is favoured by young people who are economically active. The 
survey shows that this kind of respondents provides a good response rate. However 
this bias is not serious as the sample distribution in the other three Edinburgh housing 
submarkets is very close to the population distribution. 
The above discussion shows that, although some biases exist in the sample, they are 
not serious. Therefore, the empirical housing choice model will be calibrated and 
tested on the basis of these 710 sample points. The results are presented in Chapter 
vil. 
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CHAPTERVII EmPIRICAL RESULTS 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter V provides a conceptual framework of modelling household housing choice 
behaviour. On the basis of this framework, Chapter VI identified two statistical 
models which were suggested to be used in the empirical calibration of the 
framework. This chapter is aimed at presenting and analysing the empirical results. 
Section 7.2 empirically classifies the buyers into four stages of the family life cycle 
and identifies seven neighbourhood housing submarkets and nine sectoral housing 
submarkets in each neighbourhood. Three non-key dwelling components are selected 
to differentiate the dwellings in each sectoral housing submarket. An empirical 
(Lothian Region) nested housing submarket structure is built up on the basis of the 
theoretical discussion in Chapter III. Section 7.3 specifies the independent variables 
used in the empirical model. These variables are derived from the theoretical model 
provided in Chapter V. Section 7.4 analyses the empirical results of housing choice by 
submarkets. An empirical comparison of the suitability of the MNL model and the 
NMNL model when applied to a housing choice case is given. Section 7.5 analyses 
the empirical results of housing choice by dwellings given a sectoral housing 
submarket. 
The results in these two sections are compared with the previous housing choice 
literature (See the discussion in Chapter II), and provide empirical evidence to support 
the theoretical discussions (conclusions) in Chapters IV to VI. 
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7.2 Data Overview 
7.2.1 Classifying Households by the Family Life Cycle 
The theoretical model in Chapter V explored that the households who were in the 
different stages of the family life cycle exhibited different housing choice behaviour. 
Therefore the household socio-economic background should be selected as the 
explanatory variables. 
Limdep 6.0 is used to empirically calibrate the discrete choice MNL and NMNL 
models. The calibration procedure does not allow (in terms of technique) the 
household information, i. e. age or family size, to enter the model directly. An 
alternatives is to group the households by their socio-economic backgrounds. In this 
study, the households is classified into the different stages of the family life cycle 
based on the theory introduced in Chapter III. 
The households in the sample is grouped into four stages of the family life cycle (See 
Table VII(l)). This classification is derived from the approach of the Minimal 
Household Unit (Ermisch & Overton 1985) discussed in Section 3.3 of Chapter III. 
147 
Table VII(1) 
Identification of the Family Life Cycle 
Life-CYcle Description Sample Size Percentage 
Stages 
Stage I Young Single age 125 17.6% 
below 44 
Stage 11 Young Couple 154 21.7% 
aged below 
44 
Stage III With Dependen 329 46.3% 
Children 
Stage IV Older couple o 102 14.4% 
Single, aged ove 
45 
rrotal 710 100% 
Source: 1992 Lothian Region Household Housing Survey (Appendix 6-2) 
The average household income and the average house price chosen by the buyers 
differ over the family life-cycle as is clear from Table VII(2) below: 
Table VII(2) 
The Average Household Income and Dwelling Price Across the Family Life Cycle 
Life-Cycle Stage Ave. Household 
Income (f) 
Ave. House Price 
M 
Ratio of 
Price/Inc 
1 17686 36604 2.07 
11 28065 48152 1.72 
111 25049 58274 2.33 
IV 19674 60920 3.09 
All 23634 52500 2.22 
Source: 1992 Lothian Region Household Housing Survey (Appendix 6-2) 
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The above table shows that the housing price selected by a household increases with 
the family life cycle, but is inconsistent with the life cycle change of household 
income. The reason is given below. 
For most of the households in UK, buying a dwelling is an important family 
investment. The home owners expect to accumulate their housing wealth through 
house price inflation. When they move (on average, every 8 years a UK home owner 
moves once), majority of the housing equity, which they have obtained from the sale 
of their previous dwelling, is re-deposited into their new house. As most of the UK 
home owners start their housing career at their late 20s, a higher stage of the family 
life cycle implies that a household may own more housing equity (Maclennan & Tu 
1995a, Tu & Maclennan 1995). Therefore they can afford a higher deposit or a more 
expensive dwelling. However, within the same stage of the family life cycle, if other 
things remain unchanged, income is a very important financial constraint in buying a 
dwelling as discussed in Chapter V. 
Their housing preferences are different over the family life cycle. an example is given 
in Table VII(3). 
Table VII(3) 
Housing Preferences Over the Family Life Cycle 
Life-Cycle Stage Ave. Dwelling Size Percentage of Flats, 
2.8 81.1% 
3.9 44.6% 
111 4.9 25.2% 
IV j 4.2 33.7% 
All 14.2 140.6% 
Note: Dwelling size is measured by the total number ofrooms except the number ofbathrooms 
and the number ofkitchens. Source: 1992 Lothian Region Household Housing Suney (Appendir 6-2) 
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Table VII(l) shows that almost 46.3% of the buyers are households with dependent 
children. On average, these buyers choose a higher ratio of price to income (Table 
VII(2)) and prefer the bigger sized houses (Table VII(3)). This is because this group 
of people have a larger size family. On the other hand, 17.6% of buyers are single 
person households in stage 1. They choose a lower ratio of price to income and prefer 
to buy smaller sized flats. This is because they have the smallest family size and may 
prefer to spend more money on other goods. Thus, the buyers have different housing 
preferences over the family life cycle. 
7.2.2 Identifying the Choice Set 
The theoretical model in Chapter V exhibits that, in a local housing market, a buyer 
faces a three level choice set. The first level alternatives are the neighbourhood 
housing submarkets; the second level alternatives are the sectoral housing submarkets; 
and the third level alternatives are the individual dwellings. An empirical dwelling 
choice set needs to be identified in order to model housing choice behaviour. 
The information needed to empirically identify this hierarchical housing choice set is 
from 1989 ESPC housing price data, the Register of Sasine data and the questionnaire 
survey. The procedure takes the following three steps: the identification of a 
neighbourhood housing submarket; the identification of a sectoral housing submarket 
and the identification of a specific dwelling. The identification of a housing submarket 
is undertaken by grouping the dwellings into different product groups. These product 
groups are simply assumed as the housing submarkets in the following discussion 
although according to the definition of housing submarket in Chapter III, a hedonic 
analysis is needed to further classify theses product groups into different housing 
submarkets. This approximation will not influence the empirical analysis as the 
estimation is based on the average housing price rather than the hedonic housing 
prices. 
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Identification of the neighbourhood housing submarkets in Lothian Region. 
1. In Edinburgh District, the dwellings are first classified into each District ward. Each 
ward is treated as a minimum unit. These wards are then grouped together into 
neighbourhoods using cluster analysis. Three factors are selected in the cluster 
analysis. They are the average housing price in each ward, the percentage of the 
detached- or semi- detached houses and the percentage of the flats in each ward. 
Based on these criteria, 62 District wards in Edinburgh are grouped into four 
neighbourhoods in terms of the similarities of the three factors. The data used are 
1989 ESPC data. In this database, district ward information is provided for each 
individual dwelling. 
2. In East, West and Mid Lothian Districts, the dwellings again are first classified into 
the District wards. The wards are then grouped by the average housing price in each 
ward. This gives three neighbourhoods constructed outside Edinburgh district. The 
data used are from the 1989 Register of Sasine database. Although this database 
doesn't provide district ward information directly, it has to be adopted here since the 
ESPC data does not cover these districts. 
The neighbourhood identification is based on Edinburgh and outside Edinburgh 
separately (See Diagram VII(l)). The reason for a separate classification is that all the 
three neighbourhoods outside Edinburgh are travel to work areas. As a result, even if 
one of these housing submarkets has a similar average housing price to a 
neighbourhood housing submarket within Edinburgh, they should not be grouped 
together because their hedonic functional form may be different. 
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Identification of the sectoral housing submarkets in Lothian region. 
Sectoral housing submarkets are constructed from two dwelling related 
characteristics: dwelling type and dwelling size. The data used are from the 
questionnaire survey since neither the ESPC data nor the Register of Sasine include 
dwelling type information. Dwelling types are differentiated by three key 
components: semi-detached or detached house, main door flat or terraced house, and 
flat; Dwelling size is differentiated by three levels of size: two or less bedrooms, three 
or four bedrooms and five or more bedrooms. Using this classification nine sectoral 
housing submarkcts arc identified, and the average house prices vary across these 
sectoral housing submarkets within each neighbourhood (See Diagram VII(2)). 
Diagram VII(I) and VII(2), together, illustrate an empirical (Lothian Region) nested 
submarket structure. 
Diagram VII(I) 
Lothian Region Sectoral Housing Submarket Within Each Neighbourhood 
where F=f lat; T= main door f lat or terraced house; H= detached or semi detached house 
S= two or less bedrooms; M= three or f our bedrooms; 
L=five or more bedrooms. 
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Within Each Neighbourhood 
Diagram VII(2) 
Lothian Region Neighbourhood Housing Submarkets 
Edinburgh 
Where: E= Edinburgh and 0= outside Edinburgh 
Some more information about the identification of Lothian Region Housing 
submarket is givens in Appendix 7-1. 
Identification of a dwelling in a sectoral housing submarket 
The discussion in Chapter V shows that the dwellings in a sectoral housing submarket 
are differentiated by the non-key dwelling components (See Chapter 111). The 
discussion below will give an empirical classification based on three non-key 
dwelling components. They are: Kitchen Type, Central Heating and Private Garden. 
This is because over 94% of the buyers think that Kitchen Type, Central Heating and 
Private Garden are the most important non-key dwelling components (see Table 2 in 
Appendix 7-2). 
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These three components produce eight alternatives (See Table VII(4)). In the table, 
'Kitchen' denotes Kitchen Type (O=small kitchen, Marge kitchen). 'Central Heating' 
denotes the facility of central heating (I=has it, O=without it). 'Garden' denotes private 
garden (I =has it, O=without it). 
Table VII(4) 
Identification of Each Individual Dwelling Within a Sectoral Housing 
Submarket * 
Alt-I Alt-2 Alt-3 Alt-4 Alt-5 Alt-6 Alt-7 Alt-8 
Kitchen I I 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Central 
Heating 
I 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Garden I11 01 11 11 01 0 11 10 
The discussion in Chapter V suggests that modelling household housing choice for 
non-key dwelling components should be based on the stated dwelling preference. In 
the empirical model, both revealed and stated preference data are used. The household 
housing survey (Appendix 6-2) provides both information. The revealed preference is 
from the buyers' real choice for the non-key dwelling components. The stated 
preference information is from the buyers' ranking for six non-key dwelling 
components including the above three. Therefore a transformation from the ranking 
data to the choice data is needed. The transformation follows that if a buyer ranks 
these three as the top three important components among the six, the buyer will 
choose alternative one; if among the top three ranks, there are only the components of 
large kitchen and central heating, then alternative two will be chosen; if among the top 
three ranks, there is only the component of large kitchen alternative flve will be 
chosen, etc.. 
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The above discussion shows that, in the Lothian Region private owner occupier 
housing market, a housing buyer faces a three level hierarchical choice set, which is: 7 
neighbourhood housing submarkets, 9 sectoral housing submarkets in each 
neighbourhood and 8 types of dwelling in each sectoral housing submarket (Appendix 
7-1). 
The empirical analysis in Sections 7.4 and 7.5 will be based on this choice set. Before 
commencing these analysis, the selection of the independent variables to be used in 
the model are given below. 
7.3 The Selection of the Independent Variables 
As required by the estimation procedure in Limdep 6.0, the independent variables 
needed for empirically modelling a MNL or a NMNL model should be the variables 
describing the natures of the alternatives. The data structure is given in Appendix 7.3. 
The following discussion will focus on the selections of the these (explanatory) 
variables. The selection is theoretically based on the conceptual framework discussed 
in Chapter V. The mathematical specifications of the variables are presented in 
Appendix 7-4. 
For a specific buyer, five factors may influence his choice for a neighbourhood. 
(a) Financial budget constraint (NRPI). As discussed in Chapter V, if other things 
remain unchanged, a lower income household is more likely to choose a 
ncighbourhood with lower average housing price. This is because the same type of the 
dwellings has different dwelling prices if located in the different neighbourhoods. If 
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income is fixed, buying a more expensive dwelling implies that the buyer has to 
reduce non-housing consumption. Therefore the ratio of the average neighbourhood 
housing price to a household income is selected. 
(b) Marketability (NVEQ. As discussed in Chapter V, a higher level of submarket 
marketability enhances a buyer's expectation for the future housing price growth, 
therefore, increase his probability of choosing the submarket. It is also pointed out 
that theoretically, marketability can be measured by the submarket dwelling 
transaction velocity defined in Chapter IV. However, empirically, this variable is 
hardly to be observed. This is because it is almost impossible to observe the number 
of searchers in a submarket. What we can obtain is the number of dwellings traded in 
a submarket during a specific time. 
Therefore, an approximation of the variable is used in this study. It is calculated as the 
percentage of the total dwelling transactions occurring in a neighbourhood housing 
submarket (the number of dwelling transactions in the submarket divided by the total 
number of the dwelling transactions in the whole housing market on the basis of the 
survey data). According to the distribution of these percentages, they are divided into 
three levels, 10% or below represents a low level marketability; 10% to 20% 
represents middle level marketability and 20% or over represents a high level 
marketability. 
(c) Neighbourhood amenities (NNAM). In this study, the measurement is based on 
the map of 'Shopping Hierarchy of Lothian Region' provided by Lothian Region 
Structure Plan 1993 (See Maps Three and Four in Appendix 7-1). A superior 
neighbourhood amenity means that a dwelling is located near to the regional shopping 
area and an inferior neighbourhood amenity means that a dwelling is located near to 
the lQgA shopping centre only. 
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(d) Physical neighbourhood condition (NPNQ. In the questionnaire, physical 
neighbourhood condition is measured by six rating scales (Appendix 6-2). However 
over 90% home buyers preferred to describe their physical neighbourhood using the 
first three ratings which are: excellent, improving and sound. Therefore, these three 
ratings are used to measure a physical neighbourhood quality. Empirically, it is 
measured by the average rate of the buyers assessment of their physical 
neighbourhood condition in each neighbourhood housing submarket. 
(c) Neighbourhood school quality (NSCH). The measurement is based on the 
secondary school quality of the neighbourhood. This is mainly because in the 
questionnaire, the dependent children are defined as children aged 16 years old or 
below. The survey was undertaken in 1992 and these households were the movers in 
1989. So when they were choosing their dwelling, their children were 13 years old or 
below. As a result, secondary school quality should be an important factor influencing 
their neighbourhood choice. There are 40 secondary schools distributed across the 
region. Their qualities are evaluated by the 'percentage of 1989-90 school leavers with 
5 or more Highers' (See Map Five in Appendix 7-1). Among 40 secondary schools, 
only three schools have 30% or more school leavers with '5 or more Highers'. The 
percentages of the other schools range from 3.5% to 29.65%. 
(f) The distance to the work place of the head of a household (DTIV). There are 
three ways to measure DTJV. 
I.. Using real distance (e. g. miles). It can provide accurate information of distance- 
choice probability cross elasticity. However, the main disadvantages are: (a) the 
respondents may not be able to precisely estimate the distance, especially if he/she 
does not drive to work. (b) real distance may become less important if there is a good 
transport link (Road, bus or train system). (c) the Limdep discrete choice modelling 
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procedure does not allow to use a variable describing household infonnation 
(Appendix 7-3). 
2. Using travel to work time. It remedies the disadvantage (b) above, but shares the 
disadvantage (c). Besides, it has an inherent disadvantage which is that different 
people use different transportation tools. This brings an empirical difficulty to 
compare the travelling time. 
Therefore, the third way of measuring the influence of distance to the work place is 
suggested in this study. The basic rule is that regional housing market area is divided 
into several subareas in terms of the location of the CRA and the sub-CRAs. 
Assuming that a buyer's work place is located in one of the CBD or sub-CBDs. If 
he/she chooses the related residential area to live (e. g. the CRA or the Sub-CRA), the 
distance is measured by '1', which means that he/she chooses to live near to the work 
place. If he/she chooses the adjacent residential area to live, the distance is measured 
by '2', otherwise the distance is measured by '3', which means that he/she chooses to 
live far from the work place. Therefore the distance is measured by an ordinal variable 
with three levels. This rule is applied to Lothian Region and the details are given in 
Appendix 7-4. The advantage is that, based on this rule, we can practically calculate 
the choice probabilities of a mover for the residential areas as long as his/her working 
location is known. This result provides a link between a local labour market and the 
local housing market structure 
(2) The alternatives are the sectoral housing submarkets. 
(a) Financial constraint (IIRPI). The reasons of choosing this variable and the 
definition are the same as variable 'NRPI'. 
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(b) Marketability (VEQ. The reasons of choosing this variable and the definition are 
the same as variable 'NVEC'. The only difference is that at sectoral housing 
submarket level, this percentage is calculated as the number of dwelling transaction in 
the submarket divided by the total number of the dwelling transactions in the nested 
neighbourhood. 
(c) Dwelling type. (TYPE). Five key dwelling related components are selected to 
measure dwelling type (see Table 12 in Appendix 7-2). These five components are 
grouped into three in terms of their similarity on the average dwelling prices: 
detached-or semi-detached house; terraced house and main door flat; and flat. This is 
because, after breaking the sample into subgroups, there are much fewer sample 
points in some dwelling sectors (see Table 12 in Appendix 7-2). This creates 
empirical calibration problems. This is a dummy variable. 
(d) Dwelling size (SIZE) Dwelling size is measured by small dwelling ( two 
bedrooms or less), middle sized dwelling (three or four bedrooms) and large dwelling 
(five or more bedrooms). This is an ordinal variable. 
(e) Dwelling age (AGE) Dwelling age is measured by the dwelling construction date 
(See Tablel. I in Appendix 7-2). Therefore, the dwellings in the same dwelling sector 
were built at the similar time. This is an ordinal variable. 
3. The alternatives are the individual dwellin2s. 
Given a sectoral housing submarket nested in a neighbourhood, the dwellings are 
differentiated by tile non-key dwelling components. These dwellings have the similar 
dwelling price (See Chapter 111), and the financial constraint is not an important factor 
at this level. Therefore tile stated preference technique can be used to relax the 
influence of tile dwelling supply constraint (See the discussion in Chapter V and VI). 
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The survey shows that among the six non-key dwelling components (Tables 17, 
21&22 in Appendix 7-2), kitchen type, central heating and private garden are more 
important than the other three. These three components are selected. 
(a) Kitchen Type (KIT). Two types of kitchen are considered in the survey: a large 
kitchen with a dinning area and a small kitchen with a separated dinning room. 
(b) Central Heating (CH). 
(c) Private Garden (Gard). 
They are measured by the dummy variables. The combination of the above three non- 
key dwelling components forms nine types of the individual dwellings (Table VII(4)). 
4. The effect of the household socio-economic backeround on the housina ch * 
The discussions in Chapter V showed that the household family life cycle was a very 
important factor influencing the housing choice behaviour. Chapter VI pointed out 
that this effect could be investigated by comparing the model coefficients between the 
subgroups classified by the family life cycle. 
In this study, the buyers are classified into four stages of the family life cycle and each 
faces 63 sectoral housing submarkets (see section 7.2). The data used are from 
Lothian Region Household Housing Questionnaire Survey undertaken by the author 
in 1992. The sample includes 710 households. Among them 125 households are single 
young person households, 154 households are young couple households and 329 
households have dependent children; 47 households are elder single or couple 
households with the head(s) working and in the other 55 households, tile licad (s) have 
160 
retired. Because of limitations of the subgroup sample size, only the subgroups of 
single young person households (Group I), young couple households (Group2) and the 
households with dependent children (Group3) are considered in this chapter. 
7.4 The Choice of a Sectoral Housing Submarket 
7.4.1 Introduction 
A buyer's housing choice behaviour for a sectoral housing submarket can be calibrated 
by both the NMNL model and the MNL model (See Chapter VI). The empirical 
calibration work is completed by the'Discrete choice procedure' in LIMDEP 6.0. The 
data structure required by the procedure is listed in Appendix 7-3. The mathematical 
definitions of explanatory variables are given in Appendix 7-4. 
7.4.1 Comparison of the MNL Model and the NMNL Model 
The discussion in Chapter VI has shown that theoretically, the application of the MNL 
model or the NMNL model to a housing choice problem will both bring bias to the 
estimation and the suitability of either model to a housing choice case is determined 
by the empirical results. This hypothesis is tested below. 
Tables VII(5a) and (5b) present the empirical results from the NMNL model. Table 
VII(6) presents the empirical results from the MNL model. 
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Table VII(5a) 
The Choice of a Sectoral Housing Submarket: Coefficients in the NMNL Model 
VARs Ovcrall Group-I Group-2 Group-3 
HRPI -0.4792 -0.41678 -0.4983 -0.5673 
(0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) 
VEC2 1.3504 1.5011 1.3747 1.3303 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
VEC3 2.2365 1.9136 2.3460 2.1245 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TYPE2 0.1882 -0.6152 ....... 0.7475 
(0.155) (0.06) (0.00) 
TYPE3 0.2274 -0.8504 ------- 0.8299 
(0.15) (0.07) (0.00) 
SIZE 0.2801 -0.7960 ....... 0.7950 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AGE -0.1743 -0.3191 -0.1937 -0.1482 
(0.05) (0.22) (0.19) (0.25) 
x2 577.48 221.94 145.1 263.99 
2 
Pseudo-R 0.56 0.84 0.62 0.56 
Table VII(5b) 
The Choice of a Neighbourhood Housing Submarket: Coefficients in the NNINL 
Model 
VARs Overall Group-I Group-2 Group-3 
DTW -1.1861 -1.4486 -0.9569 -1.5433 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NPNC 0.1514 -0.4577 ........ ........ 
(0.07) (0.01) -------- ........ 
NNAM -0.046 ........ -0.2779 ........ 
(0.59) ........ (0.03) ........ 
NSCH -------- ........ ........ 5.18 
........ ........ -------- (0.00) 
I -cr 1.534 0.68 1.43 1.90 
(0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) 
x2 277.82 111.75 47.42 208.99 2 
Pseudo-R 0.33 0.60 0.27 0.48 
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Table VII(6) 
The Choice of a Sectoral Housing Submarket: Coefficients in the MNL Model 
VARs Overall Group-1 Group-2 Group-3 
I-IRPI -0.5159 -0.7576 -0.5095 -0.6993 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
VEC2 1.3654 1.6024 1.3836 1.3444 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
VEC3 2.2866 2.0272 2.3678 2.2044 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TYPE2 0.1948 -0.4681 -------- 0.8318 
(0.12) (0.12) ........ (0.00) 
TYPE3 0.2488 -0.5533 ....... 0.8530 
(0.09) (0.19) ....... (0.00) 
SIZE 0.3257 -0.5702 ....... 0.9656 
(0.00) (0.01) ....... (0.00) 
AGE -0.2343 . 0.4076 -0.2638 -0.0446 
(0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (0.66) 
DTW -1.3130 -1.2387 -1.0520 -1.4823 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NNAM -0.2425 0.2551 -0.3683 ........ 
(0.00) (0.17) (0.01) -------- 
NVEC2 ........ ........ 0.5662 ........ 
........ --------- (0.04) ........ 
NVEC3 ........ ........ 0.3835 -------- 
........ ........ (0.19) ........ 
NSCII ........ ........ ........ 3.2431 
-------- ........ ........ (0.01) 
x2 854.4 329.6 196.8 445.6 
Pseudo-R 0.70 0.93 0.72 0.75 
The column marked 'Overall' gives the empirical results based on all the sample 
households. In Table VII(5a), the figures represent the coefficients in equation (9) of 
Chapter VI, in Table VII(5b), the figures represent the coefficients in equation (10) of 
Chapter VI and in Table VII(6), the figures represent the coefficients in equation (1) 
of Chapter VI. The values in the brackets are the p-values. For example, if we use 5% 
as tile significance level, all the coefficients, which have less than 5% p-values, will 
be significantly different from zero. 
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Because the value of X2 is influenced by the sample size, Pseudo-R2 , which is derived 
from X2, is used to interpret the model fit. This value is within a unit interval and a 
higher Pseudo-R 2 represents a better model fit. 
Some variables are omitted from the models as they are not statistically significant. 
For example, 'NSCH' is omitted from Group 1. This is because the choice of a 
dwelling location for a single person household won't be influenced by the 
neighbourhood school quality. 
An empirical comparison of the NMNL model and the MNL model is given below. 
I. The comparison of the model fit. 
Table VII(7) 
2 A Comparison of the Model Fits (Pseudo-R 
Modcl Ovcrall Group-I Group-2 Group-3 
NMNL-s 0.56 0.84 0.62 0.56 
NN4NL-n 0.33 0.60 0.27 0.48 
MNL 0.70 0.93 0.72 0.75 
Note: NAINL-s denotes the modelfils of the choice ofa sectoral submarkel given 
a neighbourhood and NAfNL-n denotes the modelfits ofthe choice ofa neighbourhood 
in the NAINL modeL The definition ofPseudo-R2 is given in Appendir 6-1. 
Two conclusions can be drawn here: for all the sample households as well as the 
samples across the subgroups, the MNL model provides a much better model fit; the 
model fits of neighbourhood choice in the NMNL model (Table VII (5b)) are not 
good. 
2. The significance of the coefficients. Comparing the significance of the coefficients 
in the MNL and the NMNL models using 5% as the significance level, it is found that, 
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for the 'Overall', the coefficients in the MNL model were more significant than the 
coefficients in the NMNL model. For the subgroups, there is no significant difference. 
3. In Table VII(5b), for the 'Overall, Group2, and Group3', the coefficients of the 
inclusive values (I -a) are bigger than ONE. This implies a 'potential' violation of the 
sufficient and necessary condition, which is that the value of (1-a) is within unit 
interval, used in the NMNL model. Here, the 'potential violation' means that the true 
values might be bigger than one. 'Groupl', the coefficient of the inclusive value is 
less than ONE. But this coefficient is not statistically significant at the 5% significant 
level. Therefore, there might also exist the 'potential' violation of the condition used 
in the NMNL model. 
4. The explicit assumption (See Chapter VI) in the functional form of the NMNL 
model may cause the bias. This is supported by the evidence of the following tables 
The values in Tables VII(8) (9a) and (9b) separately represent the restricted log- 
likelihood (the third column), the unrestricted log-likelihood (the fourth column), the 
Chi-square (the fifth column) and the Pseudo-R 
2 (the last column) of the MNL model 
(Table VII(8)), the conditional probability of the NMNL model (the choice of a 
sectoral housing submarket conditional on the chosen neighbourhood, Table VII(9a)) 
and the marginal probability of the NMNL model (the choice of a neighbourhood 
housing submarket, Table VII(9b)). The definitions of the unrestricted log-likelihood, 
restricted log-likelihood, CHi-square and the Pseudo-R 
2 
were given in Appendix 6-1. 
Comp'aring the third columns of the three tables, it is found that, the lo, 1P. and X2 in 
Table VII(8) are about the sum of the ones in Table VII(9a) and Table VII(9b) 
separately. This implies that the total value of the log-likelihood is from two sources: 
one is from the choice of a sectoral housing submarket conditional on the chosen 
neighbourhood, the other is from the choice of a neighbourhood housing submarket. 
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Comparing the Pseudo-R 
2 in the three tables, it is found that the MNL model and the 
conditional probability of the NMNL model provide a good model fit. However, the 
marginal probability of the NMNL model shows a low explanatory ability (low model 
fit). 
There are two possible reasons: one is that the independent variables were not 
correctly specified to explain the neighbourhood choice. However, if this were true, 
the Pseudo-R 
2 in the MNL model should not have been so high (See Table VII(8)). 
The other reason is that the implied assumption in the NMNL model is not a suitable 
one (See Chapter VI). In other words, we cannot simply use the inclusive value to 
represent the influence of sectoral housing submarka condition on a neighbourhood. 
choice. 
Table VII(8) 
The Goodness of Fit of the MNL Model Over the Subsamples 
MNL N 10 IR x2 Pseudo -R2 
Overall 710 -2941.63 -2514.44 854.37 0.70 
Group-I 125 1 . 517.89 -353.06 329.66 0.93 
Group-2 154 -638.04 -539.64 196.81 0.72 
Group-3 329 -1363.09 . -1140.29 . 
445.6 0.75 
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Table VII(9a) 
The Goodness of Fit of the NMNL Model Over the Subsamples (1) 
NMNL-l N Lo LD x2 Pseudo -R 
Overall 710 -1560.03 -1271.29 577.48 0.56 
Group- 1 125 . 274.65 -163.65 221.94 0.8 
Group-2 154 -338.37 -265.82 145.1 0.62 
Group-3 329 -722.89 -590.89 . 
263.99 0.56 
Table VII(9b) 
The Goodness of Fit of the NMNL Model Over the Subsamples (2) 
NMNL-11 N 10 10 x2 Pseudo -R 
Overall 710 -1381.6 -1242.69 277.82 0.33 
Group- 1 125 1 -243.24 -187.37 111.75 0.60 
Group-2 154 -299.67 -275.96 47.42 0.27 
Group-3 329 -640.2 -535.71 208.99 0.48 
The above conclusions provide show that, on the basis of the statistical diagnostics 
available, the MNL model is superior to the NMNL model for this housing choice 
case. This is contrary to the previous arguments (McFadden 1978, Quigley 1985), 
which emphasised that the NMNL model is theoretically superior to the MNL model 
in a housing choice circumstance. In fact, the previous research over emphasised the 
violation of the IIA axiom implied by the MNL model and lacked of considering the 
empirical estimation biases caused by using the NMNL model. 
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One point has to be stressed that the conclusion above does not mean that the NNL 
model is better than the NMNL model in all cases of housing choice. In this case the 
MNL model gives a better result, which only means that the estimation biases from 
the NMNL model are larger than those from the MNL model. In addition, the MNL 
model is a simultaneous housing choice model and the NMNL model is a sequential 
housing choice model. Although the conceptual framework in Chapter V shows a 
hierarchical choice set structure and a buyer's decision making process can be a 
simultaneous process or a sequential process, the MNL model provides a better fit. 
This implies that the sequence used in the discrete choice model is conceptually 
different from the sequence used in describing the housing choice decision making 
process. This result clears the ambiguous assumption implied in some previous 
housing choice literature (e. g. Boehm 1982, Quigley 1985), which is the two 
sequences are assumed to be the same. 
The implication of the results in this study is that there does not exist a model which 
is definitely superior to another. The choice of a suitable model mainly depends on the 
empirical results or data. This is consistent with the theoretical argument in Chapter 
vi. 
7.4.3 Empirical Results: choosing a housing submarket 
I The results (See Table VII(6)) show that the MNL model provides a good model fit 
for all the sub-sample groups. By systematically adding or omitting a variable to and 
from the models, the coefficients in the table were found to be robust. The hypotheses 
discussed in Chapter V are tested by the conclusions in this section. 
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The hypothesis (Chapter V) that the household housing preferences have a clear life- 
cycle pattern is proved by the coefficients in Table VII(6). As King (1980) has 
pointed out, it appears important to allow the housing preferences to be distributed 
across the population. Table VII (6) shows that young single person households prefer 
to buy smaller flats located in the central area of Edinburgh, which has a good 
neighbourhood amenities. Households with dependent children prefer to buy larger 
houses from a neighbourhood with good quality schools. For this group, the 
coefficients of the dwelling age are not significant, showing that the dwelling age has 
less influence on their housing choice. The coefficients of the dwelling type and size 
of young couple households are very insignificant and are dropped from the model. 
Looking at the survey data, their dwelling interests are seen to be very much more 
varied than those of the other groups. One possible reason is that the incomes of this 
group are generally high and the family size is small, giving them a larger range of 
dwellings to select from. Their choice may also be influenced by their future family 
plans, unknown to this survey. Because their preferences vary a lot, the coefficients 
become very insignificant. However, this group of households has shown their strong 
preference of locating in a neighbourhood further from city centre (See the negative 
coefficient of 'NNAM' in the table). 
This life cycle pattern implies that there is a distribution of the price elasticities of 
demand across the consumers, which is both interesting in itself and significant for an 
analysis of the housing wealth gain and loss from submarket housing price changes. 
For example, if the house price in a sectoral housing submarket of small flat changes, 
the influence on single young person households will be stronger than on any other 
groups as this type of dwelling are more preferred by them. 
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The influence of the distance to the work place on the housing choice behaviour is 
well documented (see the discussion in Chapter V). Quigley (1985) provides USA 
empirical evidence which is the households are willing to bid a substantial premium 
for a more accessible location to their work place. He finds that, to save one hour 
commuting time by car per month, households are willing to pay $2.29 per month in 
higher rent, or about 62% of the average pre tax hourly wage. 
In this study, the finding is, if other things are equal, the logit of a buyer choosing a 
dwelling from the same location as his work place is 1.31 compared with choosing a 
dwelling from the adjacent location (see Appendix 7-4). For example, in Lothian 
Region, if a person gets a job in West Lothian, the logit of he/she choosing a dwelling 
from the West Lothian housing market is 1.31 compared with choosing a dwelling 
from the adjacent locations, e. g. from the Edinburgh housing market or the Linlithgow 
housing market. This result is very useful. in investigating the influence of a local 
labour market change on the local owner occupier housing market. 
The evidence in this study also shows that their preference has a clear life cycle 
pattern. This is contrary to the argument of Blackley & Ondrich (1988), which is that 
controlling for unit quality and size, the socio-economic characteristics are not 
significantly related to the distance from the central business district (CBD). Their 
findings are based on the USA rental housing market. 
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In Lothian Region owner occupier housing market, it appears that households with 
dependent children have the strongest propensity to live near to the work place of the 
head of a household, their preference for 'short distance to the work place' is almost 
41% (the calculation is based on the difference between the coefficients) higher than 
young couple households. This is because, most young couple households have two 
working people (e. g. husband and wife). They prefer to choose a place which is 
convenient for both of their work places, but not just for one of them. 
The big gap between the housing price and the income constrains a buyer's choice of 
a dwelling (See Chapter V). It has been proved in previous studies (Kain & Quigley 
1975, Ellickson 1981, Boeham 1982, Follain & Jimenez 1985) that higher income 
households prefer higher quality dwelling. Follain & Jimenez (1985) also indicates 
that the income elasticity of the demand for living space is less than the income 
elasticity of the demand for amenities (Canadian Rental Housing Market). Although 
these research provides affluent evidence of the role of income on housing choice, few 
of them has investigated the effect of the ratio of the housing price to the income on a 
housing choice in an owner occupier housing market. This ratio is crucial as it reflects 
the trade-off between the housing consumption and the non-housing consumption in 
the current mortgage system (See the discussion in Chapter V). In this studies, this 
effect is analysed. 
The empirical evidence shows that all the buyers prefer to choose a lower ratio, and 
this preference has a life cycle pattern. Single young person households and 
households with dependent children prefer to choose a lower ratio compared with 
young couple households. Their preferences for choosing lower ratio are 48.7%, 
37.3% higher than young couple households. This is not surprising: single young 
person households generally have a lower income and face a stronger budget 
constraint, and they may also prefer to spend more money on holidays or other leisure 
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activities. Households with dependent children may have higher non-housing 
expenditures due to their children. As a result, although they generally have higher 
incomes, they prefer to choose a lower ratio. These conclusions testify the hypothesis 
in Chapter V and show the important role of the ratio on housing choice behaviour. 
The most significant contribution of this housing choice model is the development of 
the identification of the choice hierarchy. Being different from the previous research 
(Boehm 1982, Quigley 1985, Birsch-Supan 1986), this study identifies a hierarchical 
housing choice set based on a nested housing submarket structure defined and 
discussed in Chapter 111. This identification allows us to investigate how housing 
submarket marketability (measured by the dwelling transaction velocity defined in 
Chapter IV) influence housing choice behaviour. Chapter V has argued that a higher 
dwelling transaction velocity in a submarket enhances a buyer's expectation for the 
future house price growth, therefore, increases their choice probability for the 
submarket. The empirical results (The coefficients of 'VEC') in this section show that, 
on average, higher marketability will attract more housing buyers to the submarket. 
Particularly, the logit of a buyer choosing a dwelling from a submarket with middle 
level marketability rather than from a submarket with lowest level marketability is 
0.19, but the logit will be 0.05 if a buyer choosing a dwelling from a submarket with 
highest level marketability rather than from a submarket with middle level 
marketability. This is because, higher level marketability implies the submarket 
housing price is high and this may constrain a buyer's preference for that submarket. 
The results from the subsamples show that this preference does not have a clear life- 
cycle pattern. But the coefficient in the model show that younger households are more 
likely to choose a dwelling from a sectoral housing submarket with higher 
marketability. This implies that the younger home owners emphasis the role of buying 
a dwelling as a family investment more than the older home owners do. This 
implication is consistent with the result of Tu & Maclennan (1995). 
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The influence of submarket marketability at neighbourhood level is not significant 
except for subgroup-2. This is because there exists collinear between the sectoral level 
marketability and the neighbourhood level marketability. Although there is an 
exception for subgroup-2, the indicator variable (NVEC3) is not significant at 5% 
level. 
The above empirical results have testified the theoretical conclusions in Chapter V. 
However, the discussion so far has been focusing on submarket level. Given a sectoral 
housing submarket nested in a neighbourhood, the choice for an individual dwelling is 
also important. As the dwellings are differentiated by their non-key dwelling 
components within a sectoral housing submarket, an attractive combination of the 
non-key dwelling components related to a dwelling in the submarket can draw more 
housing buyers towards the submarket. This will be discussed in the next section. 
7.5 The Choice of a Dwelling from a Scctoral Housing Submarkct 
In this section the MNL model is chosen to empirically calibrate the revealed and the 
stated non-key housing preferences. Limdep 6.0 is used to undertake the calculation. 
The mathematical specification of the independent variables is given in Appendix 7-4. 
The discussion in this section will provide empirical evidence of how the dwelling 
supply constraint can be relaxed using the stated preference data. 
Table VII(I 0 presents the empirical results of the household housing preference for 
the non-key dwelling components. The calibration work was initially undertaken by 
adding an income variable to the model. However, the coefficient is not significant. 
After omitting the income variable, the value of X2 shows no significant change and 
the coefficients of Kitchen, Central Heating and Garden are relatively robust. This 
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proves the hypothesis (See Chapter 111) that the budget constraint does not 
significantly influence the choice of the non-key dwelling components. 
Table VII(IO) 
The Choice of a Dwelling Given a Sectoral Housing Submarket: 
Coefficients in the MNL model. 
VARs Overall Group-I Group-2 Group-3 
RP SP RP SP RP SP RP SP 
Kitchen -0.0810 1.1370 -0.6549 1.7720 -0.1266 1.2010 0.0998 1.0505 
(0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.46) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00) 
Central 1.7352 1.8452 0.6932 1.7050 1.7373 1.9694 2.1644 1.8192 
Heating (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Garden 1.0649 0.6954 -0.4340 0.12 0.7239 0.8505 2.1290 1.0161 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.52) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
x2 527.34 654.28 30.54 127.4 98.3 163.62 431.75 315.54 
Pleudo- 0.81 0.87 0.41 0.90 0.75 0.90 0.96 0.89 
R 
The results in the table show that the MNL model fits the stated preference data much 
better than it fits the revealed preference data. All the coefficients in the stated 
preference models are significant except the coefficient of 'Garden' in Group- 1. Some 
coefficients in the revealed preference models are not statistically significant. They 
are the coefficients of 'kitchen' type across the subgroups except Group-1. The results 
also show that these coefficients are negative in the RP model. 
These two results together with the positive and significant coefficients in the SP 
models show the influence of the housing supply constraint on housing choice. This is 
discussed below. 
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1. The stated coefficients of 'Kitchen' across the life cycle show that people prefer to 
buy a dwelling with large kitchen, e. g. the kitchen with a dinning area. However, the 
revealed coefficients give the different results. As it has been discussed at the 
beginning of this section, income constraint does not significantly influence a buyer's 
choice for the non-key dwelling components. Therefore, this difference implies the 
effect of supply constraint on housing choice. In other words, people prefer to have a 
large kitchen inside the dwelling. Because of the supply constraint, this type of 
dwelling is not always available. Their revealed choice is not their maximum utility 
choice. This results in the inferior model fits in RP models. Overall, the SP model 
shows that the logit of a buyer choosing a dwelling with a large kitchen in contrast to 
a dwelling with small kitchen is 1.14. This propensity becomes stronger for single 
young person households, the logit is 1.77. 
2. Both the stated and revealed coefficients of 'Central Heating' across the life-cycle 
show that people prefer to have central heating. Their stated preference is generally 
stronger than their revealed preference. Overall, in the SP model, the logit of choosing 
a dwelling with central heating in contrast to a dwelling without central heating is 
1.84. The difference between the SP preference and the revealed preference is very 
strong for single young person households. The logit value increases from 0.69 to 
1.7 1. This is because single young person households prefer to buy small flat located 
in the central Edinburgh area. These flats are generally very old without central 
heating system. The physical dwelling stock adds the dwelling supply constraint on a 
buyer's choice. When SP technique is used, such constraint is relaxed. In other words, 
SP information provides more precise data to reflect a buyer's housing preference 
when income constraint is less important. 
3. Both the stated and revealed coefficients of 'Garden' across the life-cycle show that 
people prefer to have their private gardens except single young households, where the 
stated preference coefficient is insignificant and the revealed preference coefficient 
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shows this is not often available in the types of dwelling chosen by this group. 
However, the preference for private garden becomes stronger among the households 
with dependent children. 
The difference between SP and RP can be further compared by Diagrams VII(12) & 
(13) below. In the diagrams, two groups of utility curves (SP and RP) are presented to 
show how a household's non-key dwelling component preferences change across the 
life cycle as well as across the different combinations of the non-key dwelling 
components. 
In the diagrams, the X-axis represents the 8 different types of dwellings differentiated 
by the three non-key dwelling components. The definition is given by Table VII(4). 
The Y-axis is the utility a buyer can obtain from choosing a dwelling given a sectoral 
housing submarkct. The utility is calculated by replacing the values in Table VII(4) 
into Table VII(I 0). The calculation is based on the subgroups. In the diagrams, Line 
(a) denotes Group-I households; Line (b) denotes Group-2 households and Line (c) 
denotes Group-3 households. 
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Diagram VII (3) 
234567 
Alternatives 
Note: (a) = Group-1, (b) = Group-2, (c) = Group-3. 
Diagram VII(4) 
(b) Utilities From The Stated Preferences 
(c 
(a 
8 
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Utilities From The Revealed Preferences 
234567 
Alternatives 
Notes: (a)=Group-1, (b)=Group-2, (c)=Group-3 
Comparing the two diagrams, a number of conclusions can be drawn. 
1. Under the dwelling supply constraint (Diagram VII(3)), households with dependent 
children (Line (c)) show a much stronger preference for the dwellings with any of the 
three components than the other two groups of households, except for the alternatives 
5 and 8 which are the dwellings without central heating and private garden. This is 
related to the dwelling types practically chosen by this group of people (See Section 
7.4.3). If the supply constraint is relaxed (Diagram VII (4)), the differences between 
the subgroups are reduced dramatically. Households with dependent children and 
young couple households show almost similar housing preferences. 
2. Both diagrams show that if a dwelling has large kitchen, central heating and private 
garden, it will have the highest probability to be chosen by all kinds of households. 
The stated preference result also shows that a household's preference for a dwelling 
varies as the combinations of the non-key dwelling components within a dwelling 
changes. Basically, his/her preference declines as the number of the non-key dwelling 
components within a dwelling are reduced. Particularly, a dwelling with large kitchen 
or central heating is more popular. This implies that kitchen type and central heating 
system within a dwelling are very important non-key dwelling components 
influencing housing choice behaviour. 
The conclusions are: 1. changing the combinations of the non-key dwelling 
components inside a dwelling influence a buyer's preference for a dwelling, therefore, 
will influence the marketability of the related housing submarket; 2. when the income 
constraint is less important, the dwelling supply constraint limiting a buyer's choice 
can be relaxed by using the SP technique. 
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This chapter provides empirical evidence to support the theoretical conclusions in 
Chapters V and VI. The main conclusions are that: 1. the MNL model can provide the 
superior empirical results than the NMNL model, at least for this case; 2. the 
hierarchy dwelling choice set on the basis of a nested housing submarket structure can 
provide greater insight into the effects of housing submarket properties on housing 
choice behaviour; 3. a combination of the RP and SP techniques can provide more 
precise information to reflect the household housing preference. 
In the next chapter, a broad conclusion about the whole research will be drawn. The 
future research potential to be developed from this research will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER VIII CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Contributions to the Housing Market Literature 
This study has a number of contributions to the micro housing market literature 
reviewed in Chapter 11. It is worth surnmarising the main points below. 
Theoretically, this study, for the first time, explicitly defines a local housing 
submarket structure as a nested structure. The definition includes both the submarkets 
at neighbourhood level and the submarkets at sector level. This is an improvement to 
the previous housing submarket research where housing submarket structure was 
regarded at neighbourhood level only. With the consideration of housing submarket 
trade friction, the dynamic stock flow approach is revised and applied to this structure. 
The discussion explores both the long run and short run housing submarket 
equilibrium and disequilibrium properties which have received little attention 
previously. The model remedies the main drawback of neo-classical micro housing 
economic theory which assumes frictionless trade in a housing market. 
Empirically, three suggestions concerning modelling housing choice behaviour can be 
made. 1. It is necessary to draw a distinction between the sequence used in a statistical 
discrete choice model and the sequence used in describing the housing choice decision 
making process. This difference was ignored and the two concepts were misused in 
the previous housing choice models. 2. The selection of a statistical discrete choice 
model should consider the empirical model fit, rather than only consider the inherent 
drawbacks of a statistical model as the previous housing choice models did. 3. A three 
level hierarchical choice set based on a nested housing submarket structure provides a 
deeper insight in understanding the household housing choice behaviour. 
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This study, for the first time, suggests that the combination of the stated preference 
information and the revealed preference information can provide a deeper insight into 
household housing choice behaviour. The empirical model emphasises the influence 
of the nuclei regional labour market structure (e. g. CBD is the main employment 
centre around which there are a number of sub-employment centres) on housing 
choice behaviour. Therefore, at regional level, the distance to the work place rather 
than the distance to the CBD as assumed in most of the previous housing choice 
models is one of the key factors influencing housing choice. Another empirical 
contribution is that housing submarket trade friction is proved to be an important 
variable in explaining housing choice in a housing submarket. 
8.2 Summary of Findings 
The thesis adopted a revised dynamic stock-flow model with trade friction to analyse 
a nested housing submarket system and empirically estimated a household housing 
choice model in a regional owner occupier housing market. These aspects have been 
selected as mutually interdependent, but relatively neglected areas of the existing 
housing market literature. 
A more detailed discussion about this research topic selection is given in Chapter 1. 
The identification of a local housing submarket structure and the investigation of its 
short term and long term equilibrium as well as disequilibrium properties are very 
important in micro housing economics. It was seen in Chapters I&III that the 
unavoidable housing search behaviour has caused an important housing submarket 
phenomenon, namely, housing submarket trade friction. Therefore, the conventional 
neo-classical economic theory does not apply to housing market. Understanding and 
analysing the operational process of a local housing submarket with trade friction is 
deemed therefore necessary. The results provide a theoretical foundation for housing 
market modelling at both urban and regional levels. One of the applications is to 
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model the household housing choice behaviour per housing submarket at regional 
level. 
Chapter 11 concludes that the conventional micro housing economic theory has several 
critical drawbacks and cannot be applied to a local housing market. Therefore, a new 
approach, namely a dynamic stock-flow model with trade friction initially developed 
by Weibull (1983) is introduced. This approach provides a general framework to 
explore regional or urban housing submarket operation in the context of a housing 
submarket and submarkct trade friction. However, this latter application has been 
ignored by previous research. 
This Chapter critically examined a variety of housing econometric models which 
progressively reduce the level (in terms of spatial dimension) of analytical abstraction 
and introduced notions of dwelling heterogeneity. The models are classified into three 
groups. It was shown that the dynamic evolution of house prices, demands and 
supplies is the central premise of macro housing econometric models. Although the 
dynamic behaviour of a housing market is a crucial issue, it only reflects partial 
information in the housing market because of the ignorance of spatial and dwelling 
type disaggregation. Particularly in an owner occupier housing market, these are 
important factors influencing housing choice behaviour. The models at regional level 
have focused on regional owner occupier housing market interaction. The geographic 
models and the cointegration models provide a deeper insight to such 
interdependence. However, these models are not perfectly defined without considering 
the role of dwelling type variety. Urban housing models, which are mainly derived 
from the utility maximisation approach attempt to consider two notions, namely spLze 
and dwelling type. In these models, the role of space is reflected by the distance to the 
CBD. This assumption is clearly unsuitable in a regional context. At regional level, 
there exists not only a hierarchy of shopping centrcs, but also a hierarchy of 
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employment centres. This regional spatial speciality together with the existence of 
housing submarkets requires the development of a regional housing choice model. 
The definitions clarified in Chapter III show that a nested housing submarket structure 
is a suitable structure to describe the link between the local housing submarkets. 
Based on the approach of the Minimum Household Unit (Ermisch & Overton 1985), 
the households are grouped into four stages of the family life cycle. The household 
housing search process in the context of a nested housing submarket structure was 
examined. This reveals the essence of housing submarket trade friction, which is, 
during any time period, the number of dwelling transacted is only a fraction of the 
short side of the housing demands and supplies (See Eq. I in Chapter III). 
In Chapter IV, a revised dynamic stock-flow model with trade friction was applied to 
a nested local housing submarket structure. The model is developed on the premise 
that within one time unit, at each housing submarket, the number of dwellings traded 
is a fixed percentage of the short side of the submarket housing demands and supplies 
(Eq. 20) in Chapter IV. A detailed discussion about the operational process of a local 
housing submarket system was given in Chapter IV, and its salient features are 
presented below. As in the short run, new dwelling supply is a very small fraction of 
the total housing stock, the discussion in this thesis is under the assumption that a 
local housing market is demand oriented. 
1. A nested local owner occupier housing submarke system has one and only one 
dynamic stock flow equilibrium position in the short run. This equilibrium has three 
aspects: first, in each sectoral or neighbourhood housing submarket, there is no price 
movement and housing demand is equal to housing supply; second, in each sectoral or 
ncighbourhood housing submarket, the extra housing demand, supply and the number 
of dwellings traded within each time unit are all equal; finally, all the housing 
submarkets can achieve their equilibrium position at the same time. 
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2. The short run submarket equilibrium housing price is determined by the household 
housing preference for the submarket and the submarket condition. The latter 
includes: the dwelling and the neighbourhood components, the dwelling stock, the 
vacancy rate, the dwelling re-choice rate (during the search), and the submarket 
dwelling transaction velocity (defined as the inverse of the submarket trade friction). 
The submarket equilibrium price will change given any change of the above factors. 
3. The implications in the long run are that, in each housing submarket, there exists a 
long run equilibrium path along which the submarket housing prices change. The 
shape of this path is determined by the changes in the above factors. For example, if 
other things are unchanged, but the physical neighbourhood appearance has been 
improved over time, the submarket equilibrium housing price will be increased over 
time. For this submarket its long rum equilibrium path will be subject to an upward 
trend. The bigger the change is, the sharper the trend will be. This implies that, the 
dynamics of the house prices in the different housing submarkets have two possible 
long term relationships: first, they may move closely together, even though the series 
themselves are trended, the difference between them is constant. In other words, the 
submarket house prices are either increasing or decreasing at the same rate over time; 
second, they may drift increasingly further away from each other or come together as 
time goes on. This may happen if some housing submarkets become deteriorating, 
while others become prosperous. 
4. The short run housing submarket equilibrium properties are therefore: (if other 
things remain unchanged) 
a. the equilibrium submarket housing demand and supply is a strictly 
increasing function of the submarket dwelling stock and the vacancy rate; 
b. the equilibrium submarket housing demand and supply is a strictly 
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increasing function of the submarket trade friction; 
c. the equilibrium submarket house price is negatively related to the submarket 
trade friction, but positively related to the qualities of the dwelling related and the 
neighbourhood related components. It is also negatively related to the 
household housing preference for the other housing markets, e. g. the owner 
occupier housing markets in the adjacent urban area or region, or the 
private rental housing market and social housing. The above relationship is 
represented by the following equation: (The definition of each variable is 
given in Appendix 4-2) 
p# =f (-TFu, +Xu, + Yi, + Pr u- Pr,, ) 
S. The computer simulation demonstrates that this short run dynamic stock flow 
equilibrium can be in one of three states: Neighbourhood Stable, Bounded Instable. 
and Instable. which depends on the segmentation of the housing submarket structure. 
It has been argued that, in reality, the housing submarket equilibrium is more likely to 
be in the state of Bounded Instability. This result together with the discussion above 
implies that, as time goes on, the submarket housing price moves along its long term 
equilibrium path with short term dynamics. The household housing choice 
probabilities for the housing submarkets are the key in directing the changes in the 
housing submarket demands and supplies. 
After examining the importance of household housing choice behaviour in directing a 
local housing submarket operation in Chapter IV, Chapter V presented a theoretical 
regional housing choice model per housing submarket based on the random utility 
approach. From this model, the factors influencing the household housing choice 
behaviour were drawn. Four major conclusions are made: 
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1. Household housing choice behaviour has a family life cycle pattern, in terms of the 
dwelling type, size and the neighbourhood conditions. 
2. Housing submarke trade friction decreases the submarket marketability. Therefore 
it is negatively related to the household housing preference for the submarket. 
3. The distance to the work place rather than the distance to the CBD is an important 
factor in determining the household housing choice for a residential location in a 
regional owner occupier housing market. 
4. Housing choice is strongly constrained by the buyers' housing financial 
affordability. This confines each buyer to the submarkets which he/she can afford. 
After examining the institutional and economic background of the household housing 
choice behaviour in Chapter V, Chapter VI gives a detailed discussion of the 
statistical model selection and the empirical data collection techniques in the context 
of housing choice. The discussion proves that: 
1. The sequential concept used in a sequential statistical model is different from the 
sequence used in describing household housing choice decision making process. 
2. Each type of statistical discrete choice model has its merits and limitations. The 
selection of the model mainly depends on the empirical model fit. The discussion in 
Chapter VI suggests that the NMNL model and the MNL model should be selected. 
This is mainly because the coefficients in these two models have a direct economic 
implication. However, which model is suitable for modelling household housing 
choice behaviour per submarket will depends on the empirical comparison. This 
model selection rule was ignored by the previous housing choice studies. 
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3. The existing housing choice models are either based on the revealed housing 
preference or based on the stated preference information. After examining the 
suitability of two information collection techniques, namely, the stated preference 
(SP) method and the revealed preference (RP) method, to a housing choice case, it is 
suggested that the RP method should be used to collect the information of a buyer's 
choice for a housing submarket and the SP information is a better way to reflect a 
buyer's preference for a dwelling after choosing a sectoral housing submarket. 
Chapter VII gives estimation for the models suggested in Chapter VI and the data is 
from the questionnaire survey discussed in the same chapter. The explanatory variable 
selection is based on the theoretical model in Chapter V. The estimation testifies the 
hypotheses raised in Chapters V&VI. The following main conclusions are indicated. 
1. The empirical comparison shows that, for this data set, the MNL model is superior 
to the NMNL model. This conclusion raises a mistrust of the hypothesis used in the 
previous hierarchical housing choice models. This hypothesis is the counterpart to the 
conclusion in this study and was stressed because of the unavoidable violation of the 
TIA axiom inherited by the MNL model in the housing choice case. Therefore, it is 
confirmed here that the statistical model selection should depend on the empirical 
model fit. 
2. The family life cycle pattern of the household housing preference is that: young 
single person households prefer a small flat located near to the CBD. They regard that 
the central heating and a large kitchen are very important non-key dwelling 
components within the flat; households with dependent children prefer a large house 
located near to a good quality school. Having a private garden is also conceived as an 
important factor influencing their housing choice; and young couple households do 
not show a clear preference for the dwelling type and size, but prefer to live near to 
187 
the CBD. Central heating is given as the most important non-key dwelling component 
by all types of households. 
3. The empirical results have shown that the household housing financial constraint 
significantly influences the choice for a housing submarket. After a sectoral housing 
submarket is chosen, the financial constraint is released at the stage of choosing a 
dwelling from the submarket. Therefore, the supply constraint becomes important. 
However, the application of the SP technique liberates the supply constraint. The 
result is that the RP method together with the SP method can provide a better insight 
into the household housing choice behaviour. 
4. If other things remain unchanged, in a regional owner occupier housing market, the 
households prefer to live near to the employment centre or sub-centre. It depends on 
the work place of the head of the household. For example, in Lothian Region, 
Edinburgh is the employment centre. East, West and Mid Lothian, each has its own 
employment sub-centre. The empirical results show that, on average, if a person 
works in Edinburgh, the probability of choosing a dwelling from Edinburgh is 3.7 
times as much as the probability of choosing a dwelling on the outside of Edinburgh 
area (Other things remain unchanged); if he/she works in East Lothian, the probability 
of choosing a dwelling in Edinburgh is 1/4 of the probability of choosing a dwelling 
in East Lothian, and the probability of living in West or Mid Lothian will be 1/13 in 
contrast to living in East Lothian. It is corroborated that the buyers' residential 
location choice is shaped by the distribution of regional employment. 
S. Housing submarket marketability (which is negatively related to the submarket 
trade friction) is empirically proved to be an important factor influencing the 
household housing choice for a submarket. If other things remain unchanged, all types 
of households prefer to choose a submarket with a high marketability, especially, 
younger households. Higher marketability implies a higher increasing rate of the 
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future submarket housing price. This intimates the dual role of buying a dwelling: as a 
family asset investment and as a shelter. 
The major conclusions of this work have been discussed above. The next section 
discusses possible model extensions and the policy implications. 
8.3 Model Extensions and Policy Implications 
Both the theoretical model (Chapter IV) and the empirical model (Chapter V to VII) 
are constructed for a local (the former) and regional (the latter) owner occupier 
housing market. They can be extended to analyse the rental housing market. 
For example, in a rental housing market where there exists both private rental (pure 
market) housing submarket and publicly regulated (rent control) housing submarket, 
the dynamic stock flow model can be adapted by using rent to replace house price. 
Therefore, the model can be used to simulate the effect of public house rent control 
by releasing the assumption of a 'Pure Housing Market'. 
The empirical housing choice model can also be conformed to estimate housing 
choice in a private rental housing market. However it should be noted that, in a private 
rental housing market, renting a dwelling is for consumption only. Therefore, the 
submarket marketability, which is a substantial factor influencing housing choice 
behaviour, becomes insignificant. The omission of this variable in a rental model may 
augment the influence of the other factors, for example, rent. 
The following discussion will focus on the policy implications derived from this 
work. 
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1. One of the conclusions in Chapter IV is that a local owner occupier housing 
submarket structure evolves as time goes on. Some housing submarkets may decay 
and others may prosper as a result of the neighbourhood, the dwelling quality and the 
household housing preference changes. This raises an important policy question: what 
are the reasons behind these changes? 
The answer to this question is important as, in the UK, the owner occupier housing 
market has become the dominant tenure. Changes in the owner occupier housing 
submarket structure has a direct link with the changes in the local social, political and 
economic system. The intensity of neighbourhood deprivation has led to concerns that 
the poorer parts of an urban area may create a drag on economic recovery (Kintrea 
1994). An empirical phenomenon is that: most British cities have faced changes in 
their economic base, and within a city, similar neighbourhoods at the onset of change 
have deteriorated whilst others remain stable or become prosperous. Therefore 
understanding local owner occupier housing submarket change and revealing the 
reasons behind are the key to understanding urban decline and attempts at 
regeneration. The nested housing submarket structure defined in Chapter III and the 
nature of the structure discussed in Chapter IV provide a theoretical foundation for 
analysing local owner occupier housing submarket structure evolution. 
2. From the viewpoint of city planning, an investment in the owner occupier housing 
market may result in housing submarket structure change. The conclusions in Chapter 
IV show that the intensity of submarket structure segmentation determines the 
housing submarket system stability, and even for a highly segmented housing 
submarket system, only the neighbourhood scale change can keep the housing 
submarket system stable. Therefore, the investment policy should consider the 
possible investment effects. For example, the aim of the policy should be to increase 
local housing submarket structure segmentation and avoid a large scale change in 
housing submarket structure in the short run. 
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Finally, the investment should also consider the household housing preference and the 
regional employment distribution. The empirical results in Chapter VII have shown 
the clear life cycle pattern of the household housing choice behaviour and the strong 
preference for the short distance to the work place. The analysis in this thesis is based 
on cross sectional data, therefore the dynamics of the household housing choice 
behaviour is unclear. It is suggested that a regular (e. g. every 3 or 5 years) analysis of 
household housing choice behaviour based on the model discussed in Chapters V to 
VII is necessary. This can provide the essential dynamic information for city planning. 
This thesis has attempted to provide a better understanding of the local owner 
occupier housing system. The dynamic stock flow approach has been adopted to 
describe the operational process of a local housing system, and the MNL discrete 
choice model has been used to forecast household housing choice behaviour at 
regional or large urban level. This approach to the dynamic nature of the housing 
market has provided deeper insights to how housing markets change over time than 
was previously possible. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 4-1 
The Derivation of The Equilibrium Point 
The proof is based on the equilibrium conditions presented by equations (30) to (35) 
in Chapter IV. In the following equations, T is dropped as the market is in 
equilibrium. 
Proof- 
Stcl2.. I: substitute Equations (20) and (21) into Equation (30). 
As d,, -=s,,: 
Pu* sil = cy * (8ii - SO 
dy = s. - 
Cij* 8ij (a) 
PY + cii 
Slw-2: as dj=sj, Equation (7-1) in Chapter IV can be re-written as: 
sij I 
qij = P,, *min(dj, sij) = FDi = 
TF# 
StQp 3: substitute equations (19) and (21) into equations (25-1) to (25-3): 
Ci zclj 
i 
So: a, = (D + 217 clAA. ) Pr 1- 2: 7 k). J 
Ci =1 Ei, * (sij - sit) 
.i 
As ai=ci, 
* di + Eil* (8,1 - Sil) ly '1 Pr, 
E k. 1 
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from equations (4) and (5) in Chapter IV: 
Pro= I -I: Pri= 
iD+2: 7'* dy 
ij y 
Equation (4) holds if the market satisfies the condition Dý: Zr:. jj*(8y-Sy) 
ij 
&-, ý: substitute equations (19) and (21) to aij=cij. 
.j72 
((D+I] *dij)*Pri+Z7, '*dij)*Prjti-(7, ' + 72)*dy = Cy* (8# - sy) 
Ij 
yiy 
substitute equation (c) in the appendix to the above equation: 
12 
u 
Pri/i cy*(5u-sy)+(7, +7y 
)*dj 
p (e) 1+72)*d, 
Z(cu*(8u-sy)+(7u 
u tj 
comparing equations (4), (5) in Chapter IV and (c), (d) in the appendix 
1: 7 Y* dii + 
1: eu* (5ii - sij) Pri 
= exp(, %*Yi+(I-cr)*Ii)= Ji -=, 
Pri 
Pr o D-Zcy*(8y-sy) Pr*o 
In(_. 
So: I=- 
cr)) 
Yi 
I- 
From equations (3) and (6) in Chapter IV and (e) in the appendix: 
exp(ai*pu+CC2*qu+a3*Xd) = exp(L)*Prj*/i 
Taking logs and substituting equation (f) in the appendix to the above equation: 
CC2 CD %II 
pii=--*q! l--*Xil -Yi+-*In(Pr. *Ili)+ * In(f-r) cc IaI cc I* (I - cr) ccl (x I Pr*o 
(g) 
End of Proof. 
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Appendix 4-2 
The Definitions of the Parameters for Chapter IV 
Subscripts: 
i=neighbourhood housing submarket. 
j=sectoral housing submarket. 
Parameters: 
TF=submarkct trade friction. The definition is given in chapter III. 
P=submarkct dwelling transaction velocity, defined as an inverse of TF. 
Pr. =the conditional probability of an individual choosing the j th sectoral housing JA 
submarket conditional on choosing the i1h neighbourhood housing submarket. 
Pr, =the marginal probability of an individual choosing the ih neighbourhood. 
Pr, 
j=the probability of choosing the 
ijth sectoral housing submarket, which is the 
product of Pr, and Pr JA L 
q=the sellers' waiting time in a submarket. 
d=the current effective housing demand in a submarket. 
s=the current effective housing supply in a submarket. 
p=the current house price in a submarket. 
D=the extra housing demand to the whole housing market. 
a=the extra housing demand to a submarket within a unit time. 
c=the extra housing supply to a submarket within a uint time. 
b=the number of dwellings transacted in a submarket witnin a unit time. 
X=the components of a sectoral housing submarket. 
Y=the components of a neighbourhood housing submarket. 
CC I CC2, CC3, %=the coefficients of p. qq X, Y in the nested logit model (NMNL model). 
8=the total housing stock in a submarket. 
c=the dwelling vacancy rate in a submarket. 
(I-cy)=the coefficient of the inclusive value in the NMNL model. 
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7 
1,2 
=the housing buyers' re-choice rates with respect to re-dwelling choice and re- 
neighbourhood choice in a sectoral housing submarket. 
Note: for each parameter, if any subscripts are attached, it will denote the corresponding value in that C, 
housing submarket. 
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Appendix 4-3 
A Summary of The Simulation Background 
This appendix summarises the simulation background. The diagram gives the housing 
submarket structure used in the simulation. The parameter (Appendix 4-2) values used 
in the simulation are presented in Table 1. The selection of these values is completed 
by a computer program (See Appendix 4-4), which is designed for randomly 
indetifying a housing submarket system and the values of the parameters satisfying 
the equilibrium conditions (See Appendix 4-1). 
Another computer program is implemented to undertake the simulation (See 
Appendix 4-5). This simulation is based on the parameter values randomly selected by 
the program in Appendix 4-4. The idea is: changing some of the parameter values to 
see if the system will be able to return to equilibrium from any disequilibrium 
position. 
HOUSING SUBMARKET STRUCTURE 
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j=2 
Table I 
An Example of Randomly Identified Nested Housing Submarket Structure 
Para. Value Para. Value Para. Value 
pil 0.4 1 
7 11 
0.3 811 4500 
P12 0.75 2 
y 
0.2 812 4000 
P21 0.5 1 
7 12 
0.1 821 6500 
P22 0.6 2 
7 12 
0.1 822 5000 
C11 0.03 1 
21 
0.1 Xii 0.000 
C12 0.02 2 
21 
0.1 X12 0.000 
C21 0.04 1 
22 
0.2 X21 0.000 
C22 0.02 2 
7 22 
0.1 X22 0.000 
D 7000 CL3 *X 9 X*Yl 2.5 
(I -cr) 0.44 OC3 *X 3 
ý, *Y2 1 
Cc 1 -0.00 (X3 *X 4 
CC2 -0.00 CL3 *X I 
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Based on the above parameter values, the related housing submarket in equilibrium is 
given in Table 2. 
Table 2 
An Example of Housing Submarket in Equilibrium 
Para. Valu Para. Valu Para. Value (f) 
ajj=bjj=cj 1255 djj=sjj 3139 pil 127842.2 
al2=bl2=Cl 779 d 12=S 12 1038 P12 93239.6 
a2l=b2l=b2 2407 d2l=S21 4814 P21 77031.6 
a22=b22=C2 967 d22=s22 1612 P22 51671.0 
PrI 0.33 PrI/I 0.74 Pr2/1 0.26 
Pr2 0.48 PrI/2 0.70 Pr2/2 0.3 
Pro 0.19 
In Appendixes 4-4 & 4-5, two programs are given for simulation. The correspondence 
of each array used in the programs to the parameters defined in Appendix 4-2 is given 
below. 
For all i=1,2 ; j=1,2 and k=1,2: 
Beta[2][2]=Pij; 
Game[2][2][2]=y',; 
Imsi[2][2]=cjj; 
Sigma[2][2]=8jj; 
Kai[2][2]=Xij; 
d=D; 
alfal=(xl in the NMNL model; 
alfa2=CL2 in the NMNL model; 
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alfa_cons[2] [2]= GC3*Xii in the NMNL model; 
Coef beta=l-cr in the NMNL model; 
Beta_cons[2]=%*Yi in the NMNL model; 
Ivalue[2]=exp(Ii) in the NMNL model; 
Proj[2][2]=Prj/i in the NMNL model; 
Proi[2]=Pri in the NMNL model; 
pij[2][2], pi[2]=pij, pi; 
qij[2][2]=qu-9 
aij[2][2], ai[2]=aij, aj; 
bij[2][2], bi[2]=bij, bi; 
cij[2][2], ci[2]=cijg ci; 
dij[2][2], di[2]=dijg di; 
sij[2][2], si[2]=sij, si. 
Based on the values in Tables 1 &2, three simulation cases are presented in 
Appendixes 4-6 to 4-8 seperately. 
199 
Appendix 4-4 
The Program of Ramdomly Identifying A Housing Submarket System 
/*This program is designed for randomly identifying a nested housing submarket 
system. The values in each array are a group of randomly selected initial values. Any 
change of these values will change the identification of the housing system, it means 
that a ncNv housing submarket system is created. */ 
double heta[2][21=(0.4,0.75), (0.5,0.6j'j; 
cloiiblegtinia[2][2][2]=«0.3,0.2,0-1,0-1), tO-1,0-1,0.2,0-1», 
double itnsi[2][2]=«0.03,0.02), (0.04,0.02»; 
double signia[2][2]=«45000,40000), (65000,50000», * 
double kai[2][2]=([0.00001,0.000015), (0.000015,0.00002»; 
double d=7000; 
double alfal=-0.000085, 
double affia2 =-0.006; 
double alfajons[2][21=«9,5), (4, lilj; 
double cocf beta=0.56; 
double beia 
- 
cons[2]=(2.5,1); 
double pi-oj[2][2], pro! [2], proi0[2]; 
double projl[2][2], pi-oi][2]; 
double ii, iiliie[2]; 
double 1)ii[2][2], dij[2][2], sij[21[2]; 
double (lij[21[2]. (11[2], - 
double ci[2][2]. b[21[2], c[21[2], - 
fill i, iI. jtil.. 
douhle xl, x2. x3, x4, x5, x6, x7: 
/*This is a SUb-program to calculate the conditional probability 'Prj/i' (See Equation 3 
in Chapter IV) in the NMNL model*/ 
double probahilify-lipeO 
double xl, x2,. i, l,. i, 2, zl, --2, ý--3, z4, - 
:I =pii[i][O], - 
: 2=qýffifflj: 
z3=pýjN[I]: 
:: 4=qýffiffl]; 
xl =affid ý--l +(ilfii2 *z2+ajfii_cons[i1[Ol. - 
x2=affii I *z3+(tlfii2*z4+iiýfii_c-oii. vfil[ll, - 
j-/=e. vl)(. v I), - 
y2=e. vp(. v2). - 
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ivalue[i]=yl +j, 2; 
if 6==O) 
return (yllivalzie[ij); 
ýf (j==1) 
relurn (y2livalue[i]); 
/*This is a sub-program to calculate the marginal probability 'Pri'(See equation 4 in 
Chapter IV) in the NMNL model */ 
double probabilily_locao 
double xl, x2, j, l, j, 2, zl, z2, - 
:1 =Iog(ivalue[O]), - 
-')=Iog(ivalue[lj), - 
xl=coef beta *-71 +beta-cons[O]; 
x2=coef beta ý. -2+beta-Consfl]. ' 
yI= exp (x I), - 
y2=exp(x2); 
if (i==0) 
relurn (yll(), I+j, 2+1)); 
ff (i==1) 
relurn (), 21(j, l+j, 2+1)); 
/*This is the main program*/ 
inaino 
FILE 
fp=fopen("inilial. dal", "w'); 
/*Obtaining the equilibriUm valLICS of a housing submarket system*/ 
fir (i=Oj<2; i++) I 
qýj[i][j]=I1(bela[i][j]); 
(1ýiN[j]=(inisi[i]Lf]*sigi? ia[i]g])I(inisi[i]&]+beta[i]Lfj); 
sýj[ij[j]=dffi]Lf]; 
xl=O. - x2=0, - x3=0, - x4=0, - x5=0, - 
. 
fi)i- (i=O, -i<2: i++) 11 
fin- (i=O. -i<21-i++)#' 
x4+ 
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for (i=O; i<2; i++) ( 
x2=0; x3=0; x5=0; 
for 6=0, j<2, j++) 
x2+ =inisi[i]Lfj*(signia[ijo]-dy[i]oj); 
A+ =ganza[i]8j[lj *dy[i]L(]; 
x5 += (gama[i], U][O] +gama[i]gj[lj) *dij[i]g]; 
pro iO[i] = (x2 +x3)1(d-x 1); 
pro i[ij = (x2 +x3)1(d+x4); 
x6 = it? isi[i][0] *(s ign ia[ij[Oj-dij[ij[0j), - 
x6+ =(gaiýia[i][0][Oj+gania[i][0][1]) *dij[i][0]; 
x7 =x2 +x5, - 
prqj[ij[Oj=x61-c7; 
x6 = it) isi[i][1] *(sigma[! ][]]-dij[ij[1j), - 
x6+= (gan ta[l][]][Oj+gan *diffifflj; 
prqj[ij[l]=x61x7; 
I 
fior (i=O; i<2; i++) ( 
for 6=0, j<2, j++)If 
xl=-(ap_cons[ija]+bela_coiis[ijlcoef beta); 
xl+=-aýfa2*qij[i][i]+(Iog(pi-oiO[i]))I(coef betat +Iog(proj[i]Lfj); 
x2=xl1ajfal; 
pýi[i][il=x2; 
fior (i=O; i<2; i++) [ 
. 
for 0=0, j<2, j++) t 
pi-ojl[i]fjj=probahilitj, -IjpeO. - 
fin- (i=O. -i<2; i+ 
. 
for (i=O; i<2, -i++) I 
. 
forq=O, j<2j++)I' 
h[i][j]=hela[Jj[j]*dij[i]8]; 
c[i][j] =in Isififfi] *(sigln(l[i]jj]-sij[ijLf]), - 
X1 =0; 
Jim- (i Oj I<2, -i 1+ +) 
I+ =g(lina[i][i /1101 Vii[iffil]: 
x2 = 0. - 
. 
fin- (i1=0, -i1<2. -il++) i 
fin- (ii =O.: il <2: il 
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x2 + =gania[il]Lf 1][1] *dy[il]Lf 1]; 
a[i][j]=((d+x2) *I)roi[i]+xl) *proj[ijo] 
-(gama[ijR][Oj+gama[ij, Uj[lj) *dij[ijo]; 
/* Saving the results in the file of'initial. dat'*/ 
. ývsteln "Clear'): 
. 
fi)i- (i=O, -i<2, -i++) 
. 
fi)r (i=O, -i<2, j++) 
%chn, 
prinýl('ý7rj=%15.3ýfn ", proj[i]Lfj); 
prinýffývjl=%15.3UIn ", projl[il81); 
prinlf("a=%jýn ", afljo]): 
prinýf("b=%lfin ", b[ij&]); 
prinljý"c=%lfin ", c[ij81); 
prinlft'ýij=%Uln "'Pii[ilal)" 
prinlj("dij=%lfin ", dij[i], U]); 
prhqf("Sýj=%jfll ", sij[i][jj): 
, 
fprinlf(fp, '7=%d, j=%d, W ". ij); 
fivinif(fp. "beta =%15.31fin ". beta[ijo]); 
fiprin(f(fl), 'ýrj=%15.3ýrn ", proj[i]fl]), - 
fivinif(fl), "Prjl=%15.31fiii". I)r(? il[i]Lf]); 
. 
fprh7tf(fp, "a=%j& ", a[i][j]); 
prinffi('ý)ri=%15.3ýf n ", proi[ij); 
printf('ý)ril =%15.3ýf n ", proil[i]): 
prh? lf("Ln(Inc)=%15.3ýfn ", log0value[il)); 
. 
fprintf(fp, 'Tri=%15.31fin ", proi[i]); 
fin-inif(fl), "Liz(hic)=%15.3ýf n "JogOvaluefl])); 
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Appendix 4-5 
The Simulation Program of a Nested Housing Submarket Operation 
/*This program is designed for simulating the operation of a randomly identified 
nested housing submarkct system. The values in each array are randomly identified 
by the program in Appendix 4-4. The meaning of each array used in the program is 
given in Appendix 4-3. */ 
gilefine epsilon 1 
clouble bela[2][21=«0.4,0.75), (0.5,0.6»; 
double gama[2][21[21=«0.3,0.2,0.1,0.1), (0.1,0.1,0.2,0.1», - 
double imsi[2][21=«0.03,0.02), (0.04,0.02)]; 
double signza[2][21=«45000,40000), (65000,50000»; 
double kai[2][21=«0.00001,0.000015), (0.000015,0.00002»; 
double d= 7000; 
double affial =-0.000085, - 
double aifa2 =-0.006; 
double aU"a_coizs[2][21= il(9,3jý, (4, lllfl. - 
double coef bta=0.56; 
double beta_cons[21=(2.5.1,1; 
clouble pi-oj[2][2], proi[2]; 
double ivalue[2]; 
double pij[2][2]=«151612.07,11j508.561ý. (76191.27,50830.65jý), - 
double pi[2]; 
double qii[2][2], qi[2]; 
double ilii[2][21=ýl(3139.53,1038.96j', e'4814.81,1612.90)j; 
double sii[2][2]=ýýý, f3139.53,1038.96,1. k'4814.81,1612.90, ýiý; 
double ti[2][2], b[2][2], c[2][2]; 
/*This is a sub-program to calculate the conditional probability: 'Prj/i' (See Equation 33 
in Chapter IV) in the NMNL model */ 
int ij.. 
dolthle prohahiliýyjlpeo 
double xl, x2, j, l, j, 2,: ],: 2, z3.: 4; 
: 2=qýi1ill0l: 
: 3=12ii[i][1]: 
: 4=qýilifll]: 
A =alfitl *: I +aýfit2*: 2+ujfit yonsfl]10]: 
x2 =a1fii I *z3 +alfi12 *: 4 +aýfii _ 
cons[i// I], - 
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Yl =exp(xl); 
j, 2=exl)(r2); 
ivalue[i]=yl +j, 2; 
if U==O) 
relurn (yllivalue[i]); 
if U==]) 
return (y2fivalitc[i]); 
/*This is a sub-program to calculate the marginal probability 'Pri' (See Equation 2 in 
Chapter IV) in the NMNL model */ 
double probabilily-locao 
double xl, x2, yl, j, 2. zl, z2; 
zl =Iog(A, alue[Oj); 
,. 2=log(ivalue[IJ); 
xl=coef beta*zl+beta - cOns[O]; x2=coef beta *z2+beta_cons[l]; 
yl =e. rp(xl); 
y2=exp(x2); 
if (i==0) 
refurn 
if O= =1) 
return (j, 21(j, l+y, 2+1)), - 
/*This is the main program*/ 
maino 
FILE *fpdl, - FILE 
. 
1j7d2; FILE *fpcB; FILE *fp(14; 
FILE *lj)sl, - FILE ýffisZ- FILE FILE *fps4; . 
1j)s3, 
FILE FILE *fpp2, - FILE FILE *fpp4. - fpl)3. 
FIL E *fp: 
im lest=l, 1=0, check=O, nwn_run=1000, il, i2jlj2; 
double xl, x2, x3, - 
prinýft'Tlease inpul runjium. - y: 
fi)(11 =fi)pen("resulldl. clca", -esulld2. dat d2", "ivy; 
Ivy; 
jj)s3 =. fi)pen("resuhs3. dal ". "it, "), - jj). 4 =1bpen("resulls4. dal "ivy: 
1j)p I =fi)17el I Cres 11111) 1. da/ ". "ir "), - . 
lj)p2 =. fi)j7en("resnllp2. dat "it, 
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fp=fopen("rtest. dat", 
/*This is to calculate the initial choice probabilities*/ 
. 
for (i=O; t<2; i++)( 
for 6f=Oj<2, j++) 
XI =(lij[ij&]-sy[ij8j; 
if ((, cl < 0)&&(fabs(xl) >epsilon)) 
qýi[i]Lfj=(sij[ijg]l(beta[i]gj*dij[ijo])); 
ýf ((-cl>O)l I (fabs(-cl)< =epsilon)) 
q ýffi]fj] e ta[i]a]); 
fin- (i=O, -i<2; i++) 
for (i=Oj<2, j++) 
proi[i]&]=probabilily-IjpeO,, 
for (i=O, -i<2, -i++)[ 
proi[i]=probabilitj, -Iocao, - 
/*This 'While' sentence is used to control the simulation times, which represents the 
time that the market will take to return to equilibrium*/ 
while West ! =O)&&(check<nwn-run)) t 
. 
for (i=O. -i<2: i++) 11 
Jim- (i=O, -. i<2, j++) I 
x2 
ýf ((. -c2< 0) 11 Nih. v(. v2) <epsilon)) 
b[i]&]= 
bela[i][j] *dýffi][j]; 
else 
hlillil= 
hei a[i][j] *ýv fi[i][i]; 
c[i][i]= iI ns i[i][j] *(sign It 
x2=0, - 
. 
fi)i- (i2=0,: i2<2.. -i2++) 
x2+=gwna[i][ . 
j2][O]*t4j[i]jj2]. 
x3=0: 
. 
fi)i-(il=O: il<2, -il++) I 
fiw (i Oj I< 2j + 
2()ql 
x3 + =gama[iJ]8l][1j *dij[iljalj; 
((d+x3) *proi[i]+x2) *proj[ijoj- 
(gciiiia[i]Lfj[Oj+gaiýia[i][i][1]) Vij[i], U]; 
for (i=O, -i<2, -! ++) ( 
, 
for 0=0, -i<2, j++) 
x2 =dij[ij[j]-sij[ij&]; 
pffi181+ =kaifl1g] *x2 
dýjfllfjj+ =a[i1[jj-b[i], Uj, - 
sffijg]+ =c[ijLfj-b[ijgj; 
x2 =dij[i][j]-sij[ij8j; 
if ((-c2<0) && (fabs(x2)>el)silon)) 
qij[i]81=sU[ij&ll(beta[i]o]*dU[i], U]); 
if ((x2> 0) 11 (fabs(x2) < =epsilon)) 
qy[i], Uj= I/ (beta[i]flj), - 
. 
for (i=O, -i<2; i++) 
for (j=Oi<2, j++) 
proj[i]fij=probabilily_tjpeO; 
. 
for (i=O, -i<2; i++) I 
1)i-oi[ij=17i-obabilitj, 
-locciO. 
- 
/*This is to test if tile market achieves in equilibrium*/ 
lesl=o; 
. 
for (i=O: i<2: i++) 
fin- (i=Oj<2, j++) I 
xl= 
x3= 
X2= 
I> 1) 11 (. v 2> 1) 1! (x3 > 1)) 
fe. vl=tesl+l, - 
prilqle "lest= %&II ". 
/* Saving this grOLIP ofshmilation resLilts*/ 
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t++; 
system ("clear'); 
prinif("1= %Ai", t); 
fprii7tf(fp, "%&n ", test); 
for (i=O; i<2; i++) ( 
for 6=0, j<2, j++) 
if (i==o &&i==O)( 
fprhqf(fpdl, "%Iýn ", diffijoj); 
fiprintf(fpsl, 'Won", sij[ijgj); 
fprinýf(fpp 1, "%16n ", pij[i]Lf]); 
ff (i==o &&j==I)If 
fprinýf(fpdZ "%Uln dij[i]o]); 
fp riii tf(fps 2, "%0ns U[ijol); 
fprh7If(fpp2, "%ýýn ", pij[i]8]); 
if (i==] &&i==O)( 
fprinif(fpd3, "%On", dij[i]Lf]); 
fprinif(fps3, "%Ijln ", sij[i]g]); 
fprintf(fpp3, "%Uln ", piffi]o]); 
ff (i==l &&j==I)t 
fivintf(fpcI4, 'Wfin ", dij[ijLf]), - 
fprint(fps4, " %? ýn", sij[i], Y]); 
1j)rinIf(fpp4, "%Ifn ", pij[ijLf]); 
. 
check++; 
)l /*End of the 'While' sejitence*/ 
ficlosco.. )l 
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Appendix 4-6 
Simulation Case One: towards equilibrium 
This simulation is based on the nested housing submarket structure identified in 
Appendix 4-3. Some changes are: 
1. the sectoral housing submarket (SS- 11,12,21,22) characteristics are 
measured by: alfa_cons[2][2]= {(9,3), (4,1)); 
2. the neighbourhood submarket (N- 1,2) characteristics are measured by: 
beta_cons[2]= (2.5,1). 
3. the sectoral housing submarket equilibrium prices are: 
p[2][2]={(1501 11.07,91979.14), (52661.86,27301.24)1. 
The average scaled standard deviation of the submarket house prices is 0.66. 
Simulation result: housing submarket equilibrium has neighbourhood stability. 
An example is given below to show the dynamic process to equilibrium after the housing 
price in submarket- II is increased 1% from the equilibrium price. 
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Appendix 4-7 
Simulation Case Two: towards disequilibrium (1) 
The simulation is based on the nested housing submarket identified in Appendix 4-3. 
Some changes are: 
1. the sectoral housing submarket (SS-1 1,12,21,22) components are measured 
by: alfa_cons[2][2]= ff 8,4), (5,2)); 
2. the neighbourhood housing submarket (N- 1,2) components are measured by: 
beta_cons[2][2]= (2,1.6); 
3. the sectoral housing submarket equilibrium house prices are: 
p[2][2]=((127842.16,93239.64), (77031.61,51670.99)) 
The average scaled standard deviation of the submarket house prices is 0.36. 
Simulation result: housing' submarket equilibrium has bounded instability. 
An example is given below to show the dynamic process to disequilibriurn after the 
housing price in SS- II is increased I% from the equilibrium price. 
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5 The dynamic processes of the neighbourhood housing price to disequilibrium 
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Appendix 4-8 
Simulation Case Three: towards disequilibrium (2) 
This simulation is based on the nested housing submarket structure identified in 
Appendix 4-3. Some changes are: 
1. the sectoral housing submarket (SS- 11,12,21,22) characteristics are 
measured by: alfa_cons[2] [2]= {(9, S), (6,3)). 
2. the neighbourhood housing submarket (N- 1,2 ) characteristics are measured 
by: beta_cons[2]= (2,1.6). 
3. the sectoral housing submarket equilibrium house prices are: 
p[2][2]={(139606.86,105004.35), (88796.32,63435.69)) 
The average scaled standard deviation of the submarket equilibrium house price is 0.32. 
Simulation result: housing submarket equilibrium has instablilit . 
An example is given below to show the dynamic process to disequilibrium. after the 
housing price in SS-I I is increased 1% from the equilibrium price. 
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2. The dynamic processes of the submarket housing prices to disequilibrium. 
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3. The dynamic process of* the subinarket housing demands to disequilibrium 
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4. The dynamic processes of the submarket housing supply, to disequilibrium 
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Appendix 6-1 
Statistical Diagnoses Used in Evaluating Discret6 Choice Model 
There are three main statistical diagnoses used in evaluating discrete choice model. 
First, robustness of the coefficients. Robustness means that, if we systematically add or 
omit a variable from the model, the coefficients of the other variables will be stable. 
Second, statistical significance of the coefficients. Significance means that the 
cocfficients are statistically', significantly different from zero at a selected significant 
level (e. g. the significant probability is 5% or 10%). 
Third, model fi . Model fit represents the explanatory ability of a model. Generally, 
fitting a model to data may be regarded as a way of replacing a set of data values Y(s) 
by a set of fitted values Y (s) derived from a model involving (usually) a relatively samll 
number of parameters. In general the Y(s) will not equal the Y(s) exactly, and the 
question then arises of how discrepant they are, because, while a small discrepancy may 
be tolerable, a large discrepancy is not. 
Given N observations we can fit models to them containing up to N parameters. The 
simplest model, called the null model, has one constant value representing all the Y(s). 
The null model consigns all the variation between the Y(s) to the random components. 
At the other extreme, the full model has N parameters, one per observation, and the 
Y(s) derived from it match the data exactly. The full model consigns all the variation in 
the Y(s) to the systematic components leaving none for the random components. 
However, in reality, the full model is too ideal and unavailable. 
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In discrete choice models (e. g. the MNL, or the NMNL models), the comparison 
between the observed and the predicted values is based on the concept of the Log- 
Likelihood. The definition and calculation of Likelihood are given in Hosmer 1989. 
The Restricted Likelihood (LO) is calculated from the Null model with no parameters, 
and represents the discrepancy of the observations (dependent variables). The restricted 
log-likelihood (1o) is: 
lo=log(LO) 
The likelihood (Lp)of a logistic function (e. g. the NMNL model or the MNL model) is 
calculated from a model which includes some parameters. The log-likelihood is: 
lp=log(Lp) (2) 
The difference between Io and Ip represents the explanatory ability of those parameters. 
For a given group of observations, this difference is defined as 
x2= -2(lo - lo) 
which follows X' distribution. 
The larger X2 is , the higher the explanatory ability of the model will 
be. However, the 
2 
value of X will automatically increase as the sample size increases. This creates 
difficulties in model comparison if the models are calibrated based on different sample 
sizes. 
2 33 8 
Another statistical diagnosis, which is called Pseudo- R2, is developed for evaluating 
model fit by likelihood. The definition is given by Equations (4) to (5). 
Pseudo -R 2=_ 
R (4)' 
max(R2) 
2 
Lo 
2) 
2 
R) and max(R (Lo)" (5) 
LD 
0: 5 Pseudo -R2<1 (6) 
10. 
From the definition, we can find that larger Pseudo- R' represents a higher explanatory 
ability. For example, Pseudo - R2=0.6 means that the model can explain 60% of the 
data Y(s). As the influence of the sample size n is diminishing from Pseudo -R2, this 
statistical diagnosis provides a common basis to compare the model fit. 
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Appendix 6-2 
Questionnaire 
The structure of this questionnaire includes three sections 
The first section of the questionnaire is designed to obtain the personal information of 
the head of a household. A household is defined as a group of people who are living in 
the same dwelling, sharing facilities and having a meal tog-^ther at least once a day 
and/or a single person living alone. The decision of whether or not to buy a dwelling is 
made under the full consideration of the whole household. Although the whole 
household is treated as one unit when buying a house, the function of the head of a 
household is very important. The head of a household is defined as the person or group 
of people in a household who is/are the main bread-winner(s) for the household. 
According to this definition, each household can have more than one person as the head. 
The definitions of the household and the head of a household were provided to the 
respondents in the covering letter. From the survey result, only 1% of the households 
were unhappy with this definition and claimed that they didn't have a single head of the 
household. 
The second section of the questionnaire is designed to obtain information on the 
dwelling and the household as a whole. 
The information on dwelling choice includes: 1. the key dwelling components (revealed 
preference infon-nation), 2. the non-key dwelling components (both revealed and stated 
prcfcrcncc information). 
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The first group of information is used to calibrate a buyer's choice behaviour for a 
submarket. In particular, the physical neighbourhood condition is obtained from the 
respondent's personal judgement about his/her neighbourhood. 
The second group of the information is used to record the buyer's choice behaviour for 
those non-key components. The respondents were asked to rank their stated (desired) 
preferences for the non-key dwelling components and the calibration is based on both 
real choice and the desired choice to increase the predictive ability. 
In order to help the respondents answer the income question, the income was classified 
into nine groups. 
The third section of the questionnaire is designed to obtain some supplementary 
information on housing choice. This information is stated preference information and 
will be used to explain housing choice behaviour in Chapter VII 
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Housing Demand Survey Questionnaire 
Section I The following questions refer to the HEAD of 
household. If you have two or more heads of 
household, please give the details for any one 
(Please tick BOXES where appropriate) 
1. Sex: 1: ) 1: 1 
2. Marital Status: C3 Married/living with long-term partner 
C3 single 
0 Widow/Widower 
0 Divorced/Separated 
3. Age: 0 Under 25 Cl 25-29 Cl 30-44 
1: 1 45-59 0 60-65 El over 65 
4. Is the household head currently 
13 full-time employed 0 part-time employed 
El self-employed unemployed 
CD retired 
5. If full/part-time employed or self-employed: 
0 which of the followings best describes his/her job ? 
11 managerial/supervisory 
13 professional person 
13 skilled worker 
ED semi-skilled worker 
CD other, please state 
0 in which Town or city is the job located? 
* how does he/she get to work (MAIN FORM OF TRANSPORT): 
0 car/van D train E3 bus C3 walk/bike 
0 how long does he/she USUALLY take to get to work: 
7-lunder 30 min. between 30-60 min. 
between 60-90 min. over 90 min. 
Please turn to the next page 
6. Highest educational qualifications to date: (for the head) 
0 Degree or similar academic qualification 
C3 Professional qualification 
0 'A'Levels or Highers 
C3 101 Levels or 101 Grade 
0 No educational qualifications. 
0 Other, please state 
Section I[[ The following questions refer to YOUR HOUSEHOLD 
AS A WHOLE. Please give the details. 
1. In which of the following categories does your 
HOUSEHOLD TOTAL ANNUAL INCOME(C) fall (Before income tax )? 
10,000 or less C1 10,000-15,000 13 15,000-20,000 1: 1 
20,000-25,000 0 25,000-30,000 13 30,000-35,000 11 
35,000-40,000 0 40,000-50,000 0 over 50,000 
2. Please give a description of the members who presently live 
in your home: (don't forget to include yourselfj please) 
IR03E I 
Number of adults (aged 25 or over) 
Number of young people (aged 16-25) 
1 Number of young people 
(aged under 16) 
Inny 2 
Number of people in full-time employment 
Number of people in part-time employment 
3. Before you bought your present dwelling, where did you live? 
Cloutside Lothian Region 
a shared dwelling with friends or relatives in Lothian Region 
0 your own dwelling in Lothian Region 
i. ] a privately rented dwelling in Lothian Region 
r-11 
-a council/housing association dwelling 
in Lothian Region 
Please turn to the next page 
4. How many times have you ever bought a dwelling? 
0 one 1: 1 two Cl three 0 four Cl five or more 
5. Please estimate when your dwelling was built: 
D before 1919 (incl. 1919) 
0 between 1920-1945(incl. 1945) 
C between 1946- 1959(incl. 1959) 
0 1960 or later 
CI don't know. 
6. The dwelling is a: 0 Detached house 
0 Semi-detached house 
0 Terraced house 
El Flat with own main entrance 
C] Flat with shared main entrance 
7. Please state the TOTAL number of ROOMS in your dwelling 
(incl. bathrooms and kitchen) 
8. Please tick all the attributes your dwelling has: 
Number Dwelling attribute Tick 
1 Spacious kitchen with a dining area 
2 Garage 
3 own priVate parking area (not a garage) 
4 Central heating 
5 Second bathroom/toilet 
6 Garden 
9. From the above SIX housing attributes, please choose the 
THREE MOST IMPORTANT to you, taking account of what you can 
afford. They NEEDN'T NECESSARILY be in your present 
dwelling. 
Number 
The MOST important attribute is 
The SECOND MOST important attribute is 
" The THIRD MOST important attribute is 
Please turn to the next page 
10. Please use a tick to describe the physical condition of your 
neighbourhood: (e. g. state of neighbourhood housing etc. ) 
C3 Excellent 
13 Improving 
0 Sound 
0 Deteriorating 
CD Poor 
11. Please answer the following questions. If you are not 
sure for some questions, please put 1*1 in the blanks. 
" How long do you USUALLY take to reach the main 
SHOPPING AREA which you MOSTLY use? 
About minutes. 
" By what TRANSPORT METHOD do you get there? 
41 How CLOSE is your dwelling to the NEAREST PUBLIC 
TRANSPORT FACILITY, if WALKING? 
(e. g. bus stop or train station) 
About minutes. 
41 If you have school age children, how long do they 
USUALLY need to get to SCHOOL? 
About minutes. 
10 By what TRANSPORT METHOD do they get there? 
Please turn to the next page 
Section III Based on your present CIRCUMSTANCES (i. e. your 
present job, income and family size), please RANK the following 
housing attributes in each box, in order of importance to you 
when choosing a dwelling. Please do so whether you are currently 
choosing a dwelling or not. 
Box 1 1=The most important attribute, 
2=The second most important attribute, 
3=The third most important attribute, 
4 =The fourth most important attribute. 
RANK Dwelling attribute 
close to the head of the household's place of work 
or potential work 
Good transport links (e. g. bus, train, motorways) 
Good neighbourhood (e. g. neighbourhood amenities 
or state of neighbourhood housing) 
I 
A dwelling of better quality (e. g. more rooms, or 
in better condition) J 
Box 2 1=The most important attribute, 
2=The second most important attribute, 
I=Thp third most imnortant attribute. 
RANK Dwelling attribute 
Type of dwelling (e. g. house or flat) 
Size of dwelling (e. g. more or bigger rooms) 
jAge 
of dwelling 
Box 3 1=The most important attribute, 
7=Thn npnnnd mnnt imnnrtant attribute. 
RANK Housing attribute 
Physical condition of the neighbourhood (e. g. state 
of neighbourhood housing etc. ) 
Good neighbourhood amenities (e. g. shops, 
schools, leisure amenities) 
it 
Please turn to the next page 
If you would be willing to be interviewed further on this 
topic, please tick this box ED and give your phone number 
or your address 
Please post your completed form in the envelope provided (no 
stamp required). 
Thank you very much for your time 
Yours sincerely 
Mrs Yong Tu 
Research student 
Department of Industrial and Social Studies 
Napier University 
Appendix 7-1 
Maps and Submarket Classification in Lothian Region 
Map One: The Lothian Region Private Owner-Occupier Housing Market Boundary 
Map Two: Lothian Region Neighbourhood Housing Submarket Classification 
Map Three: Edinburgh Neighbourhood Housing Submarket Classification 
Map Four: Lothian Region Shopping Hierarchy 
Map Fivc: Edinburgh Shopping flicrarchy 
Map Six: Lothian Region High School Distribution 
Map Seven: Edinburgh High School Distribution 
Table 1: Lothian Region and Edinburgh High School Quality 
Sources of all the above except Maps Two and Three arc from Lothian Region 
Structure Plan 1993. Maps Two and Three are drawn on the basis of Register of 
Sasine data and ESPC data. 
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Table 2 
Sub- 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 
Markct 
1 E29,52 E36,99 L44,65 E42,86 E16,95 L 16,95 E33,00 
8 6 8 7 0 0 0 
(77) (23) (40) (6) (3) (2) (3) 
2 06,60 03,92 L57,94 E44,83 00,22 00,22 09,85 
4 6 6 3 6 6 6 
(19) (34) (9) (8) (10) (12) (10) 
3 08,65 E38,21 L50,00 L45,01 E43,70 E43,70 L41,58 
5 4 0 3 4 4 3 
(5) (17) (1) (2) (13) (6) (3) 
4 L40,50 L40,00 L63,39 L83,33 00,00 E30,00 E29,00 
8 0 4 3 0 0 0 
(11) (5) (21) (1) (1) (1) (1) 
5 L4 3,3 8 L48,88 E71,69 L68,80 06,24 06,24 L46,50 
4 4 7 7 8 8 0 
(14) (16) (14) (7) (8) (13) (4) 
6 E35,09 L56,70 E80,98 07,05 L50,01 E50,01 L60,79 
5 7 6 7 8 8 8 
(5) (38) (11) (19) (22) (20) (15) 
7 L24,00 L60,00 E86,24 E74,73 E37,55 E37,55 E75,50 
0 0 1 5 5 5 0 
(1) (2) (5) (5) (7) (1) (1) 
8 109,32 E75,21 122,78 130,40 E75,80 L75,80 E50,87 
7 0 6 5 7 7 5 
(4) (11) (5) (21) (22) (21) (2) 
9 111,00 E75,21 L76,24 
0 0 (0) (0) (0) (0) 4 
1 (1) (23) 1 (15) 
Averag E36,22 E52,73 02,69 L84,74 E40,30 Z49,86 L54,08 
e 7 1 5 1 9 7 8 
(137) (169) (106) (69) (86) (76) (54) 
Note: 1. The number in the bracket is sample size and the sum of the sample sizes is 697. However, 
in the empirical ana4vses, 7/ 0 sample points arc, used, the extra 13 sample points are the artificial 
sample points. TheY are created in order to suil to the need ofthe model calibration (see Chapter VI). 
2. In the table. the codes II to 14,2 1 to 23 represent different neighhourhood suhmarkels which are 
inarkedinAhip Tit-oand Three. Thecodes Ito 9 represent diffcrentsectoralhotisingsuhmarkets. The 
thfinitions (? f the codes ure given below. 
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Table 2 gives the average house price (in 1989) and the sample size in each 
ncighbourhood and scctoral housing submarkct. The codes used in the table 
correspond to the codes in Maps Two and Three. 
Each of the Codes of II to 23 corresponds to the following district wards. 
II =Pilton, Muirhouse, Newhaven, Broughton, Lome, Fort Harbour, Lochend, Links, 
Haymarket, St. Giles, flolyroad, N. Ilailes, S. Ilailes, Sighthill, Moat, Stenhouse, 
Dairy, Firrhill. 
12=SW/SE. Corstorphinc, Telford, Trinity, Craigcntinny, Willowbracc, Portbcllo, 
Milton, Kaimes, Alnwickhill, Inch, Gilmerton, Niddire, Craigmillar, 
Longstone, Queensferry, Kirkliston, Baberton, Ratho, Currie, Bonnyrigg, Polton, 
Lasswade, Biliston, Musselburgh, Tranent, Wallyford, Elphinstone. 
13=Murrayfield, Dean, New Town, Stockbridge, Inverleith, Calton, Tollcross, 
Merchiston, Momingside, Sciennes, Marchmont, Prestonfield, Mayfield, Shandon. 
14=Parkgrove, NW/NE. Corstorphine, Mountcastle, Cramond, Blackhall, Colinton, 
Braidburn. 
21=Armadale, Bathgate, Blackbum, Westfield, Whitbum, Fauldhouse, Longridge, 
Livingston, East Calder, Mid Calder, West Calder, Ladywell, Pumpherston. 
22=Linlithgow, Gorebridge, Penicuik, Rosewell. 
23=11addington, North Berwick, Dunbar. 
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Each of the codes I to 9 are defined below: 
I =Flat with less than or equal to two bedrooms. 
2=Main door flat or terraced house with less than or equal to two bedrooms. 
3=Detached- / semi- detached house with less than or equal to two bedrooms. 
4=Flat with three or four bedrooms. 
5=Main door flat or terraced house with three or four bedrooms. 
6=Detached / scmi-detached house with three or four bedrooms. 
7=Flat with five or more bedrooms. 
8=Main door flat or terraced house with five or more bedrooms. 
9=Detached / semi-detached house with five or more bedrooms. 
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Appendix 7-2 
Supplementary Information 
Part One The Dynamics of House Prices in Lothian Region, Scotland and the UK 
Diagram I 
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Part Two Lothian Region 1992 Housing and Houschold Survey Results 
The information presented below includes three sections corresponding to the 
questionnaire structure: (the number in the bracket is the sample size) 
1. Socio-Economic Background of the Head of Household 
Table 1: Sex 
% Overall Stage-I Stage-Il Stage-III Stage-IV 
Male 68.8 47.5 71.6 76.4 67.4 
Female 31.2 52.5 28.4 23.6 32.6 
Total 100(677) 
, 
100(122) 
. 
100(148) 
. 
100(309) 
, 
100(98) 
Note: Stage-I=Young single households; 
Stage-ll= Young couple households without children: 
Stage-111=11ouseholds with dependent children; 
Stage-I V= Older households without children. 
Table 2: Marriage Status 
% Overall 
1 70.7 
2 19.0 
31 2.6 
4 7.7 
Total 100(679) 
Note: I =married1longterm partner, 2=single; 3=u, indowler; 4=Divorcedlseparate. 
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Table 3: Employment Status 
% Overall Stage-I Stage-II Stage-III Stage-IV 
Full-time 74.3 88.4 87.8 78.4 25.6 
Part-time 3.5 1.5 1.4 3.2 9.9 
Self- 
employed 
9.8 6.0 7.4 12.3 10.8 
Un- 
employed 
4.0 3.3 2.7 3.9 6.7 
Retired 7.1 0 0 0.3 47.0 
Student 1.3 0.8 0.7 1.9 0.0 
Total 100(681) 1 100(122) 1 100(148) 1 100(310) 1 100 (101: )] 
Table 4: Profession 
% Overall Stage-I Stage-11 Stage-III Stage-IV 
Managerial/ 27.7 25.0 32.8 31.2 12.9 
Supervisory 
Professional 43.1 50.0 47.3 44.6 24.8 
person 
Skilled 14.8 16.4 16.4 15.4 8.9 
worker 
Semi- 3.0 3.4 1.4 3.9 2.0 
skilled 
worker 
Others 11.4 5.2 2.1 4.9 51.4 
Total 100(670) 100(116) 100(148) 100(305) 100(101) 
Table 5: Transportation To Work Methods 
% Overall Stage-I Stage-11 Stage-III Stage-IV 
CarNan 62.6 52.5 71.2 72.2 32.3 
Train 2.1 3.3 4.1 1.0 1.0 
Bus 15.7 26.7 17.1 12.9 9.1 
Walk/bike 7.4 12.5 14.1 1 8.4 3.0 
Others 12.2 5.0 1 3.5 1 5.5 1 -54.6 
Total 100(674) 100(120) 1 100(146) 1 100(309) 1 100(99) 
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Table 6: Travel To Work Time 
% Overall Stage-I Stage-Il Stage-III Stage-IV 
< 30 mins 60.9 70.0 59.9 66.3 34.7 
30-60 
mins 
21.0 20.8 32.0 21.2 4.1 
60-90 
mins 
4.6 4.2 4.8 4.3 6.1 
> 90 mins 1.2 0 0 2.6 0 
Varies 12.3 5.0 3.3 5.6 55.1 
Total 100(671) 1 100(120) 1 100(147) 1 100(30 100 (98)_-] 
Table 7: Highest Educational Level 
% Overall Stage-I Stagc-11 Stage-III Stage-IV 
Degree or 39.6 50.1 46.7 34.1 32.6 
equal 
Qualifica- 23.1 18.0 18.2 25.0 31.5 
tion 
'A' level 14.2 16.4 12.8 15.6 9.0 
or 
Higher 
'0' level 16.6 13.9 18.2 18.5 11.2 
or 
'O'Grade 
Others 6.5 1.6 4.1 6.8 15.7 
Total 100(667) 100(122) 100(148) 100 (308) 100 (89) 
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2. Socio-Economic Background of the Households 
Table 8: Annual Household Income Before Tax 
1992 (f) 
% Overall Stage-I Stage-11 Stage-III Stage-IV 
<10,000 11.4 14.1 2.7 8.5 31.5 
10,000- 
15,000 
14.4 28.1 4.8 10.1 26.1 
15,000- 
20,000 
18.6 29.8 11 20.9 8.7 
20,000- 
25,000 
17.7 13.2 25.3 19.2 6.5 
25,000- 
30,000 
12.5 8.3 20.0 12.1 7.6 
30,000- 
35,000 
8.1 3.3 10.3 10.1 4.4 
35,000- 
40,000 
8.4 3.3 15.8 7.8 5.4 
40,000- 
50,000 
4.1 0 5.4 5.2 3.3 
>50,000 4.8 0 6.5 
Total 100(666) 100 (121) 100 (146) 100 (307) 100(92) 
Table 9: Sources of Owner Occupier Housing Demand 
% Overall Stage-I Stage-11 Stage-III Stage-IV 
1 23.8 19.6 21.6 23.2 33.6 
2 16.0 27.1 23.0 12.3 4.0 
3 45.2 27.1 38.5 52.2 55.4 
4 9.7 21.3 13.5 5.5 3.0 
5 4.7 4.9 2.7 6.5 2.0 
others 0.6 0 0.7 0.3 2.0 
Total 100(681) 
, 
100(122) 
, 
100(148) 
. 
100(310) 
. 
100(101) 
Nole., /. Front oulside the Region, - 
2. Front the shared Divelling; 
3. Front the Lothian Region ou-ner occupier housing market; 
4. Front the Lothian Region private rental housing market; 
J. From the Lothian Region councibbousinýSr association dWelling: 
6. Others: e. g. tiedhouses. 
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Table 10: Experiences in Housing Market 
% Overall Stage-I Stage-11 Stage-III Stage-IV 
1 32.9 60.7 41.2 25.4 10.0 
2 30 27.8 37.2 29.0 25.0 
3 20.1 9.0 15.5 25.4 24.0 
4 10.6 2.5 5.4 14.0 18.0 
5 or more 6.4 0 0.7 6.2 23.0 
Total 100(677) 100(122) 100(148) 100(307) 100(100) 
Note: The code represents how matty times a housheold hm, e in, er bought a dwelling (including this 
time). 
Table 11: Dwelling Age 
% Overall Group-I Group-2 Group-3 Group4 
before 
1919 
31.5 50.0 36.5 24.5 23.8 
1920- 
1945 
11.0 7.4 9.5 12.3 13.9 
1946- 
1959 
7.1 0.8 2.0 11.6 7.9 
1960 later 50.4 41.8 52.0 51.6 54.4 
Total 100(681) 100(122) 100(148) 100(310) 100(101) 
Table 12: Dwelling Type 
% Overall Stage-I Stage-11 Stage-III Stage-IV 
Detached 20.0 3.3 13.5 27.1 27.8 
House 
Semi- 20.7 8.2 20.3 27.2 16.8 
detached 
House 
Terraced 18.7 7.4 21.6 20.6 21.8 
1 fouse 
Main 12.2 18.9 10.8 10.6 10.7 
Door Fait 
Flat 28.4 62.2 33.8 14.5 22.9 
Total 100(681) 100022) 100(148) 100(310) 100(101) 
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Table 13: Dwelling Size 
Mean Overall Stage-I Stage-11 Stage-III Stage-I 
Num. of 
Bedrooms 
3.1 1.8 2.9 2.9 3.2 
Table 14: Physical Neighbourhood Condition 
Overall Stage-I Stage-11 Stage-III Stage-IV 
Excellent 48.1 33.3 40.4 51.0 68.0 
Improving 21.3 33.3 22.6 18.6 13.0 
Sound 26.5 29.2 31.5 26.8 15.0 
Detcriorat 3.1 1.7 4.8 2.6 4.0 
Poor 1.0 12.5 0.7 0.9 0 
Total 100(672) 1 100(120) 100(146) 100(306) 100(100) 
Table 15: Time To Shopping Area 
Mean Overall Stage-I I Stage-Il I Stage-III I Stage-11 
Minutes 9.3 8.2 110.1 19.4 19.4 
!d 
Table 16: Time to School 
Mean OveraH Stage-I Stage-11 I Stage-III I Stage-I 
Minutes 5.74 --- 1534 1 --- 
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Table 17: Non-kcy Dwelling Components RP Preference 
% Overall Stage-I Stage-11 Stage-III Stage-IV 
Large 
Kitchen 48.3 33.3 48.0 53.1 52.0 
Central 
Heating 84.6 64.2 84.5 89.6 94.0 
Private 
Garden 74.6 38.3 68.2 89.6 81.0 
Garage 
35.6 14.2 29.1 43.0 48.0 
Private 
Parking 45.9 34.2 43.2 51.1 48.0 
Second 
Bathroom 
- - 
25.6 5.8 17.6 33.7 36.0 
[ AI 1 (677) (120) (148) (309) (100) 
3. Stated Housing Choice 
Table 18: Stated Preference of Neighbourhood vs Dwelling 
The most important component 
% Overall Stage-I Stagc-11 Stage-III Stage-IV 
Close to 8.5 13.2 8.8 6.2 9.7 
work 
Place 
Good 9.3 9.1 6.1 8.2 18.5 
Transport 
Links 
Good 44.8 44.6 39.5 47.0 44.9 
Neighbour 
-hood 
Better 37.4 33.1 45.6 38.6 26.9 
quality of 
dwelling 
Total 100(672) 100(121) 100(147) 100(306) 1 100(98) 
Note: The ineanbkq of the percentagefigures is, for example, overall 44.8% households out of 672 
housheoldv think that 'Good neighhourhood Condition'is the most important component to he 
considered compured with the other three contopnents. However. the survey shows that some 
respondentsfind it is (111ficult to compare 'neur to the work place' with others. This question leads to to 
. -ionte iyiivsnderstundhýq. 
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Table 19: Stated Preference for Dwelling 
The Most Important Component 
% Overall Stage-I Stage-11 Stage-III Stage-IV 
Type 45.1 31.4 45.2 42.3 70.8 
Size 50.5 62.8 48.6 55.7 20.8 
Age 4.4 5.8 6.2 2.0 8.4 
Total 100(668) 1 100 121) 1 100(146) 1 100(305) 1 100 (96): ] 
Note: The meaning of the percentagefigures is, for example. overall 45.1 % households out of 668 
housheolds think that 'Dwelling t)pe'is the most important component to be considered compared 
with the other two comopnents. 
Table 20: Stated Preference for Neighbourhood Condition 
The Most Important Componct 
% Overall Stage-I Stage-Il Stage-III Stage-IV 
Good 70.0 71.1 76.7 66.3 69.8 
Physical 
Neighbou- 
rhood 
Good 30.0 28.9 23.3 33.7 30.2 
Neighbour 
-hood 
Amenties 
Total 100 (669) 1100 (121) 1100 (146) 1100 (306) 1100 
Note: The meaning of the percentagefkgures is, for example, overall 70% households out of 669 
housheolds think that 'Goodphysical neighhourhood'is the most important component to be 
considered compared with 'Good neighbourhood amenties'. 
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Table2 1: Stated Preferences: the most Important Non-key Dwelling Component 
% Overall Stage-I Stage-11 Stage-III Stage-IV 
Large 31.0 37.4 32.5 26.7 36.0 
Kitchen 
Central 48.6 46.9 51.3 48.5 47.0 
Heating 
Private 15.1 9.6 14.2 19.5 9.0 
Garden 
Garage 2.1 5.2 0 1.0 3.0 
Private 1.2 0.9 2.0 1.3 1.0 
Parking 
Second 2.0 0 0 3.0 4.0 
Bathroom 
All I 100(664) 100(115) I 100(146) I 100(303) 1 100 
(100) 
Note: The meaning ofthepercentagefigures is, for example, overall 31% households out of 664 
housheolds think that 'Large kitchen'is the most important component to be considered compared with 
the otherfive comopnents. 
Appendix 7-3 
Statistical Software Package: LIMDEP 6.0 
Limdep is a statistical software package, which is very good at calibrating discrete 
choice model. 
This appendix gives the data structure required by the Limdcp discrete choice 
modelling program (see Chapter 41 in Limdcp 6-0). The data in the table corresponds 
to only one sample point. Each raw represents one sectoral housing submarket 
denoted by 'SMKT'. Each column represents one variable. 'Dep' is the dependent 
variable with T denoting the submarket chosen by this individual and '0' denoted the 
submarkcts which were not chosen. 'Indj' and Indi' are the variables converted from 
'Dep". This coding is required by the procedure. 'Dprice' is the average sectoral 
submarket house price. 
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INCOME SMKT Indj ýIndi DEP ýDPRICE iTYPE2 JYPE3 ISIZE 
12500 111 1 -2 1 29528ý 0 
12500 112 0 -2 0 36604.73 01 1 
12500 113 0 -2 0 38655.19; oý 11 1 
----12500- 
114 0 -2 0 40507.731 oý oý 2 
12500 115 0 -2 0 43383.92 oý 2 
12500 116 0 -2 0 35095.19 01 l! 2 
12500 117 0 -2 0 24000. oý 0e 3 
12500 118 0 -2 0 1093271 lý 01 3 
12500 119 0 1 0 1110001 0 ji 3 
12500 1- 21 -3 -2 0 36996.21 ý 
6, 
' 01 1 
12500 lý2 -3 -2 0 33926.35! 11 
12500 123 -3 -2 0 38213.69 o! 
12500 124 -3 -2 0 41340 oý oý 2 __ 12 5ýd- 
- 
i-2 5 
-3 -2 0 48884.12 1 0 2 
li5oo---- - i-26 -3 -2 0 56i07.12 0; i 2 
12500 127 .3 -2 0 60000 0 0 3 -1 -i -8 -3 -2 0 75210 1 0 3 13566 -3 0 0 75210 0 1 3 
1 250j- 1 ii 0 44658.28 0 0 1 
125 Dö- 13-2- -3 -2 0 57946.89 1 0 1 - 1250Ö 133 -3 -2' 0 50000 0 1 1 i MOO-- -3 -2 0 63394.42 0 0 2 1-2566 135 -3 -2 0 71697 1 0 2 
1 MOO- 136 -3 -2 0 80986.17 0 1 2 
12500 137 -3 -2 0 86241.39 0 0 3 
, u66- 138 -3 -2 0 122786.2 1 01 3 _f2 5M 139 -3 0 0 140000 0 1 3 i25 60-- 141 -3 -2 0 42866.67 0 0 1 
12500 142 -3 -2 0 44832.87 1 0 1 
1 i500 143 -3 -2 0 45013 0 1 1 
1 2W6 144 -3 -2 0 83333 0 0 2 
f2500- - ii- -2 0 68806.71 1 0 2 
12500- 1467 -3 -2 0 77057 0 1 2 
12500, 147-- 3--'- - --2-- 0 74735.2 0 0 3 
12-500' 148- - 130405 1 0 3 
12500 149 --: 3ý 140000 0 1 3 
1M00 211 -3 -2' 0 18050 0 0 1 
12500' 212' 0 27279 1 0 
f2500' _i13'- -3 -2 0 34236.92 0 1 1 
1M00' 214 -: i -2 0 39950 01 . 0 2 
12500-- -21 - 9--- 0 31431.25 1 0 2 
-1 MOO 2167 ---- -3 -2 0 38545 0 1 2 
12500' 217-- 40056.42 0 0 3 
12500' 218* 0 57946.08 1 0 3 
12500' 21-9'- -3 
6 - 60000 0 1 3 
12500' 221' -3- -2 16950 0 0 1 12500 2 i2' -3* --2 0 30225.83 1 0 1 
12500- 223 -3' -2' 
--c ýä704.32-- 0 t 1 
12560' -- -22,4- -ä- -2- 
6 30000 01 2 
l 2500« 225' -3- -2* 
6- -ä-E -248.23 1 0ý 2 
_ 127506- -- -226-- -ä- --2'- 
---ä 018.05 0 1 2 
- 12566- - --- - N7- --- - - -3* 
-- --2'- - --0 37555 0 0ý 3 
1M00' 228' -i- --2' 
---6 5807.32 1 0 3 
12560 N9 3 -2-, 0 80000 0 1 
i 
_ 12500 . 231 -ä- 
6 - 33000 0 0 1 
12500' - 2ý2' --- -- --3- 
- --- 
-2- 
-, -- 39855.5 11 oý 1- 
12500' 233 -3 -2 0 41583.32 0 1 1 
12500* 234' -3- -- - -2- 
0 -- 29000 0 0ý 2 
12500' 235' -3' 
--- 
-2* 
- d' - U- -Z6 o( 6 06 1 01 2 
12500- 236' -3' -2' 
6' 60798.39 0 1 2 
12500' 237' -3' -2* 0 
- --- -0 0 3 
12500 238' -3' -2* 0' 
- 50875'- 3 
12500 239 -3 -2 0 76244.73 0 1 
210 
A GE 
- 
VEC2 VEC3 NPNC NNAM NSCH OTW NVEC2 NVEC3 
. ei 0 1 1 3 0.07 1 0 
3 0.07 1 0 
0 0 1 3 0.07 1 0 
0.07 1 0 
3 0.07 1 0 
0 
- 
3 0.07 1 0 
0 0.07 1 0 
0 0 1 3 0.07 1 0 
-- -------- 
0.07 1 0 
2.57 0 2 0.162 1 0 
3.12 -2 0.162 1 0 
0.162 1 0 
0.162 1 0- 1 
0 2- 0.162 1 0 1 
0 1 
3 0 
- ' - 
0.162 1 0 1 
0 2 2' 0 
3 
* 
1 
*- ýo - 
2 
' 
2 0.162 1 0 1 
i. 98 
--- '- -- 
0 
-- * -, -" 
l 
* 
2 
-- 
-Y 1 1 0 
1.66 
- ' 
0 
- 
ä 
* 
2 
- * -, -- 
1 1- 0 
4 
- *- 
o ö i -3 1 1 0 
1. 9 1- 0.25 1 l' 0 
. 57 - -, -- - 
1 
-- -' 
0 2 3 0.25 1 1 0 
1 Ö 2' 3 0.25 1 1 . 
2.2 0 0 0.25 
- 
1 1 0 
0 2 3 --0-. 2-5 1 1 0 
2 0 0 2 3 0.25 1 1 0 
0 0 3 3 0. 1 0 0 
0.179 1 0 0 
4 0 0 3 3 
- 
0.179 1 0 0 
' 
0 
- 
3 01 0 
i. 43 1 3 0.179 1 0 0 
* , - * ' 
3- - i9 1 0 - 6 
3.2 
' 
0 0 
' 
3 
* 
3' * 0 
i. 43 
« - 
l 
* 
3 
»* 
3 0. iii Ö-- -- 6 
2.5 
' 
d 0 3 37 ' 0.179 1 0 0 
4 
» 
1 0.087 2 1 
' 
o 1'- 2 1 
3 . 
69 
- 
0- 
, 
l" 0.087 2 1 0 
4 
, * 
0 
, 
0.087 2 1 0 
i. j8 
_ 
0 1 0.087 2 1 0 
i91 
' , » 
6di- 2 1 0 
2.57 
* 
0 
* 
0 
* 
1 -2- ------ 0 
3.86 
' 
0 
, 
l 
, 
l' -, i -« 2 1 0 
4 
' 
0 
, 
0 
* 
1 - 0 
2 
' 
0 0 
, 
2' 1- 0 
3.75 1 0 2' - 1' *-- -b. -- 1 0 
3.83 
' 
0 
, 
0 
, 
2 1 
l 
' 
0 0 2" 1, - 0 
2.9 2 
* 
1 0, 
- 
2 2 1 0 
4 
' 
0 
* 
i 
* 
2' f - 0.17 2 1 0 
4 0 0 2* . - l* 2 1- 0 
2.86 
. 
0 1 
* 
- 2 1 0.17 2 1 0 
ä 
' , 
d 
- 
0.17 2 1- 0 
l 0 
' 
0 
* 
3* 1- - -'- -6. ý Ö-2- 2 0 -6 
2.7 l 0 3* l ' 0 
3 0 0 3 1 0. 0 0 
l 0 
, 
0 3 1 N2 0 0 
2.5 0 0, 3' l' 0*. 202*--- -"2*--, -- 
3.67 0 1 3 1 0.202 2 0 0 
4 0 0* 3 l' 0.202' 2* . 'ä .- . -- -- 0 
2.5 0 0 3 l 0.202 2 0 0 
2.93 0 1 3 1 0.202 2 0 0 
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Appendix 7-4 
The Definitions of the Independent Variables 
Table I 
Sectoral Housing Submarket 
Variable Names Variable Definitions 
HRPI The ratio of average sectoral submarket house price to 
household annual income. This is a continuous variable. 
VEC The marketability of a sectoral housing submarket. 
It is measured by Low, Middle and High three 
levels defined in (Section 7.3). 
The dummy variables are: 
VECI VEC2 VEC3 VEC 
000 Low 
011 Middle 
001 High 
TYPE The dummy variables of dwelling type components. 
TYPEI TYPE2 TYPE3 
Detached- 010 
semi-detached 
Main door flat or 001 
Terraced house 
Flat 000 
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SIZE The average size of the dwellings in each sectoral 
submarket. It is measured by the total number of 
bedrooms in a dwelling. This number is equal to the total 
number of rooms-the number of kitchens - the number 
of bathrooms-1. The average size is converted to an ordinal 
variable. 
Size=1 if the number of bedrooms is 2 or below; 
Size=2 if the number of bedrooms is 3 or 4; 
Size=3 if the number of bedrooms is 5 or over. 
AGE The average age of the dwellings in each sectoral 
submarket. This is an ordinal variable: 
1= before 1919; 
2=between 1920-1945 
3=between 1946-1959 
4=after 1960 
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Table 2 
Neighbourhood Housing Submarket 
Variable Names Variable Definitions 
NRPI Average neighbourhood house price to household income. 
This is a continuous variable. 
NVEC The marketability of a neighbourhood housing submarket 
It is measured by Low, Middle and High three levels defined 
in (Section 7.3). The dummy variables are: 
NVECI NVEC2 NVEC3 NVEC 
0 0 0 Low 
0 1 1 Middle 
0 0 1 High 
NNAM Neighbourhood amenities is described by an ordinal variable: 
I =near to the local shopping centre only; 
2=near to the district shopping centre; 
3=near to the regional shopping centre. 
NPNC Physical neighbourhood, condition is measured by the average 
rate of the buyers' assessment of their physical 
neighbourhood condition in a neighbourhood submarket. 
This variable is an ordinal variable and constructed by the 
respondents' rating: 
I =Sound; 
2=lmproving; 
3=Excellent. 
NSCII The secondary school quality of a neighbourhood. It is a 
continuous variable measured by the average percentage of 
1989-90 school leavers with '5 or more Highers' in a 
neighbourhood. 
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DTW The distance to the work place of the head of a household. it is 
measured by an ordinal variable. Lothian Region housing' 
market is divided into five locations: 
a=Edinburgh, 
b=Midlothian (Code 22 in MapTwo of Appendix 7-1), 
c=Linlithgow (Cpde 22 in Map Two of Appendix 7-1), 
d=West Lothian (Code 21 in Map Two of Appendix 7-1) 
e=East Lothian (Code 23 in Map Two of Appendix 7-1) 
The ordinal varable is constructed by: 
Niving and working in the same location; 
2=living in a location adjacent to the location of the work place. 
If working in 'a', the adjacent locations are V to V; 
If working in V, the adjacent location is 'a'; 
If working in V, the adjacent location is 'a' and V; 
If working in V, the adjacent location is 'a' and V; 
If working in V, the adjacent location is 'a'. 
3=Otherwise. 
If working in W, but living in location V or V or'e'; 
If working in V, but living in location Wor V; 
If working in V, but living in location V or'e'; 
If working in V, but living in location V or'c'ord'. 
Note: 1. the coding of 'DTVis hased on the geographic distance as well as thefacilities of the 
transport link hetween the locations (Lothian Regiona Structure Plan 1992). 
2. in Limdep discrete choice modelling procedure, an ordinal variable can be treated as a 
dumm 
*y variable or a continuous variable. 
In this study, both ways were used The results showed that 
treating it as a continuous variable procided a good modelfit 
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Table 3 
A Dwelling Given A Housing Sector 
Variable names Variable Descriptions 
KITCHEN Kitchen Type. - 
KIT=I, representing large kitchen with a dinning area 
KIT=O, representing small kitchen with a separate 
dinning room. 
CH Central Heating. 
Cfl=l, a dwelling with central heating. 
CH=O, a dwelling without central heating. 
GARDEN Private Garden. 
GARD=I, a dwelling with a private garden. 
GARD=O, a dwelling without a private garden. 
They are dummy variables. 
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